Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of first degree robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, holding that the admission of an out-of-court statement made by an alleged coconspirator who did not appear at Defendant's trial, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.While the sole issue on appeal was whether Defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violatedl. The Court held (1) this Court assumes, without deciding, that a Confrontation Clause objection was properly articulated; and (2) because the remaining evidence was sufficiently compelling to support the jury's finding of guilty, the admission of the coconspirator's out-of-court declaration was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action, holding that summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's negligence claim.Plaintiff and Defendant were fellow employees. Defendant injured Plaintiff when he ignited gasoline in a bathroom Plaintiff was occupying and the gasoline burst into flames. Plaintiff filed a negligence complaint against Defendant. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, R.I. Gen. Laws 28-29-20. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) R.I. Gen. Laws 28-35-58 did not enable Plaintiff to maintain a suit against Defendant even though Plaintiff accepted and received workers' compensation benefits from his employer; and (2) absent disputed issues of material fact in this case, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Defendant. View "Mello v. Killeavy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial after convicting Defendant of of assault and battery resulting in serious bodily injury and possession of a knife with a blade of more than three inches, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.In his motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence when he agreed with the jury's verdict because the trial justice did not take into account that Defendant had to appreciate that he knowingly had an opportunity to retreat in safety. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial justice more than adequately performed his role under each step of the analysis of Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "State v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

In this case between former spouses who disagreed about the ex-husband's entitlement to visitation with two dogs the parties acquired during their marriage, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court approving the marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered into between Diane and Paul Giarrusso and ordering that Paul had the dogs Tuesdays through Thursdays, as provided in the MSA.Diane and Paul entered into a MSA formalizing the terms of the dissolution of their marriage. The final judgment dissolving the marriage incorporated the MSA. The MSA gave Diane title and interest in and to the two dogs and permitted Paul to take the dogs for weekly visits. After Diane unilaterally ceased allowing the visits, Paul filed a motion for post-final judgment relief. Diane also filed a motion for relief, claiming that Paul had breached the MSA regarding the dogs. The hearing justice denied Diane's requested relief, finding that the MSA unambiguously gave Paul the right to visitation with the dogs every week from Tuesday to Thursday and that Paul acted in good faith with respect to the dogs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in not withdrawing the court's approval of the MSA and did not overlook or misconceive any evidence. View "Giarrusso v. Giarrusso" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, NAMCO, LLC, the company that sold the swimming pool in which a four-year-old child drowned to the child's grandmother, holding that there existed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.Plaintiffs filed negligence claims alleging that Defendants negligently installed or allowed the safety ladder and pool to be installed without proper permitting and in violation of applicable ordinances, building codes and health regulations. NAMCO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because NAMCO did not install the pool or ladder and because the entity that did the installation was not its agent, NAMCO had no duty to Plaintiffs regarding the installation of the pool. Further, NAMCO argued that Plaintiffs could not prove that its actions were the proximate cause of the child's death. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for NAMCO. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a factual issue remained in dispute as to whether the installer acted as NAMCO's agent; and (2) the issue of whether NAMCO had a duty to vet the installers it recommended could not be resolved on summary judgment. View "Oliver v. Narragansett Bay Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the September 20, 2016 judgment of the superior court entering judgment against Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. and affirmed the November 9, 2016 order of the superior court granting Family Dollar's emergency motion for a thirty-day extension of time within which to file its notice of appeal, holding that the hearing justice erred in dismissing Family Dollar's declaratory judgment action.Family Dollar filed this action against Justin B. Araujo seeking a declaratory judgment that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement releasing Family Dollar from claims that Araujo asserted against it in his charge before the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights and also alleging breach of contract. The Commission was added as an additional party to the case. The hearing justice granted Defendants' motions to dismiss on the basis that the proper forum for this action was before the Commission. Family Dollar later filed an emergency motion for a thirty-day time extension, which the hearing justice granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in finding excusable neglect in this case; and (2) Family Dollar's declaratory judgment action may proceed in superior court on remand. View "Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Araujo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the appellate division of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial judge finding that work-sharing benefits were properly not included in Petitioner's average weekly wage for workers' compensation benefits, holding that work-sharing benefits received pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 28-44-69 may not be taken into account when determining the average weekly wage to be used in calculating workers' compensation benefits pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 28-33-20.Petitioner was injured during the course of his employment and was unable to work for two months. At the time of the injury, Petitioner received work-sharing benefits from the state under an approved work-sharing program pursuant to section 28-44-69, in addition to receiving remuneration. Petitioner applied for workers' compensation benefits, but Petitioner's "average weekly wage" calculation did not take into account the work-sharing benefits Petitioner had been receiving. Petitioner filed a "claim for a trial" to challenge the calculation of his average weekly wage. The trial judge concluded that Petitioner's work-sharing benefits were properly not included in his average weekly wage. The appellate division of the WCC affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that work-sharing benefits are not included as part of the term "wages" in section 28-33-20. View "Powers v. Warwick Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the hearing justice that Plaintiff, Christy's Auto Rentals, Inc., lacked standing to bring this declaratory judgment action against Christian Lanoie and his insurer, Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company (Homeland), holding that the hearing justice correctly ruled that Homeland did not waive the standing defense and that Christy's lacked standing to pursue this declaratory judgment action.In this action against Homeland, Christy's sought a ruling that the damages Lanoie caused to its rental vehicle and a trailer owned by a third party were covered under Lanoie's policy with Homeland. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Homeland because Christy's had not secured a judgment against Lanoie. The hearing justice went on to opine that Lanoie's insurance policy with Homeland did not provide coverage for the collision giving rise to the underlying dispute and that such coverage was not statutorily mandated. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling with respect to Christy's lack of standing, holding that Christy's asserted injury was conjectural and hypothetical unless and until there was and unsatisfied final judgment in Christy's tort action against Lanoie. View "Christy's Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the order of the superior court authorizing a permanent receiver to distribute the proceeds from the sale of 25 Burnside Avenue in Narragansett in accordance with the receiver's recommendations, holding that the order is vacated to the extent that it deducted the entire balance of an outstanding mortgage from Kevin Hunt's share of the proceeds.The property in this case was owned by Kevin and Alice Hunt as tenants by the entirety. After the family court dissolved the Hunts' marriage, Bank scheduled a sale of the property to foreclose upon the mortgage. Alice filed a petition for receivership to protect her equity interests in the property, and the property was placed into temporary judicial receivership. The receiver eventually sold the property and filed a final report and a recommendation on allowance of claims. The superior court entered an order adopting the receiver's recommendations. The Supreme Court held that the superior court justice (1) did not err when he concluded that the net proceeds were to be distributed equally between Kevin and Alice; (2) erred when he attributed the mortgage wholly to Kevin; and (3) did not err by ordering Kevin to pay rent retroactively. View "In re 25 Burnside Avenue, Narragansett, R.I." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial after a jury found in favor of Defendants in this negligence action, holding that the motion was properly denied.Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence against Defendants seeking damages for injuries Plaintiff sustained when she slipped on some ice on pavement on Defendants' property. Plaintiffs also sought punitive damages, alleging that Defendants' conduct was reckless and willful. The punitive damages claim was dismissed after Plaintiffs rested their case. After deliberating, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and failed to do substantial justice between the parties. The trial justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material and relevant evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. View "Letizio v. Ritacco" on Justia Law