Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Morse, a long-time fire-rescue captain, had separate work-related back injuries in 2009 and 2011. In both cases he was eventually released to work. Morse injured his back again while lifting a patient during a 2012 rescue call. After the third injury, he did not return to work. Pursuant to the Providence Code of Ordinances, Morse was evaluated by three independent medical examiners. There was disagreement concerning whether the code covers disability as the result of multiple injuries. One of the consultants found Morse not to be disabled. The Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence denied Morse’s application for an accidental disability pension, based solely on the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the decision. The board’s adoption of the unanimity rule effectively abandoned its authority to a single disagreeing physician. Because the board failed to make any factual findings with regard to the petitioner’s application, this matter was remanded to the board for reconsideration. View "Morse v. Employees Ret. Sys. of the City of Providence" on Justia Law

Cashman sued, alleging Cardi provided defective cofferdams for construction of the Sakonnet River Bridge. Cofferdams are temporary watertight enclosures that are pumped dry to expose the bottom of a body of water so that construction can occur. During discovery, Cashman sought, and Cardi refused to produce, computer models and draft reports that had been “considered by” its testifying engineering expert to determine “certain stress and loads that are going to be placed on certain points on this cofferdam,” including models “that [the expert] created which [he] may not have relied on but certainly would’ve considered” and draft reports. Cardi argued that Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow discovery of materials “considered by” an expert in forming an expert opinion. The hearing justice concluded that he did not have the authority to compel production of the material. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, after considering interpretations of the corresponding Federal Rule. The state rule is “clear and unambiguous” and is confined to discovery through interrogatories or deposition. It does not provide for the disclosure of documents. View "Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2008, defendant received a seven-year suspended sentence with probation, after he had pled nolo contendere to one count of breaking and entering a dwelling. In June 2012, after defendant was found to be in violation of his probation, he was sentenced to serve six months, leaving 78 months of his suspended sentence remaining. The defendant was still on probation in March 2014, when the state filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation by “fail[ing] to keep the peace and be of good behavior” in connection with a domestic disturbance involving his pregnant girlfriend. The court ordered him to serve 72 of the 78 months remaining on the suspended sentence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and that the penalty was “excessive.” The lower court adequately considered the “hiatus” in defendant’s criminal conduct. View "State v. Fairweather" on Justia Law

In 2003, Budlong, a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority bus driver, claimed that he was assaulted while on his bus route. Over a year later, Budlong identified Hall as his attacker. Budlong’s bus route went by the Halls’ Newport home about 32 times each day. Hall was ultimately acquitted. The Halls later alleged that Budlong “embarked on a pattern of harassment” and sent letters informing RIPTA of the alleged harassment. A superior court granted the Halls a temporary restraining order against Budlong and later entered mutual restraining orders. RIPTA informed the Halls that routes were assigned under a collective bargaining agreement and that this was “a private dispute,” or “a police matter.” The Halls filed suit against RIPTA, specifying incidents in which Budlong drove toward them, blocked their driveway, and engaged in other intimidating behavior. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated summary judgment in favor of RIPTA, stating the Halls’ letters put RIPTA on notice of the conflict and claims of harassing behavior, so that RIPTA had a duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting a full investigation, followed by appropriate action to ensure that its employee was not harassing the Halls. View "Hall v. City of Newport" on Justia Law

Benoit was working as part of a crew replacing windows at an apartment complex, when a resident found him rifling through a wallet that was on the top of a dresser in the resident’s bedroom. Benoit was convicted of entering an apartment with the intent to commit larceny and received a four-year sentence, with 18 months to serve and 30 months suspended, with 30 months of probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of his intent to commit larceny at the time he entered the apartment and that the jury heard an officer testify that he responded to a call for a “[p]ossible burglary in progress,” the prejudicial effect of which was so severe that a mistrial was warranted. View "State v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Early in the morning of October 25, 2011, as she was leaving for work, Lora, was viciously attacked by a masked assailant in the front hall of her home and was severely cut on her face with a small blade. Lora subsequently identified her attacker as Breton, with whom she had previously had a two-year-long romantic relationship. Breton was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and simple assault on Lora. A third count was for a simple assault against Lora’s daughter, which was alleged to have occurred on May 26, 2010. When the case was reached for trial, Breton was convicted of the two counts of assault against Lora, but acquitted of the third count. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial justice misconstrued the evidence when he found Lora to be a more credible witness than the alibi witnesses produced by Breton, Breton’s mother and a family friend. View "State v. Breton" on Justia Law

Florez was convicted of one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (sexual contact with a person 14 years of age or under) in violation of G.L. 1956 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4 and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, with eight years to serve and the remaining time suspended with probation. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial; that the trial justice’s jury charge and verdict sheet were flawed in that they permitted the jury to return a non-unanimous guilty verdict; that the trial justice erred by allowing the state to improperly refresh the complainant’s recollection; and that the trial justice committed reversible error by declining to admit parts of the witness statement of the complainant’s father into evidence. View "State v. Florez" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Cranston Police Department filed delinquency petitions alleging that, when B.H. was 13 years old, he committed two offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of first-degree child molestation and one offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of second-degree child molestation. The victims were 11-year-old boys.The Family Court found the B.H. delinquent for the violations under G.L. 1956 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded, finding that the evidence at the delinquency proceeding was insufficient to establish sexual penetration—an element of both of the charges of first-degree child molestation of which the respondent was adjudged to be delinquent. The court directed the Family Court to enter adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (second-degree child molestation). View "In the Matter of B.H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice lawsuit against Defendants, his optometrist and his optometrist’s employer, arguing that his optometrist breach the duty of care to him because he failed to diagnose a detached retina, which resulted in permanent vision loss. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, concluding that although the optometrist violated the standard of care in treating Defendant, that violation was not the cause of Plaintiff’s vision loss. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial justice erred by restricting the testimony of Plaintiff’s causation expert, and Plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on all issues. View "Ribeiro v. Rhode Island Eye Inst." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased certain property at a tax sale and then filed a petition to foreclose tax lien seeking to foreclose Bank’s right of redemption with respect to the property. Bank did not timely file an answer after its receipt of the petition. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for entry of default and final decree and a motion for decree pro confesso. Thereafter, Bank filed a motion to file a late answer and its response to the petition, which contained an offer to redeem. The trial justice granted Bank’s motion to file a late answer and Bank’s request for redemption. The court then entered judgment allowing Bank and redeem the property and setting forth the amount of redemption. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) Bank’s motion to file a late answer should have been denied because there was no good cause shown for Bank’s failure to comply with the deadline set out in the petition; and (2) accordingly, Bank was in default and should not have been permitted to redeem the property. View "Conley v. Fontaine" on Justia Law