Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and using a firearm when committing a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies; (2) refusing to give an “empty chair” jury instruction due to a witness’s absence of trial; and (3) making certain evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant. Further, Defendant’s argument that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warranted reversal was without merit. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bayal Restaurant Inc. entered into a lease agreement with the predecessor in interest to plaintiff to rent certain commercial property. Aly Diene (Defendant), in consideration of the lease, executed a personal guaranty. In 2013, title to the premises was conveyed to OSJ of Providence, LLC (Plaintiff). In conjunction with the conveyance, all rights of the seller were transferred to Plaintiff. After Bayal defaulted on the terms of the lease, Plaintiff demanded overdue rent, interest, and fees. When Plaintiff did not receive the full amount requested, Plaintiff filed a complaint for eviction for nonpayment of rent. The parties entered into a stipulated judgment, but Bayal failed to make any payments pursuant to the stipulated judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for default on the guaranty. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff as to Defendant’s liability under the guaranty. After a hearing, judgment was entered for Plaintiff in the amount of $37,760.04. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s appeal, holding (1) Plaintiff’s claim was not time-barred; and (2) the hearing justice properly granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. View "OSJ of Providence, LLC v. Diene" on Justia Law

A two-vehicle collision resulted in one of the automobiles striking Plaintiff while she was standing at her post as a crossing guard. Plaintiff sustained severe bodily injuries from the accident. Plaintiff filed suit against the two drivers, Chicara Alston and Rick Ford, alleging that each was negligent. As relevant to this appeal, the hearing justice granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred when he concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the elements of the negligence claim were inappropriately treated as a matter of law because the facts suggested more than one reasonable inference, and therefore, summary judgment was inappropriately granted. View "Williams v. Alston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting that Defendants had caused contaminants to flow onto their property. Plaintiffs then filed amended complaints asserting claims for continuing trespass, public and private nuisance, and federal and state environmental regulations. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, nonetheless, appealed from adverse rulings in Defendants’ favor. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice erred when she impermissibly limited the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert; and (2) the trial justice abused her discretion in imposing sanctions against Attorney Brian Wagner. Remanded for a new trial on all issues with the exception of the prayer for injunctive relief. View "Paolino v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Sandra Armand and Gorvey Armand filed two adoption petitions so that Gorvey might become the legal father of Kai Jackson’s two sons, Kyeshon and Jarell. Jackson refused to consent to the adoptions. Thereafter, Petitioners moved to terminate Jackson’s parental rights with respect to the two boys. After a trial, the trial justice found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Jackson was unfit as a parent and that it would be in the best interests of Kyeshon and Jarell to terminate Jackson’s parental rights so that Gorvey, the boys’ stepfather, might adopt them. The trial justice then entered a decree terminating Jackson’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in terminating the parental rights of Jackson to his sons. View "In re Kyeshon J." on Justia Law

After a trial, the family court justice concluded that Respondent abused and neglected his minor daughters. The family court justice entered a decree committing the children to the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The Supreme Court denied and dismissed Respondent’s appeal and affirmed the family court’s decree committing the girls to the care, custody and control of DCYF, holding (1) the family court justice did not abuse her discretion in her challenged evidentiary rulings; (2) the family court justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in making her decision; and (3) DCYF met its burden of proof with respect to establishing that the girls were abused and neglected. View "In re Emilee K." on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Beverley Corbin, III (Bev) appealed a Family Court order on two post-final-judgment motions filed by plaintiff, Anne duPont Corbin. Defendant contended that the trial justice erred when she determined that the post-employment compensation that he received from his employer was marital property and therefore her award of 50 percent of it to Anne was also made in error. Alternatively, defendant argued that if the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s findings with regard to the post-employment compensation, then the fee that he paid to an attorney for negotiating that compensation should be considered marital debt, of which Anne should pay half. Additionally, defendant argued that the trial justice erred when she awarded counsel fees to Anne for her prosecution of a motion to modify child support, after she made a specific finding that defendant did not adequately notify Anne when he regained employment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court. View "Corbin v. Corbin" on Justia Law

In March 2012, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) received a tip of an alleged incident of domestic violence that occurred in Massachusetts between respondent John S. and Malachii’s mother, which also involved Malachii. DCYF was informed that respondent attempted to quell his ten-month-old child’s crying by pinching, slapping, and throwing the child against a wall, which the mother claimed rendered the child unconscious. A petition for dependency and abuse was filed ex parte against both parents in Rhode Island, where Malachii resided, and respondent was charged in Massachusetts with felony crimes arising from the alleged assault. A no-contact order was issued prohibiting respondent from having any contact with Malachii. Respondent was convicted in Massachusetts by jury of reckless endangerment of a child and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to serve three to five years in prison, followed by a two-and-one-half-year probationary term. A second no-contact order was issued in Massachusetts after respondent’s conviction. Shortly thereafter, DCYF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent and Malachii’s mother. This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal of respondent when his parental rights were indeed terminated. Finding no error in the Family Court’s judgment terminating parental rights, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Malachii O." on Justia Law

After Deborah Bates-Bridgmon fell at Roch’s Market in West Warwick, Deborah and her husband, Jackie Bridgmon (together, Plaintiffs), filed suit against Defendant, Roch’s Market, for injuries Deborah sustained from her fall. The jury rendered a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial; (2) the trial court did not err by not instructing the jury on the “mode of operation” theory; and (3) this Court declines to consider the merits of adopting the mode of operation theory in light of the circumstances presented in this case. View "Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Nappa Construction Management, LLC (Nappa) and Caroline and Vincent Flynn (the Flynns) entered into a contract for a commercial construction project. Service Insurance Company, Inc. (Service Insurance) furnished a performance bond on the contract. In 2013, the Flynns directed Nappa to stop work on the project. Nappa subsequently submitted an application for payment, which the Flynns declined to pay. Nappa then terminated the contract due to nonpayment. The Flynns filed an action alleging that Nappa had wrongfully terminated the contract. Nappa filed a demand for arbitration in accordance with an arbitration provision in the contract and also named Service Insurance as a party to the arbitration. The arbitrator found that Nappa was not justified in terminating the contract but concluded that, under the termination-for-convenience clause in the contract, neither Nappa nor the Flynns were in breach of the contract. The arbitrator awarded Nappa $37,980. The superior court granted Nappa’s petition to confirm the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in holding that the contract was terminated for convenience. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in interpreting the contract. View "Nappa Construction Management, LLC v. Flynn" on Justia Law