Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of felony assault and received a deferred sentence. Thereafter, Defendant was presented with a notice of violation based on an alleged act of second-degree child molestation of Jessica, Defendant’s niece. After a trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of second-degree child molestation. The hearing justice, however, imposed on Defendant a twenty-five-year sentence with five years to serve, concluding that, by his sexual contact with Jessica, Defendant had violated the conditions of his deferred sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a violation of the conditions of Defendant’s deferred sentence had occurred. View "State v. Giard" on Justia Law

Lend Lease (US) Construction was the general contractor on a project, and Rossi Electric Company, Inc. was a subcontractor. An employee of Rossi’s subcontractor was injured while working on the project and filed a negligence claim against Lend Lease. Lend Lease filed a third-party complaint against Rossi, alleging that, under the terms of a contract between the parties, Rossi was required to defend and indemnify Lend Lease. The superior court entered an order granting summary judgment for Rossi. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that issues of material fact remained to be determined, and therefore, this case was not ripe for summary judgment. Remanded. View "Walsh v. Lend Lease (US) Construction" on Justia Law

The Preservation Society of Newport County and Newport Catering, Inc. (together, Petitioners) filed two applications for victualing licenses, proposing to sell pre-wrapped food prepared off-site, along with snacks and nonalcoholic drinks, at two historic mansions in the City of Newport. The City Council of the City of Newport (Respondent) denied the applications. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the Council exceeded its jurisdiction and applied inappropriate criteria in denying the victualing licenses. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Council and directed the Council to issue the licenses forthwith, absent any compelling evidence of significant health and/or safety issues, holding that the Council failed to provide factual findings and legal grounds to support its decision denying Petitioners’ applications for victualing licenses. View "Preservation Society of Newport County v. City Council of the City of Newport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Charles Faber and Karen Faber, filed suit against insurance agencies and related individuals, claiming insurance malpractice. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs responded that the limitation period was tolled because Charles could not reasonably have discovered the alleged insurance malpractice until a date within the limitations period because a reasonable person does not read his or her insurance policies. Summary judgment was entered for Defendants on grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under the three-year limitation period for insurance malpractice claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants were untimely. View "Faber v. McVay" on Justia Law

This certified question concerned an action pending in federal court in which Plaintiff alleged that he was illegally denied a promotion in the Providence Police Department. At issue in this proceeding was Plaintiff’s count claiming that Chief of Police of the Providence Police Department was liable, in his individual capacity, for the City’s failure to have promoted Plaintiff in violation of section 28-5-7-(6) of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. Clements moved to dismiss the count, arguing that section 28-5-7(6) does not provide for individual liability. The district court then certified to the Supreme Court the question at issue here. The Supreme Court answered that section 28-5-7(6) does not provide for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer. Remanded. View "Mancini v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

Defendant was in debt under a credit card account that he opened and maintained with Bank of America, N.A. Bank of America assigned the right to collect the debt to CACH, LLC, and CACH filed a complaint seeking to recover $10,288.04 from Defendant. After CACH filed a motion for summary judgment, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision of the Cardholder Agreement entered into between Defendant and Bank of America. The hearing justice denied Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because he had failed to raise a right to arbitrate as an affirmative defense in his answer. The justice then granted summary judgment in favor of CACH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration; and (2) the superior court did not err in granting CACH’s motion for summary judgment. View "CACH, LLC v. Potter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Rohena, as parent and natural guardian of Josue Espinal, brought suit against Defendant, the City of Providence, to recover damages for injuries that Josue suffered while participating in a baseball game at Corliss Park, which was owned by Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable pursuant to the Recreational Use statute. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s conduct fell outside the scope of the Recreational Use Statute because the City willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a known dangerous condition was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Rohena v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

Mark Furia was injured while working for Ajax Construction Company. After Furia filed a petition against Ajax in the Workers’ Compensation Court, Ajax petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court to determine which insurer - Beacon Mutual Insurance Company or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company - was obligated to pay Furia’s claim. The trial judge concluded that Ajax was liable to Furia and that Beacon was primarily liable to Furia. The judge also found that Ajax had dual or overlapping coverage regarding Furia’s claim and, given the overlapping coverage, Liberty must reimburse Beacon for fifty percent of the benefits that Beacon paid to Furia. The Appellate Division vacated the trial judge’s decree and ordered that Beacon be held fully responsible for paying workers’ compensation benefits to Furia and to reimburse Liberty for any benefits paid to beacon by Liberty under the prior decree. The Supreme Court quashed the Appellate Division’s decree, holding that the Appellate Division erred in finding Beacon solely responsible for the payment of Furia’s benefits. View "Ajax Construction Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial due to the purported lack of credibility on the part of the complaining witness and his half-brother and inconsistencies in their testimonies concerning the alleged molestations. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice neither clearly erred nor overlooked or misconceived relevant evidence and that the trial justice properly denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Muralles" on Justia Law

The Zoning Officer for the Town of Hopkinton issued a notice of violation to Todd and Tina Sposato for being in violation of the Hopkinton Zoning Ordinance by having four alpacas on their property, which was located in an R-1 zone. The Zoning Board overturned the Zoning Officer’s ruling, concluding that alpacas are “domestic animals,” and therefore, keeping them on the property was a permitted use. Thereafter, the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Hopkinton imposed four “conditions” on the Sposatos with respect to the continued presence of alpacas on the property. The fourth condition explicitly provided that “[t]he right to keep alpaca on this property does not run with the land; that is, if the [Sposatos] sell this property the next owners are not permitted to keep alpaca.” The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the last of the four conditions imposed upon the Sposatos by the Zoning Board was inconsistent with venerable and settled principles in the law of land use. View "Preston v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Hopkinton" on Justia Law