Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit at a condominium association lien foreclosure sale. In 2013, Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the unit in his name. Plaintiff also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a foreclosure by Defendant, the prior owner’s first mortgage holder. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff took title to the property subject to Defendant’s mortgage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a condominium foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to the Rhode Island Condominium Act extinguishes a prior-recorded first mortgage on the unit following the mortgagee’s failure to exercise the right of redemption provided for in R.I. Gen. Laws 34-36.1-3.21(c). Remanded. View "Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a school bus driver employed by Durham School Services (Durham), a private bus company. Citing a “Driver Withdrawal” provision from its contract with Durham for transportation of school students, the Town of Johnston School Department formally requested to not have Plaintiff transport students of the Johnston Public Schools. Lomastro was subsequently terminated. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the interim superintendent for the Town of Johnston and the director of facilities and transportation of Johnston public schools (collectively, Defendants), claiming that Defendants intentionally interfered with her contract with her employer. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the school department invoked its contractual right to withdraw its approval of Plaintiff as a driver without justification, which prevented Plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations. Therefore, the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of felony domestic assault, two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, and one count of simple domestic assault after previously having been convicted twice of domestic assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective because he stipulated to the fact that Defendant had two prior convictions for domestic violence in the presence of the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, and even if Defendant were able to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, Defendant’s right to a fair trial was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s conduct. View "Snell v. State" on Justia Law

In 2003, Robert Loppi purchased a life insurance policy from United Investors Life Insurance Co. in which he initially named Marilyn Loppi, his wife, as the beneficiary. In 2008, after Marilyn filed for divorce from Robert, Robert applied to United Investors to change the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to his uncle, David Loppi. In 2009, during the course of the divorce proceeding, the family court entered an interlocutory order ordering that Robert’s life insurance policies be cashed in and that the cash surrender value be divided equally between Robert and Marilyn. Before Robert complied with the interlocutory order, Robert died. Thereafter, United Investors declined to pay the life insurance death benefit to either David or Marilyn. David filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he alone was entitled to the life insurance policy death benefit. The hearing justice granted David’s petition for declaratory judgment stating that David was entitled to 100 percent of the policy proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Marilyn was not entitled to any portion of the life insurance proceeds at issue. View "Loppi v. United Investors Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions in Family Court alleging that Respondent had abused and neglected his two minor children and sought to terminate Respondent’s parental rights to both children. After consolidating the neglect and termination petitions for trial, the family court granted DCYF’s petitions and terminated Respondent’s parental rights to his two children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not infringe Respondent’s due process rights when she rendered her decision to terminate Respondent’s parental rights immediately after she had appointed substitute counsel; and (2) the trial justice did not err by finding that DCYF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was unfit to parent his two minor children. View "In re Jake G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell down the stairs in his residence. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendants, his landlords, alleging that Defendants failed to maintain the premises in a clean and safe condition. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The superior court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred by denying his motion to pass the case due to jury prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not commit reversible error by rejecting Plaintiff’s motion to pass the case due to juror misconduct. View "Roma v. Moreira" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of assault with the intent to commit a sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in permitting the State to impeach him with a prior conviction for assault and denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Defendant’s assault conviction was admissible to impeach Defendant’s credibility; and (2) the trial justice was neither clearly wrong nor misconceived or overlooked material evidence in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Swiridowsky" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, the family court issued a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to three of her children. Mother appealed, arguing that both R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7 and Supreme Court precedent with respect to the factors to be considered when addressing a petition for termination of parental rights violate her constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother’s parental rights as concerns her three children, holding that Mother’s contention on appeal had been waived, as Mother did not raise her constitutional argument before the family court. View "In re Shy C." on Justia Law

Defendant was adjudicated by a justice of the superior court to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation for his participation in a home invasion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding him to be a probation violator. The Supreme Court entered an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The Court then determined that cause had not been shown and affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that Defendant violated the terms of his probation. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her mother, filed a complaint against the City of Pawtucket, alleging that she sustained injuries when she received a splinter while playing on a wooden jungle gym at a city park. A hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the City, determining that the City was qualified as a landowner that was entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use Statute (RUS) because the playground had been opened to the public for recreational purposes, there was no evidence to suggest that the jungle gym was damaged or dangerous, and the City did not engage in any wanton or malicious conduct. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that an exception to the RUS, R.I. Gen. Laws 32-6-5(a)(1), was applicable to her case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had knowledge of either the particular defect at issue int his case or similar injuries, and thus it could not be concluded that the City willfully disregarded a known risk of injury. View "Symonds v. City of Pawtucket" on Justia Law