Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Reyna Bernard purchased property and executed a promissory note in the principal amount secured by a mortgage on the property. The mortgage was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. A fire later destroyed the property. Manuel Rosario entered into an insurance adjusting agreement with an LLC providing that the LLC would assist with the adjustment of the loss in return for a percentage of the total recoverable loss. Thereafter, Bernard defaulted on the note, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to HSBC, leaving an unpaid deficiency on the note in the amount of $246,072. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA) subsequently initiated an interpleader action to determine the respective rights of the LLC, Bernard, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as agent for HSBC with regard to the insurance proceeds. The superior court found that Ocwen was entitled to the entirety of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the language contained in the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bernard and Rosario failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the insurance proceeds; and (2) the mortgage executed by Bernard was duly acknowledged as statutorily required and was therefore valid. View "R.I. Joint Reinsurance Ass’n v. Rosario" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased property from Seller, and Seller conveyed the property to Plaintiffs by deed. After the sale was finalized but before Plaintiffs were able to move into the property, Plaintiffs experienced significant flooding in the driveway, garage, and basement. The flooding and water-penetration issues persisted over the next several years. In 2010, Plaintiffs experienced extensive flooding of their property. Plaintiffs brought this action against Seller and entities involved in the sale (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. The superior court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ contract and negligence claims; but (2) the merger and disclaimer clause contained in the purchase and sales agreement was not drawn with sufficient specificity to bar Plaintiffs’ claim for fraud. Remanded. View "McNulty v. Chip" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to his son. After a trial held in 2014, the trial justice concluded that Father was unfit to parent his son. A final decree was subsequently entered terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence, in finding that DCYF had proven that Father was unfit to parent his son; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at reunification between Father and his son. View "In re Max M." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four criminal counts related to a murder committed during the course of an attempted robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment of conviction and its denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice did not improperly credit the testimony of three key witnesses; and (2) the trial justice did not err in allowing one witness to testify as to Defendant’s behavior during their romantic relationship because the testimony was relevant and only marginally prejudicial. View "State v. Virola" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in district court, Defendant was convicted of one count of simple domestic assault and one count of resisting arrest. Defendant appealed these convictions to the superior court. Immediately before the start of trial, Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the complaint of resisting arrest. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of simple domestic assault. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to one year’s probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err when he allowed into evidence the facts regarding the charge of resisting arrest. View "State v. Peltier" on Justia Law

Officer Tori-Lynn Heaton filed a grievance with the City of Cranston seeking to be allowed to retire from the Cranston Police Department at nineteen years, six months, and one day with her full twenty year pension. The City denied the grievance. Because Officer Heaton deferred her retirement until she had served the full twenty years, the issue in dispute at the arbitration was whether the City violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 when it refused to credit Officer Heaton with a year of service for pension purposes. The arbitrator concluded that the City violated the ‘round-up’ rule of the CBA when it declined to credit Officer Heaton with a full additional year of service. Because there was no remedy available to Officer Heaton where she in fact completed a full twenty years of service before she retired, the arbitrator transmuted the arbitration award into a declaratory judgment. The trial justice granted the City’s motion to vacate, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he fashioned an award on a dispute that was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of the arbitrator was improper and outside the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority. View "City of Cranston v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301" on Justia Law

After the parties’ divorce was granted and a final judgment of divorce was entered, William filed two motions in the family court seeking clarification of the division of assets, specifically as to two businesses that he and Valerie had operated during their marriage. The family court justice entered an order clarifying the final judgment of divorce and awarding the businesses to William. The court then entered an order adjudging Valerie in contempt and ordering her to comply with the final judgment of divorce. Included in the order was an award of interest against Valerie. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the chief judge of the family court did not err in assigning the motion for clarification to the family court justice who had presided over the original divorce action; (2) the family court justice did not err in issuing a decision on William’s motion for clarification; and (3) Valerie pointed to no valid basis for disturbing the contempt finding. View "Bremer v. Bremer" on Justia Law

Respondent was indicted for inflicting numerous injuries on his five-week-old daughter, resulting in the infant’s death. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families subsequently petitioned to terminate Respondent’s parental rights to his other child, a one-year-old son. After a trial, the family court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Respondent was an unfit parent due to the cruel and abusive nature of his conduct towards his daughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice’s finding that Respondent caused his daughter’s injuries was reasonable, and termination of Respondent’s parental rights to his son logically followed. View "In re Kristopher J." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by information with stealing over $500 in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-41-1 and 11-41-5 and soliciting another to receive stolen goods in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-1-9. The amount of money in question was $714. Subsequently, the Governor signed into law an act amending section 11-41-5 to increase the threshold for felony larceny from $500 to $1500. During trial, Defendant sought to have the larceny count amended and the solicitation charge amended due to the legislative change. The trial court proceeded with the counts as charged and convicted Defendant of having committed larceny over $500 and having solicited another to receive stolen goods over $500. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice was correct in determining that the general savings clause, R.I. Gen. Laws 43-3-23, was applicable and that the changes to section 11-41-5 should not be applied retroactively. View "State v. Whiting" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a medical malpractice suit against numerous medical organizations and professionals twelve years after their daughter, Yendee, was born with a genetic disorder. Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment relating to Yendee’s genetic disorder and also asserted their own claims for loss of consortium. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1; and (2) in light of Yendee’s status as a minor, the tolling provision in section 9-1-14.1(1) would allow Yendee to file suit in the future on her own behalf upon reaching the age of majority, but Yendee’s parents would not be permitted to attach their loss-of-consortium claims to Yendee’s future suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-1-14.1(1), a minor’s parent or guardian may file suit on the minor’s behalf within three years of the occurrence or reasonable discovery of alleged malpractice, or the minor may file suit on her own behalf, but not until she reaches the age of majority; but (2) Plaintiffs’ claims may be asserted alongside Yendee’s claims if she elects to file suit upon reaching the age of majority. View "Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital" on Justia Law