Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was arrested by the Rhode Island State Police on January 13, 2017, following allegations of child molestation by the complainant, A.R. During the post-arrest interview, the defendant admitted to various instances of sexual contact with A.R. Subsequently, the state filed a ten-count criminal information against the defendant, including eight counts of second-degree child molestation. The defendant moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, arguing they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his due process rights and Rule 5(a) of the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. He also sought to introduce expert testimony on false confessions, which the state moved to preclude.The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding that his statements were made voluntarily and that the delay in presentment to the District Court was not causative of his confession. The court also granted the state's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony on false confessions, reasoning that it would invade the jury's province and that effective cross-examination of the police would suffice. The jury found the defendant guilty on five counts of second-degree child molestation, and the trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to suppress, as the defendant's statements were made voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances. The Court also upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony on false confessions, agreeing that it would improperly influence the jury's role in determining credibility. Finally, the Court found no error in the trial justice's denial of the motion for a new trial, as the trial justice had appropriately evaluated the evidence and witness credibility. View "State v. Coletta" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Daniel B. Struebing and Amanda L. Lyons, appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Jeremy J. Fournier and Jennifer M. Fournier, in a case involving claims of trespass and adverse possession. The plaintiffs argued that a "seizure" by the United States government of their property interrupted the statutory period for the defendants' adverse possession claim. They also contended that the hearing justice improperly acted as a factfinder and overlooked a federal court's determination regarding the forfeiture of the property.The Superior Court initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment due to concerns about federal jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings. However, after the federal court clarified that it did not retain jurisdiction over the property dispute, the Superior Court granted the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment. The court found that the defendants had satisfied the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, having maintained and used the disputed area exclusively for over ten years.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the federal government's actions did not constitute a seizure that interrupted the adverse possession period. The court also agreed that the defendants had established their adverse possession claim by clear and convincing evidence, noting their continuous and exclusive use of the property since 2008. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claims of trespass and slander of title were rendered moot. View "New Phase Realty, LLC v. Fournier" on Justia Law

Verizon New England Inc. (Verizon) sought review of a District Court judgment favoring Neena S. Savage, the Tax Administrator for Rhode Island. The case revolved around the interpretation of "accumulated depreciation" under G.L. 1956 § 44-13-13, which governs the taxation of tangible personal property (TPP) for telecommunications companies in Rhode Island. Verizon, a New York corporation providing telecommunications services in Rhode Island, had declared the value of its TPP based on financial accounting depreciation until 2009. After reevaluating its approach, Verizon submitted amended valuations and requested tax refunds, which were denied.Verizon requested an administrative hearing, arguing that "accumulated depreciation" should include all forms of depreciation, including physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and economic obsolescence. The hearing officer recommended affirming the refund denials, and the tax administrator adopted this recommendation. Verizon then appealed to the District Court, claiming the tax was excessive due to the incorrect calculation of accumulated depreciation.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, reasoning that the plain and ordinary meaning of "accumulated depreciation" did not include external factors like obsolescence. The court noted that the tax administrator had consistently applied financial accounting-based depreciation for forty years without legislative intervention.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court's interpretation. The court held that "accumulated depreciation" in § 44-13-13 refers to financial accounting depreciation, reflecting the value on Verizon's balance sheet. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, concluding that the plain and ordinary meaning of depreciation did not encompass market contingencies such as economic and functional obsolescence. View "Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage" on Justia Law

The case involves allegations of child molestation against the defendant, who was indicted on one count of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. The complaining witness, a minor, accused the defendant of multiple instances of molestation occurring when she was between four and eight years old. The defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. He was sentenced to a sixty-year sentence, with twenty-five years to be served, for the first-degree count, and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the second-degree count.In the Providence County Superior Court, the trial justice granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the two counts of second-degree child molestation. The jury found the defendant guilty on the remaining counts. The defendant did not file a motion for a new trial. The trial justice later sentenced the defendant, and a judgment of conviction and commitment was entered.The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the trial justice erred by allowing a medical expert to testify in a manner that impermissibly bolstered the complaining witness’s testimony. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and determined that the defendant had not properly preserved his objection to the expert’s testimony for appellate review. The court noted that the defendant failed to object to the specific questions that formed the basis of his appeal and did not move to strike the expert’s answers or request a cautionary instruction. Consequently, the court deemed the issue waived and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "State v. Lantigua" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Etleva Stratoberdha, filed a lawsuit in Superior Court against Clements Properties, LLC, Robert P. Rucando, and officials from the Town of Portsmouth. They alleged that Clements Properties caused continuous trespass by creating an illegal drainage structure, Rucando failed to disclose flooding issues when selling the property, and the Town neglected to enforce ordinances. During the prolonged litigation, Etleva filed for divorce, and the Family Court issued orders related to the sale of the marital home and the settlement of the Superior Court action.The Family Court appointed a Commissioner to sell the marital home and authorized her to settle the Superior Court action. Robert did not appeal these orders. The Family Court later approved a settlement agreement where Clements Properties would buy the marital home for $870,000, and the Town would pay $75,000 in damages. The Family Court's orders and the settlement agreement were incorporated into the interlocutory decision pending entry of final judgment in the divorce case. Robert's appeal of this decision was dismissed as untimely.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order approving the settlement agreement. The Court held that the Family Court's orders were final and could not be challenged in the Superior Court. The Superior Court's approval of the settlement agreement was a ministerial act based on the Family Court's final decrees. The Court found no merit in Robert's arguments and concluded that the Superior Court properly relied on the Family Court's orders. View "Stratoberdhav. Clements Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, purchased property at 5 Bowser Court in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), acquired adjacent property at 51 Kingston Avenue. A dispute arose when NRI's representative, John Gullison, conducted renovations and removed part of the plaintiffs' cobblestone landing, claiming it encroached on NRI's property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over the disputed land based on the doctrine of acquiescence, adverse possession, and an easement by prescription.The Superior Court awarded title to the plaintiffs for the disputed land, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired the land through the doctrine of acquiescence. The court also granted title to other abutters of Bowser Court, even though they had not requested such relief. NRI appealed, arguing that the trial justice misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence and erred in awarding title to other abutters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice erred in granting relief to the other abutters who had not requested it. The court also determined that the doctrine of acquiescence was not applicable because the disputed boundary was not solely on the parties' adjoining lots but also bordered Bowser Court. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription over the five-foot strip of land, as they had used the walkway openly, continuously, and hostilely for the statutory period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in part, recognizing the plaintiffs' easement by prescription, and vacated the part of the judgment granting relief to the other abutters. View "Urbonas v. Gullison" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 26, 2018, David Page was shot and killed while picking up acquaintances at 100 Lowell Avenue. The Providence Police Department (PPD) responded and found Mr. Page unresponsive in his car. Surveillance footage showed a black vehicle near the scene. On July 2, 2018, during unrelated investigations, police found a black Audi linked to Kennedy Terrero. Further investigation connected this Audi to the shooting. Terrero, under a cooperation agreement, testified against Jaythan Hang and Chandanoeuth Hay, implicating them in the shooting.The Superior Court jury found Hang guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy, felony assault, and firearms offenses. Hang appealed, arguing the trial justice erred in several pretrial and trial rulings, including denying a motion for severance, admitting evidence of prior bad acts, admitting statements against interest, and allowing lay opinion testimony. He also challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy count.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's decisions. The court held that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible to show motive and intent, and the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting the corroborative evidence and testimony presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Hang" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on charges including first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possessing pistols without licenses. He reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a maximum sentence of eighty years with fifty years to serve, twenty of which would be nonparolable, and a thirty-year suspended sentence. The defendant pled guilty, and the trial justice accepted the plea and sentenced him to a term of twenty years, a concurrent term of ten years, a consecutive term of twenty years without parole, a consecutive suspended sentence of twenty years, and a concurrent suspended sentence of ten years.The defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35, arguing that the trial justice misconceived material evidence and failed to consider mitigating factors. The state objected, asserting that the defendant had forfeited his right to file a Rule 35 motion as part of his plea agreement. The trial justice denied the motion, finding no grounds for relief, and the defendant appealed.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice did not demonstrate prejudice or personal bias against the defendant, and his decision not to recuse himself was proper. The court also held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion, as the defendant's sentence was below the statutory maximum and the agreed-upon cap. The court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "State v. McLean" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dino J. Guilmette, owned a property in North Providence, Rhode Island, and executed a mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation in 2006. The mortgage was later assigned to Wells Fargo, with PHH Mortgage Services as the servicing company. Guilmette requested a modification of his mortgage in 2014, resulting in a Shared Appreciation Modification Agreement. This agreement increased the principal balance and included a provision for a shared appreciation amount if the property value increased and was sold.Guilmette sold the property in 2022 and disputed the calculation of the shared appreciation amount provided by PHH. He argued that PHH's calculation was incorrect and that they overcharged him by $40,708.33. Guilmette filed a breach of contract action, claiming that PHH did not properly calculate the shared appreciation amount according to the modification agreement.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, PHH and Wells Fargo, concluding that the modification agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court found that the defendants correctly calculated the shared appreciation amount based on the terms of the agreement and the attached disclosure statement, which provided specific examples of the calculation method.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the modification agreement was unambiguous and that the defendants' calculation of the shared appreciation amount was correct. The court emphasized that the disclosure statement, which was part of the agreement and signed by Guilmette, clearly illustrated the calculation method, and there was no ambiguity in the contract terms. View "Guilmette v. PHH Mortgage Services FKA Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

Jacquelin Glassie filed a claim against the estate of her father, Donelson Glassie, alleging he breached a property settlement agreement by failing to adequately fund a trust established for her benefit. The executor of Donelson's estate, Paul Doucette, disallowed the claim, leading to a lawsuit in the Superior Court. After Jacquelin's death, her sister Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin's estate, continued the lawsuit. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment for the estate, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trustee of the trust, Wells Fargo, was the proper plaintiff. Wells Fargo then assigned its claims to Alison.A jury trial in the Superior Court resulted in a verdict for Alison, awarding her $1,164,138.43 in damages, which, with prejudgment interest, totaled $2,856,572.45. The jury also rejected the estate's counterclaim that Jacquelin had forfeited her interest under Donelson's will. The defendant, Doucette, filed a notice of appeal but failed to timely order the trial transcripts, leading Alison to move to dismiss the appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case after the Superior Court granted Alison's motion to dismiss the appeal due to Doucette's failure to timely order the transcripts and follow proper procedures for an extension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that Doucette's reasons for the delay, including hopes for mediation and cost-saving, did not constitute excusable neglect. The Court noted the extensive litigation history and the trial justice's efforts to move the case forward, concluding that the deadlines were necessary and should be adhered to. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law