Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

One evening, Shawn McKiernan drove by Kevin Hough several times in an automobile owned by Rita Bower and taunted Hough as he drove past. McKiernan subsequently exited the insured vehicle and punched Hough, who was knocked to the pavement. Hough suffered a serious head injury as a result of the assault and battery. Hough filed a negligence complaint against Bower as the vehicle owner, alleging liability under the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws 31-33-6, which imputes vicarious liability upon the owner of a vehicle for its consensual use or operation. Due to the subsequent death of Bower, Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle, was substituted as a party defendant. The trial justice granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Quincy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish the causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injuries sustained by Plaintiff required to impute liability under section 31-33-6. View "Hough v. McKiernan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Equity One, Inc. As security for the note, Plaintiff executed a mortgage on the property in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The note was twice transferred, eventually landing in the possession of Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. was retained to service the loan. Meanwhile, MERS, as nominee for Equity One, assigned its interest in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. After Litton and Deutsche Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed an action alleging that the assignment from MERS to Deutsche Bank was invalid for lack of authority. When Plaintiff sought to depose a MERS designee, MERS filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment. The superior court denied the motion. MERS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Litton and Deutsche Bank then moved for summary judgment, which the hearing justice granted. The Supreme Court (1) quashed the order denying MERS’ motion for a protective order, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment in question; and (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Litton and Deutsche Bank, holding that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage. View "Genao v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a patron at a bar on Defendant’s premises when he was involved in a fight first inside Defendant’s premises and then in Defendant’s parking lot. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed a negligence complaint against Defendant. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding both parties negligent, attributing twenty percent of the negligence to Plaintiff, and awarding a total of $543,433 to Plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial and alternative motion for a remittitur. View "Bitgood v. Gordon Greene Post Number 27 of the Am. Legion" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned a highly contested labor dispute between the Town of North Kingstown and the North Kingstown Firefighters, Local 1651, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (“union”). At the heart of the litigation was the town’s unilateral implementation of a three-platoon structure and the effects of that reorganization, including a change to a twenty-four hours on, forty-eight hours off schedule. The superior court issued various declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the town’s actions in implementing its decision to change to a three-platoon structure were lawful under the circumstances; but (2) provided that the union complies with the requirements of the Firefighters Arbitration Act and makes timely requests, the town must bargain regarding the effects of its decision to implement the three-platoon structure. View "Town of North Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651" on Justia Law

Imperial Capital Bank granted a loan to Main and West, LLC in the sum of $607,500. Main and West signed a promissory note as security for the loan, and two individuals personally guaranteed the loan. City National Bank (Plaintiff) acquired the loan after Imperial dissolved. When Main and West defaulted on the note, Plaintiff filed suit seeking full payment of the obligations of Defendants - Main and West and the guarantors. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. Defendants appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment because he considered an exhibit that was viewed in camera without having afforded defense counsel an opportunity to review it. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded, holding that the trial justice inappropriately reviewed and relied on a document not shown to defense counsel in granting summary judgment. View "City Nat’l Bank v. Main & West, LLC" on Justia Law

This controversy arose from an easement over a right-of-way that ran along a driveway on Plaintiff’s lots allowing access to Poppasquash Road from Defendant’s property. When Defendant and her family began using the right-of-way across Plaintiff’s lots to access the road from their property, Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet title to the right-of-way and damages for trespass. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that she had an express easement permitting her to travel on the right-of-way. The trial justice granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Defendant had established the existence of an express easement appurtenant. View "Kinder v. Westcott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff executed a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage on her real estate. The mortgage deed named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. The note was transferred to USA Residential Properties, LLC, and Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC became the servicer for the loan. MERS then assigned its interest in the mortgage to ACT Properties, LLC, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to USA Residential. When Rushmore initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties was invalid because the signer was unauthorized. When Plaintiff filed a notice to depose a MERS designee as to the authority of the official who executed the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties, MERS moved for a protective order seeking to restrict discovery, arguing that Plaintiff had no standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. The hearing justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court quashed the hearing justice’s decision, holding that because Plaintiff merely alleged that the assignment was voidable, as opposed to void, and because she was not a party to the assignment, she lacked standing to challenge it and was not entitled to engage in discovery pertaining to the authority issue. View "Cruz v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, Plaintiff filed a suit against Defendant in her capacity as Treasurer and Finance Director of the Town of Cumberland, alleging age discrimination in hiring and retaliation. After a trial, a verdict was returned for Plaintiff on both counts. Upon motion by Defendant, however, the verdicts were vacated and a judgment as a matter of law was entered for Defendant on both counts. Alternatively, the trial justice granted Defendant’s motions for a new trial on both claims. The Supreme Court vacated the trial justice’s finding on the discrimination claim. On remand, the case was retried before a second jury. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in disallowing questioning on portions of a 1999 letter from Defendant’s counsel to the Commission of Human Rights; (2) the trial justice’s refusal to impart a jury instruction on a federal regulation and a state statute did not misconstrue the law; and (3) the judge did not err in now allowing Plaintiff to present evidence of his retaliation claim. View "McGarry v. Pielech" on Justia Law

In order to finance her purchase of a home, Plaintiff executed a note payable to New Century Mortgage Corporation. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee. New Century, the lender, subsequently filed for bankruptcy and filed a notice of rejection of executory contract regarding its membership agreement with MERS and its status as a MERS member. MERS then assigned the mortgage to UBS Real Estate Securities, and UBS assigned the mortgage to USA Residential Properties. Thereafter, USA Residential and its loan servicer, Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, commenced foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this complaint against MERS, UBS, USA Residential, and Rushmore, declaring that the mortgage assignments were void and the foreclosure sale was invalid. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignments of the mortgage and, alternatively, that the assignments were valid and the foreclosure proper. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage on her home and adequately stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "DiLibero v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the parents of a minor child. The family court entered an order granting joint custody of the parties’ child to the parties, physical placement with Mother, and visitation in favor of Father. Mother later filed an expedited motion to suspend Father’s visitation and to grant her sole custody of the child, claiming that Father had previously visited the child without his parents’ supervision in direct contravention of a previous court order. The hearing justice found Father to be in willful and malicious contempt of the court’s prior order and modified Father’s visitation to provide that all visitation take place at the courthouse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in determining that modifying the visitation was in the child’s best interests. View "Pacheco v. Marulanda" on Justia Law