Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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R. Suzanne Smith hired Michael Ead to construct an addition onto her home. After receiving notice that the construction was in violation of the local zoning ordinance, Smith ceased construction and decided to sell the property. Raymond Wells and his wife offered to purchase the property on the condition that they remove the addition. Wells enlisted Plaintiff to help demolish the newly constructed addition. While working at the site, Plaintiff fell from the roof and was injured. Plaintiff sued Smith and Ead (together, Defendants), alleging negligence, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment as to (1) Plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring against Smith, as Smith had no duty to ensure that what Ead built would be safe for a demolition; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims of negligent design, construction, and inspection against Ead, as Ead did not have a legal duty to make the roof safe for dismantling. View "Wells v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff allegedly suffered from chronic headaches, which she treated with the medication Percocet, while enrolled in the nursing program at the Community College of Rhode Island (CCRI). Plaintiff filed a disability discrimination action against CCRI, the Board of Governors for Higher Education, and two individuals (collectively, Defendants), alleging that she had been dropped from the nursing program at CCRI because of her disability. The jury reached a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) admitting into evidence a medical report prepared by a neurologist who treated Plaintiff after she left the college; and (2) excusing a juror on the fourth day of trial due to concerns about his objectivity. View "Thornley v. Cmty. College of R.I." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in order to purchase certain real property. To secure payment obligations under the note, Plaintiffs executed a mortgage on the property. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for the original lender, assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), which was then authorized to service the note for Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). When Plaintiffs failed to make timely payments, OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs filed an action against MERS and OneWest seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to OneWest was invalid and to quiet title to the property. OneWest eventually held a sale, and the property was sold to Fannie Mae. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) MERS validly assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest, and therefore, OneWest had the statutory power of sale; (2) Plaintiffs defaulted under the terms of the note; and (3) Fannie Mae, as the buyer at the foreclosure sale, held the record title to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed such that granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was appropriate. View "Breggia v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

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Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency (PRA) filed a complaint against Patricia Brown alleging that the PRA had entered into an agreement with Defendant to loan her $100,000 toward the purchase and maintenance of a classic diner and that Defendant had breached the agreement by defaulting on repayment of the advance and refusing to repay the loan. Defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the PRA on its book account claim and also rendered a verdict in favor of Defendant on her negligent misrepresentation counterclaim. The PRA subsequently filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion for a new trial on Defendant's counterclaim. The trial justice denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law but granted the motion for a new trial, concluding that the damages awarded to Defendant was against the fair preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not timely appeal the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the trial justice did not err in granting the PRA’s motion for a new trial and to set aside the jury verdict on Defendant’s counterclaim. View "Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency v. Brown" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of felony assault, one count of simple assault, and one count of first-degree child abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice (1) did not abuse his discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance in order for the defense to investigate genetic-testing results that were provided to the defense during jury selection in the second trial; and (2) did not err or violate Defendant’s right to present a defense by prohibiting Defendant’s father from testifying in Defendant’s case-in-chief. View "State v. Verry" on Justia Law

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In Nye I, before final judgment entered awarding a judgment parcel to Plaintiff, Defendants transferred via quitclaim deed to their family trust a property that the judgment parcel was located within. In Nye II, the Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the transfer of the disputed property. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the transfer of the disputed property to the trust before final judgment entered in Nye I served to render the final judgment a nullity. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud claims and dismissed Plaintiff’s quiet title claim on the basis that Plaintiff was ordered to, and failed to, comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 34-16-2 by submitting an abstract of title or similar report concerning the status of the title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice was correct in granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s fraud and negligence claims and in dismissing Plaintiff’s quiet title claim. View "Nye v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was seriously injured in a collision while he was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned by the insureds of Defendant. Defendant obtained a judgment for money damages but subsequently settled with the insureds in exchange for an assignment of claims the insureds had against Defendant. Plaintiff then filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Defendant to pay the entire judgment from the underlying tort action (count one) and a declaration that Defendant was liable for prejudgment interest on the judgment in the underlying tort action (count two). A superior court justice granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on counts one and two. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in count one and remanded for a new trial and affirmed the judgment in count two. On remand, Plaintiff sought a calculation of prejudgment interest. The superior court granted the motion, determining that Defendant’s argument with respect to the judgment satisfied order had been waived in regards to count two. The court subsequently ordered Defendant to make payment to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed from that order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived its arguments with respect to the judgment satisfied order and that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute throughout the litigation. View "DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In 2002, Applicant was convicted for the second-degree murder of his infant daughter. In 2007, Applicant filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that newly discovered evidence required a new trial. At a hearing before a justice of the superior court, Applicant presented the testimony of Dr. Richard T. Callery, who, while he was employed with Rhode Island’s Office of State Medical Examiners, had reviewed the victim’s file. The hearing justice denied the application for postconviction relief, concluding that the newly discovered evidence was not material and would not change the verdict at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testimony of Dr. Callery did not warrant postconviction relief. View "D’Alessio v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In January 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree robbery and presented as a probation violator. In April 2006, Defendant was adjudicated a probation violator and began serving his previously suspended sentences for drug-related charges. Defendant was found guilty on both counts and sentenced in April 2009. Three years later, Defendant filed a motion for credit for time served, arguing that his sentence in the robbery case should have been reduced by the number of days that he spent incarcerated between his arrest and his sentencing. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the superior court, holding that, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-19-2, Defendant was entitled to a credit for the time he spent incarcerated between January 2006 and April 2006. View "State v. Wray" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal concerned Defendant’s third attempt to challenge his plea and sentence with a motion to reduce or correct sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial justice denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that his life sentence was illegal because he should have been convicted of manslaughter, which carries a maximum sentence of thirty years, and that the continued imposition of his purportedly illegal sentence constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment to both the federal and the state Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the hearing justice’s decision to deny the Rule 35 motion and that Defendant’s constitutional arguments had no merit. View "State v. Miguel" on Justia Law