Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint against Defendants - the Town of Narragansett, the treasurer for the town, the town police department, and two police officers - alleging, among other things, assault and battery, false arrest, and gross negligence or misconduct. The superior court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed and further appealed the denial of multiple pretrial motions. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment of the superior court with respect to its grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of assault and battery, holding that the assault and battery claim was not fit for resolution by summary judgment; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that none of Plaintiff’s other claims withstood summary judgment and that there was no error in the denial of Plaintiff’s pretrial motions. View "Albanese v. Town of Narragansett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against APG Security-RI, LLC (APG) and employees/agents of APG (collectively, Defendants) alleging that when she was employed as a security guard by APG, Defendants violated the employer drug testing statute (EDTS) by requiring her to submit to a drug test and subsequently terminating her employment based on the result of that test. Plaintiff sought damages pursuant to both the EDTS and Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-2. The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the three-year statute of limitations in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-14(b) governed Plaintiff’s cause of action. At issue on appeal was whether the ten-year period of limitation as provided in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-13(a) or the three-year period of limitation as provided in section 9-1-14(b) applied to Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that actions brought pursuant to the EDTS and section 9-1-2 are subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in section 9-1-14(b). View "Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC" on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fifteen years’ incarceration, with five years to serve and ten years suspended, with probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, as the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the offense; and (2) the issue of whether the trial justice erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession was not properly before the Court for review. View "State v. Maria" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic simple assault and domestic disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) sufficient competent and credible evidence existed in the record to support the trial justice’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the offenses; (2) the trial justice did not err in her credibility determinations and factual findings and applied the correct burden of proof with respect to Defendant’s claim of self-defense; (3) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in her evidentiary rulings and or in limiting cross-examination; and (4) the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Van Dongen" on Justia Law

The dispute in this receivership action centered on the receiver’s sale of commercial property owned by P.T.A. Realty, LLC to NMLM Realty, LLC. NMLM’s agent, Liberty Title & Escrow Company, failed to list all the municipal taxes owed on the property, resulting in an overpayment of funds to Bank of America, N.A. NMLM filed a petition for restitution against the Bank, which Liberty incorporated in its own petition for restitution against the Bank. The Bank argued that it was insulated from a restitution claim as a third-party creditor that received the payment in good faith and without notice of Liberty’s error. A hearing justice ruled in favor of the Bank. NMLM and Liberty filed a joint notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that, at the time the proceeds from the sale were disbursed, the Bank knew that it was receiving an overpayment of funds; and (2) therefore, the Bank received the excess funds in good faith, and NMLM and Liberty could not seek the return of their erroneous payment predicated on the theory of unjust enrichment. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. P.T.A. Realty, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

John Izzo was the owner of certain property and his mother, Carmel Izzo, held a mortgage on the property. After the failure to pay sewer fees, the property was put up for sale at a tax sale. Defendant purchased the property and filed a petition to foreclose the Izzos’ (Plaintiffs) rights of redemption on the property (the petition). After a hearing, a final decree was entered foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption to the property. Plaintiffs filed this complaint seeking entry of an order vacating the final decree foreclosing their rights of redemption, alleging inadequate notice of the petition. The trial justice granted Plaintiffs’ request, concluding that inadequate notice to Plaintiffs of the petition amounted to a denial of due process. An order subsequently implemented the trial justice’s bench decision and vacated the final decree foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice erred in finding that notice of the petition as it pertained to John was inadequate since John was estopped from raising such an argument; and (2) the notice provided to Carmel was adequate. View "Izzo v. Victor Realty" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, the trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. The justice also entered judgment in favor of Defendant on his counterclaim for conversion. Plaintiff appealed the adverse rulings and also appealed the denial of her post-trial motion for relief from the superior court judgment, which motion invoked Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) determining that there was no contract; (2) finding in Defendant’s favor on his conversion counterclaim; and (3) dismissing Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "Turdo v. Main" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon. Appellant was also charged with first-degree murder, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that charge. After a second jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder. Appellant later filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his second trial was not fair because the justice who presided over that trial had previously represented Appellant in family court when Appellant was a minor. Appellant also alleged that his counsel at the second murder trial was ineffective. After a hearing, the hearing justice denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice did not err in denying postconviction relief on the grounds that the trial justice at Appellant’s second murder trial should have recused; and (2) Appellant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance at Appellant’s second murder trial. View "Perry v. State" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were both dual citizens of the United States and the Republic of Ireland. The parties later divorced. In accordance with a property settlement agreement, the parties share joint custody of their three children, with Mother having physical placement. As part of the agreement, the parties stipulated that future child-custody disputes shall remain under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and that of the Rhode Island Family Court. The parties stayed with Mother in Ireland and visited Father in Rhode Island each summer. Father later filed three motions in the Rhode Island Family Court, including an ex parte emergency motion to modify custody and placement. The court granted the ex parte order. Mother moved to vacate the order and sought to dismiss the action on the grounds that the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where the children had resided in Ireland continuously for more than five years. After a hearing, The hearing justice declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the hearing justice abused her discretion in executing both steps of the necessary two-part analysis under section 15-14.1-19 of the UCCJEA and by declining jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Hogan v. McAndrew" on Justia Law