Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The estate of a former resident of Charlesgate Nursing Center filed a civil action against Charlesgate and related defendants (collectively, Charlesgate), claiming that the former resident was the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by employees at Charlesgate. During the relevant time period, Charlesgate was insured by Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island (JUA). The JUA filed the instant action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants against the allegations set forth in the estate’s complaint. Charlesgate counterclaimed requesting a declaratory judgment establishing that the JUA owed a duty to defend Charlesgate in the action by the estate. The superior court granted summary judgment for Charlesgate with respect to the declaratory-judgment count of its counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the JUA had a duty to defend Charlesgate in the estate’s underlying suit. View "Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of R.I. v. Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was found guilty of breaking and entering, assault with a dangerous weapon, and simple assault. In 2012, while he was incarcerated, Defendant was involved in an altercation with a correctional officer. As a result, the state initiated probation-violation proceedings seeking to revoke the suspended portion of Defendant’s sentence for felony assault. The hearing justice ultimately found that Defendant was the aggressor in this case and that he had violated in the terms of his probation. The judge then ordered Defendant to serve the entirety of his thirteen-year suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication of probation violation, holding that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously by finding a violation on the basis of the evidence presented by the state. View "State v. Prout" on Justia Law

Defendants hired various construction companies to assist in the construction of a house and barn on their property. Plaintiff was one of the subcontractors that worked on the project. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for breach of contract, book account, and unjust enrichment seeking payment for the work it had completed but for which it had not been paid. The superior court justice entered judgment for Plaintiff on its claim of unjust enrichment but entered judgment for Defendants on the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims. The trial justice also entered an order awarding costs to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment but vacated and remanded the order, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found the three elements that a Rhode Island plaintiff must prove to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment; and (2) the trial justice erred in awarding Plaintiff’s “Application for Taxation of Costs” because the order explicitly included the fee generated by expert testimony. View "South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon" on Justia Law

Reyna Bernard purchased property and executed a promissory note in the principal amount secured by a mortgage on the property. The mortgage was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. A fire later destroyed the property. Manuel Rosario entered into an insurance adjusting agreement with an LLC providing that the LLC would assist with the adjustment of the loss in return for a percentage of the total recoverable loss. Thereafter, Bernard defaulted on the note, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to HSBC, leaving an unpaid deficiency on the note in the amount of $246,072. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA) subsequently initiated an interpleader action to determine the respective rights of the LLC, Bernard, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as agent for HSBC with regard to the insurance proceeds. The superior court found that Ocwen was entitled to the entirety of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the language contained in the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bernard and Rosario failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the insurance proceeds; and (2) the mortgage executed by Bernard was duly acknowledged as statutorily required and was therefore valid. View "R.I. Joint Reinsurance Ass’n v. Rosario" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased property from Seller, and Seller conveyed the property to Plaintiffs by deed. After the sale was finalized but before Plaintiffs were able to move into the property, Plaintiffs experienced significant flooding in the driveway, garage, and basement. The flooding and water-penetration issues persisted over the next several years. In 2010, Plaintiffs experienced extensive flooding of their property. Plaintiffs brought this action against Seller and entities involved in the sale (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. The superior court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ contract and negligence claims; but (2) the merger and disclaimer clause contained in the purchase and sales agreement was not drawn with sufficient specificity to bar Plaintiffs’ claim for fraud. Remanded. View "McNulty v. Chip" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to his son. After a trial held in 2014, the trial justice concluded that Father was unfit to parent his son. A final decree was subsequently entered terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence, in finding that DCYF had proven that Father was unfit to parent his son; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at reunification between Father and his son. View "In re Max M." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four criminal counts related to a murder committed during the course of an attempted robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment of conviction and its denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice did not improperly credit the testimony of three key witnesses; and (2) the trial justice did not err in allowing one witness to testify as to Defendant’s behavior during their romantic relationship because the testimony was relevant and only marginally prejudicial. View "State v. Virola" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in district court, Defendant was convicted of one count of simple domestic assault and one count of resisting arrest. Defendant appealed these convictions to the superior court. Immediately before the start of trial, Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the complaint of resisting arrest. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of simple domestic assault. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to one year’s probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err when he allowed into evidence the facts regarding the charge of resisting arrest. View "State v. Peltier" on Justia Law

Officer Tori-Lynn Heaton filed a grievance with the City of Cranston seeking to be allowed to retire from the Cranston Police Department at nineteen years, six months, and one day with her full twenty year pension. The City denied the grievance. Because Officer Heaton deferred her retirement until she had served the full twenty years, the issue in dispute at the arbitration was whether the City violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 when it refused to credit Officer Heaton with a year of service for pension purposes. The arbitrator concluded that the City violated the ‘round-up’ rule of the CBA when it declined to credit Officer Heaton with a full additional year of service. Because there was no remedy available to Officer Heaton where she in fact completed a full twenty years of service before she retired, the arbitrator transmuted the arbitration award into a declaratory judgment. The trial justice granted the City’s motion to vacate, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he fashioned an award on a dispute that was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of the arbitrator was improper and outside the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority. View "City of Cranston v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301" on Justia Law

After the parties’ divorce was granted and a final judgment of divorce was entered, William filed two motions in the family court seeking clarification of the division of assets, specifically as to two businesses that he and Valerie had operated during their marriage. The family court justice entered an order clarifying the final judgment of divorce and awarding the businesses to William. The court then entered an order adjudging Valerie in contempt and ordering her to comply with the final judgment of divorce. Included in the order was an award of interest against Valerie. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the chief judge of the family court did not err in assigning the motion for clarification to the family court justice who had presided over the original divorce action; (2) the family court justice did not err in issuing a decision on William’s motion for clarification; and (3) Valerie pointed to no valid basis for disturbing the contempt finding. View "Bremer v. Bremer" on Justia Law