Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jah-nell’s mother and father. After a trial, the trial justice concluded that Father’s parental rights to Jah-nell be terminated. Specifically, the justice found that Father was unfit because he had been unable to complete the objectives of his case plans, that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Jah-nell with Father, and that it was in Jah-nell’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the trial justice’s finding of parental unfitness and the trial justice’s finding that DCYF provided reasonable efforts at reunification and that, notwithstanding those efforts, there was not a reasonable probability that Jah-nell would be able to be reunified within a reasonable period of time. View "In re Jah-nell B." on Justia Law

Defendants were the divorced parents of a minor child, Maya. Maya lived with Mother but regularly stayed at Father’s home for overnight visits twice a week. While Maya was visiting Father in keeping with the normal visitation schedule, she was bitten by Father’s dog and suffered serious injuries. Mother brought a personal injury suit on Maya’s behalf against Father. Father sought a defense under the terms of his homeowner’s insurance policy with Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). Peerless, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Maya was a resident of Father’s household and was therefore excluded from coverage for injures she sustained from the attack by Father’s dog. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Peerless, concluding that Maya was a resident of Father’s home, and therefore, there was no coverage for her injuries under the Peerless policy. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Maya was a resident of Father’s home on the day she was injured. View "Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe" on Justia Law

An investment scheme exploiting the complexities of certain variable annuity policies led to litigation in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court two questions, and the Court accepted those questions pursuant to the discretionary authority provided to it in Article I, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court answered (1) an annuity is not infirm for want of an insurable interest when the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit is a stranger to the annuitant; and (2) a clause in an annuity that purports to make the annuity incontestable from the date of its issuance precludes the maintenance of an action based on the lack of an insurable interest. View "W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Town of Narragansett invited competitive bidding for a five-year concession contract to operate a paddle sports business on town-owned property. Plaintiff submitted a bid to the Town. During a meeting of the Town council, the council voted to reject all bids and commence the bidding process again. Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated this action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing, inter alia, that the Town violated R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-55-5, entitled “Competitive sealed bidding.” The trial justice denied relief, concluding that the provisions of section 45-55-5 were inapplicable to this bidding process and that the Court’s standard on competitive bidding, as set forth in Gilbane Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in refusing to apply section 45-55-5 to the Town’s action; but (2) the trial justice erred in its determination as to the applicability of the Gilbane standard. View "Kayak Centre at Wickford Cove, LLC v. Town of Narragansett" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of more than five kilograms of marijuana. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant waived her argument that the trial justice did not err in his supplemental jury instruction given in response to a question posed by the jury; (2) the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on both the weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) Defendant’s argument that her twenty-year sentence violated R.I. Const. art. I, 8 was not properly before the Court. View "State v. Mendez" on Justia Law

In three separate debt collection cases, three attorneys authored pleadings on behalf of three pro se defendants without disclosing their respective identities or entering his or her appearance in the cases. In separate orders, two hearing justices sanctioned each attorney for drafting, but not signing, answers and objections to dispositive motions on behalf of the pro se defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions, holding (1) the “ghostwriting” conduct of the three nonsignatory attorneys did not violate Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) under the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney shall not assist a pro se litigant with the preparation of pleadings, motions, or other written submission unless the attorney signs the document and discloses on the document his or her identity. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Pichette" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault. The trial justice denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, as sufficient evidence supported the conviction; (2) did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (3) did not err in allowing the complaining witness’s statements made to the police officer at the scene into evidence at trial under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The estate of a former resident of Charlesgate Nursing Center filed a civil action against Charlesgate and related defendants (collectively, Charlesgate), claiming that the former resident was the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by employees at Charlesgate. During the relevant time period, Charlesgate was insured by Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island (JUA). The JUA filed the instant action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants against the allegations set forth in the estate’s complaint. Charlesgate counterclaimed requesting a declaratory judgment establishing that the JUA owed a duty to defend Charlesgate in the action by the estate. The superior court granted summary judgment for Charlesgate with respect to the declaratory-judgment count of its counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the JUA had a duty to defend Charlesgate in the estate’s underlying suit. View "Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of R.I. v. Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was found guilty of breaking and entering, assault with a dangerous weapon, and simple assault. In 2012, while he was incarcerated, Defendant was involved in an altercation with a correctional officer. As a result, the state initiated probation-violation proceedings seeking to revoke the suspended portion of Defendant’s sentence for felony assault. The hearing justice ultimately found that Defendant was the aggressor in this case and that he had violated in the terms of his probation. The judge then ordered Defendant to serve the entirety of his thirteen-year suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication of probation violation, holding that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously by finding a violation on the basis of the evidence presented by the state. View "State v. Prout" on Justia Law

Defendants hired various construction companies to assist in the construction of a house and barn on their property. Plaintiff was one of the subcontractors that worked on the project. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for breach of contract, book account, and unjust enrichment seeking payment for the work it had completed but for which it had not been paid. The superior court justice entered judgment for Plaintiff on its claim of unjust enrichment but entered judgment for Defendants on the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims. The trial justice also entered an order awarding costs to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment but vacated and remanded the order, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found the three elements that a Rhode Island plaintiff must prove to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment; and (2) the trial justice erred in awarding Plaintiff’s “Application for Taxation of Costs” because the order explicitly included the fee generated by expert testimony. View "South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon" on Justia Law