Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a shooting that occurred in the City of Woonsocket, which left Ikey Wilson with severe injury to his stomach and required the amputation of his right leg. Defendant Christian Rosado appealed his conviction on two separate counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (firearm). Defendant maintained that the hearing justice erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on what he perceived to have been the state’s discovery violation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rhode Island v. Rosado" on Justia Law

Applicant Robert Dominick appealed the denial of his application for postconviction relief, arguing the trial court erred in finding that he failed to present newly discovered evidence that would have entitled him to a new trial. Applicant was convicted in 2009 for the assault and battery of a person over sixty years old. The victim testified that an altercation arose when she was mowing her lawn, and Applicant yelled at her to get off his lawn. Applicant shoved her against a granite marker pole located on her property, causing scrapes to her arm. The lawn mower was damaged as a result of the altercation. During the hearing and in his filings before the Superior Court, applicant relied on two items he described as "newly discovered": (1) the picture of the lawn mower, coupled with the information that Beltram had disposed of the lawn mower, and (2) an eyewitness' testimony. Applicant claimed that during the civil trial he learned for the first time that the victim had destroyed the lawn mower involved in their altercation but that she had kept a photograph of the lawn mower. He claimed that the photograph could have been used to impeach the victim's testimony at the criminal trial that the lawn mower had been damaged as a result of applicant’s conduct because the photograph did not depict any damage to the lawn. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in finding Applicant failed to present new evidence, and affirmed in all respects. View "Dominick v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

In two consolidated actions, Edward Voccola (Mr. Voccola) sought to recover property which he alleged his daughter, Patricia, had wrongfully transferred. Patricia and her company, Red Fox Realty, LLC, were named as defendants. Mr. Voccola died during the pendency of the actions, and Mr. Voccola’s children, Barbara and Edward, in their capacities as co-executors of Mr. Voccola’s estate, were substituted as plaintiffs. The superior court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err when she (1) concluded that Mr. Voccola’s signatures authorizing the transfer of the properties to Red Fox were not genuine; (2) determined that the transfer of Mr. Voccola’s properties was not a gift to Patricia; and (3) awarded Patricia $82,000 on her counterclaim. View "Voccola v. Forte" on Justia Law

In 2012, defendant was charged with simple assault, G.L. 1956 11-5-3. On February 15, 2013, a separate criminal information was filed charging defendant with “break[ing] and enter[ing] the dwelling of [defendant’s sister] without the consent of the owner,” G.L. 1956 11-8-2 and 12-29-5. Both charges were tried on a jury-waived basis. Defendant moved to dismiss the breaking and entering charge “based on the fact that [the state had] not presented evidence to establish the crime of breaking and entering.” Defense counsel stated: “I’m suggesting .. that you apply the statutory language for ... willful trespass ...my client is most likely guilty of.” The trial justice found her guilty of simple assault; with respect to breaking and entering, he concluded that it had been established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the misdemeanor offense of willful trespass. The justice sentenced her to a one-year suspended sentence with one year of probation on each count, to run consecutively. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that, concerning the simple assault, defendant’s speedy trial right was violated; that willful trespass is not a lesser-included offense of breaking and entering; and that the trial justice erred in denying her motion to dismiss the breaking and entering charge. View "State v. Connery" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims that on April 30, 2011 he sustained personal injuries during a “melee” at defendants’ Providence nightclub. On April 18, 2014, he filed a complaint that erroneously stated that the incident occurred on November 4, 2010. On April 20, 2015, defendants moved to dismiss, based on the three-year statute of limitations. Defendants’ counsel certified that he mailed the motion and a memorandum of law to plaintiff’s counsel, in addition to filing via the recently-installed electronic filing system now required by the Superior Court Rules. The motion’s hearing occurred as scheduled, on June 16. Plaintiff did not appear. On June 23, plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal, indicating that his counsel did not receive notice. On June 25, 2015, final judgment entered dismissing plaintiff’s claim and plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to correct the date. Plaintiff’s counsel argued excusable neglect and that there was no issue of notice because the police report issued in connection with the incident, of which defendants had a copy, contained the correct date. The court denied the motion to vacate, but did not rule on plaintiff’s motion to amend. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, discerning no extenuating circumstances to excuse plaintiff’s failure to object to or to attend the hearing on defendants’ motion. View "Santos v. D. Laikos, Inc." on Justia Law

Morse, a long-time fire-rescue captain, had separate work-related back injuries in 2009 and 2011. In both cases he was eventually released to work. Morse injured his back again while lifting a patient during a 2012 rescue call. After the third injury, he did not return to work. Pursuant to the Providence Code of Ordinances, Morse was evaluated by three independent medical examiners. There was disagreement concerning whether the code covers disability as the result of multiple injuries. One of the consultants found Morse not to be disabled. The Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence denied Morse’s application for an accidental disability pension, based solely on the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the decision. The board’s adoption of the unanimity rule effectively abandoned its authority to a single disagreeing physician. Because the board failed to make any factual findings with regard to the petitioner’s application, this matter was remanded to the board for reconsideration. View "Morse v. Employees Ret. Sys. of the City of Providence" on Justia Law

Cashman sued, alleging Cardi provided defective cofferdams for construction of the Sakonnet River Bridge. Cofferdams are temporary watertight enclosures that are pumped dry to expose the bottom of a body of water so that construction can occur. During discovery, Cashman sought, and Cardi refused to produce, computer models and draft reports that had been “considered by” its testifying engineering expert to determine “certain stress and loads that are going to be placed on certain points on this cofferdam,” including models “that [the expert] created which [he] may not have relied on but certainly would’ve considered” and draft reports. Cardi argued that Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow discovery of materials “considered by” an expert in forming an expert opinion. The hearing justice concluded that he did not have the authority to compel production of the material. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, after considering interpretations of the corresponding Federal Rule. The state rule is “clear and unambiguous” and is confined to discovery through interrogatories or deposition. It does not provide for the disclosure of documents. View "Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2008, defendant received a seven-year suspended sentence with probation, after he had pled nolo contendere to one count of breaking and entering a dwelling. In June 2012, after defendant was found to be in violation of his probation, he was sentenced to serve six months, leaving 78 months of his suspended sentence remaining. The defendant was still on probation in March 2014, when the state filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation by “fail[ing] to keep the peace and be of good behavior” in connection with a domestic disturbance involving his pregnant girlfriend. The court ordered him to serve 72 of the 78 months remaining on the suspended sentence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and that the penalty was “excessive.” The lower court adequately considered the “hiatus” in defendant’s criminal conduct. View "State v. Fairweather" on Justia Law

In 2003, Budlong, a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority bus driver, claimed that he was assaulted while on his bus route. Over a year later, Budlong identified Hall as his attacker. Budlong’s bus route went by the Halls’ Newport home about 32 times each day. Hall was ultimately acquitted. The Halls later alleged that Budlong “embarked on a pattern of harassment” and sent letters informing RIPTA of the alleged harassment. A superior court granted the Halls a temporary restraining order against Budlong and later entered mutual restraining orders. RIPTA informed the Halls that routes were assigned under a collective bargaining agreement and that this was “a private dispute,” or “a police matter.” The Halls filed suit against RIPTA, specifying incidents in which Budlong drove toward them, blocked their driveway, and engaged in other intimidating behavior. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated summary judgment in favor of RIPTA, stating the Halls’ letters put RIPTA on notice of the conflict and claims of harassing behavior, so that RIPTA had a duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting a full investigation, followed by appropriate action to ensure that its employee was not harassing the Halls. View "Hall v. City of Newport" on Justia Law

Benoit was working as part of a crew replacing windows at an apartment complex, when a resident found him rifling through a wallet that was on the top of a dresser in the resident’s bedroom. Benoit was convicted of entering an apartment with the intent to commit larceny and received a four-year sentence, with 18 months to serve and 30 months suspended, with 30 months of probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to commit larceny at the time he entered the apartment and that the jury heard an officer testify that he responded to a call for a “[p]ossible burglary in progress,” the prejudicial effect of which was so severe that a mistrial was warranted. View "State v. Benoit" on Justia Law