Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury-waived trial, the family court issued a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to three of her children. Mother appealed, arguing that both R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7 and Supreme Court precedent with respect to the factors to be considered when addressing a petition for termination of parental rights violate her constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother’s parental rights as concerns her three children, holding that Mother’s contention on appeal had been waived, as Mother did not raise her constitutional argument before the family court. View "In re Shy C." on Justia Law

Defendant was adjudicated by a justice of the superior court to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation for his participation in a home invasion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding him to be a probation violator. The Supreme Court entered an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The Court then determined that cause had not been shown and affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that Defendant violated the terms of his probation. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her mother, filed a complaint against the City of Pawtucket, alleging that she sustained injuries when she received a splinter while playing on a wooden jungle gym at a city park. A hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the City, determining that the City was qualified as a landowner that was entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use Statute (RUS) because the playground had been opened to the public for recreational purposes, there was no evidence to suggest that the jungle gym was damaged or dangerous, and the City did not engage in any wanton or malicious conduct. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that an exception to the RUS, R.I. Gen. Laws 32-6-5(a)(1), was applicable to her case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had knowledge of either the particular defect at issue int his case or similar injuries, and thus it could not be concluded that the City willfully disregarded a known risk of injury. View "Symonds v. City of Pawtucket" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Defendant charging him with burglary. After a combined bail and violation hearing, a hearing justice found that Defendant failed to be of good behavior and that Defendant violated the terms of his violation. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that evidence obtained from the search of a vehicle should have been suppressed because it was obtained from an illegal search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant lacked standing to contest the legality of the search of the vehicle; (2) even assuming the police illegally obtained the evidence, the exclusionary rule did not apply at Defendant’s probation revocation hearing; and (3) the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that Defendant violated his probation. View "State v. Ditren" on Justia Law

This action arose from injuries Plaintiff suffered as a result of a fall he took while he was incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State alleging negligence in failing to reasonably maintain the premises. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the State. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice had a sufficient basis to find that the jury acted reasonably in rendering its verdict for the State; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that the State should be held strictly liable for his injuries was barred by the raise-or-waive rule. View "Battle v. State" on Justia Law

The issue in these consolidated cases was the passing of the Financial Stability Act and the appointment of a Receiver for the City of Central Falls. The Supreme Court already held that the Act is constitutional, and the issues now before the Court on appeal dealt with the superior court’s holdings that (1) the Central Falls Receiver was entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees; (2) the Central Falls Mayor was not entitled to indemnification from the Receiver for costs and expenses arising out of the instant cases; and (3) denied advance attorney’s fees filed by Attorney Lawrence Goldberg. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment in all respects, holding (1) in granting the Receiver reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees, the hearing justice misapplied R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-9-11; (2) the hearing justice erred in concluding that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the Act and when he defended himself in the action filed by the Receiver and therefore was not entitled to indemnification for his legal costs; and (3) because Attorney Goldberg was properly retained by the City Council for Central Falls to represent it in the suit regarding the constitutionality of the Act, the attorney was entitled to remuneration. View "Shine v. Moreau" on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jah-nell’s mother and father. After a trial, the trial justice concluded that Father’s parental rights to Jah-nell be terminated. Specifically, the justice found that Father was unfit because he had been unable to complete the objectives of his case plans, that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Jah-nell with Father, and that it was in Jah-nell’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the trial justice’s finding of parental unfitness and the trial justice’s finding that DCYF provided reasonable efforts at reunification and that, notwithstanding those efforts, there was not a reasonable probability that Jah-nell would be able to be reunified within a reasonable period of time. View "In re Jah-nell B." on Justia Law

Defendants were the divorced parents of a minor child, Maya. Maya lived with Mother but regularly stayed at Father’s home for overnight visits twice a week. While Maya was visiting Father in keeping with the normal visitation schedule, she was bitten by Father’s dog and suffered serious injuries. Mother brought a personal injury suit on Maya’s behalf against Father. Father sought a defense under the terms of his homeowner’s insurance policy with Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). Peerless, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that Maya was a resident of Father’s household and was therefore excluded from coverage for injures she sustained from the attack by Father’s dog. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Peerless, concluding that Maya was a resident of Father’s home, and therefore, there was no coverage for her injuries under the Peerless policy. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Maya was a resident of Father’s home on the day she was injured. View "Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe" on Justia Law

An investment scheme exploiting the complexities of certain variable annuity policies led to litigation in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court two questions, and the Court accepted those questions pursuant to the discretionary authority provided to it in Article I, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court answered (1) an annuity is not infirm for want of an insurable interest when the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit is a stranger to the annuitant; and (2) a clause in an annuity that purports to make the annuity incontestable from the date of its issuance precludes the maintenance of an action based on the lack of an insurable interest. View "W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Town of Narragansett invited competitive bidding for a five-year concession contract to operate a paddle sports business on town-owned property. Plaintiff submitted a bid to the Town. During a meeting of the Town council, the council voted to reject all bids and commence the bidding process again. Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated this action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing, inter alia, that the Town violated R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-55-5, entitled “Competitive sealed bidding.” The trial justice denied relief, concluding that the provisions of section 45-55-5 were inapplicable to this bidding process and that the Court’s standard on competitive bidding, as set forth in Gilbane Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in refusing to apply section 45-55-5 to the Town’s action; but (2) the trial justice erred in its determination as to the applicability of the Gilbane standard. View "Kayak Centre at Wickford Cove, LLC v. Town of Narragansett" on Justia Law