Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought a dimensional variance by the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown. After the Board denied the variance, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision and granted Plaintiffs’ variance application. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for an award of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act. The trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Board was not an “agency” within the purview of the Act and that the hearing before the Board was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as the term is defined in the Act. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment below, holding that the Board is an agency and that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ variance application was an adjudicatory proceeding on the Act. Remanded for written findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining prerequisites for relief. View "Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

After Strine Printing Company terminated Richard Bisbano’s employment, Bisbano filed an eight count complaint against Strine Printing and its president, alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination. During the pendency of that lawsuit, the parties disagreed about the exact amount of commissions that Strine owed Bisbano. The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. Bisbano subsequently filed another lawsuit against Strine Printing and Menasha Packaging Company, LLC in superior court, alleging unpaid commissions. The trial justice ruled in favor of Defendants, concluding that the three-year statute of limitations contained in Rhode Island’s Payment of Wages Act barred the claim and that res judicata barred Bisbano’s contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this action was barred by the statute of limitations contained in the Payment of Wages Act; and (2) because the statute of limitations issue is dispositive, the Court shall not address the issue of res judicata. View "Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, failure to report a death with the intention of concealing a crime, obstruction of a firefighter while in the execution of his duty, and violation of a no-contact order. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that, based on the Court’s review of the record and the trial justice’s application of the required three-step analysis, and after consideration of Defendant’s contentions, the trial justice was neither clearly wrong nor misconceived or overlooked material evidence when she denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Greenslit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint against Defendants - the Town of Narragansett, the treasurer for the town, the town police department, and two police officers - alleging, among other things, assault and battery, false arrest, and gross negligence or misconduct. The superior court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed and further appealed the denial of multiple pretrial motions. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment of the superior court with respect to its grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of assault and battery, holding that the assault and battery claim was not fit for resolution by summary judgment; and (2) otherwise affirmed, holding that none of Plaintiff’s other claims withstood summary judgment and that there was no error in the denial of Plaintiff’s pretrial motions. View "Albanese v. Town of Narragansett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against APG Security-RI, LLC (APG) and employees/agents of APG (collectively, Defendants) alleging that when she was employed as a security guard by APG, Defendants violated the employer drug testing statute (EDTS) by requiring her to submit to a drug test and subsequently terminating her employment based on the result of that test. Plaintiff sought damages pursuant to both the EDTS and Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-2. The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the three-year statute of limitations in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-14(b) governed Plaintiff’s cause of action. At issue on appeal was whether the ten-year period of limitation as provided in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-13(a) or the three-year period of limitation as provided in section 9-1-14(b) applied to Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that actions brought pursuant to the EDTS and section 9-1-2 are subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in section 9-1-14(b). View "Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC" on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fifteen years’ incarceration, with five years to serve and ten years suspended, with probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, as the State presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the offense; and (2) the issue of whether the trial justice erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession was not properly before the Court for review. View "State v. Maria" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic simple assault and domestic disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) sufficient competent and credible evidence existed in the record to support the trial justice’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the offenses; (2) the trial justice did not err in her credibility determinations and factual findings and applied the correct burden of proof with respect to Defendant’s claim of self-defense; (3) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in her evidentiary rulings and or in limiting cross-examination; and (4) the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Van Dongen" on Justia Law

The dispute in this receivership action centered on the receiver’s sale of commercial property owned by P.T.A. Realty, LLC to NMLM Realty, LLC. NMLM’s agent, Liberty Title & Escrow Company, failed to list all the municipal taxes owed on the property, resulting in an overpayment of funds to Bank of America, N.A. NMLM filed a petition for restitution against the Bank, which Liberty incorporated in its own petition for restitution against the Bank. The Bank argued that it was insulated from a restitution claim as a third-party creditor that received the payment in good faith and without notice of Liberty’s error. A hearing justice ruled in favor of the Bank. NMLM and Liberty filed a joint notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that, at the time the proceeds from the sale were disbursed, the Bank knew that it was receiving an overpayment of funds; and (2) therefore, the Bank received the excess funds in good faith, and NMLM and Liberty could not seek the return of their erroneous payment predicated on the theory of unjust enrichment. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. P.T.A. Realty, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

John Izzo was the owner of certain property and his mother, Carmel Izzo, held a mortgage on the property. After the failure to pay sewer fees, the property was put up for sale at a tax sale. Defendant purchased the property and filed a petition to foreclose the Izzos’ (Plaintiffs) rights of redemption on the property (the petition). After a hearing, a final decree was entered foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption to the property. Plaintiffs filed this complaint seeking entry of an order vacating the final decree foreclosing their rights of redemption, alleging inadequate notice of the petition. The trial justice granted Plaintiffs’ request, concluding that inadequate notice to Plaintiffs of the petition amounted to a denial of due process. An order subsequently implemented the trial justice’s bench decision and vacated the final decree foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice erred in finding that notice of the petition as it pertained to John was inadequate since John was estopped from raising such an argument; and (2) the notice provided to Carmel was adequate. View "Izzo v. Victor Realty" on Justia Law