Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Jason Ortiz, was charged with several criminal counts, including carrying a pistol without a license, domestic assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The charges stemmed from an incident in which Ortiz was apprehended by police after a domestic dispute. The police found a pistol in the vicinity of Ortiz's arrest, and DNA evidence linked Ortiz to the weapon. Ortiz was nineteen years old and a resident of Massachusetts at the time of his arrest.In the Superior Court for Providence County, Ortiz filed a motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a pistol without a license, arguing that the Rhode Island statute requiring a license to carry a pistol violated his Second Amendment rights. The state objected, arguing that Ortiz lacked standing to challenge the statute because he had never applied for a license and therefore had not been denied one. The trial justice denied Ortiz's motion to dismiss, finding that Ortiz lacked standing to challenge the statute and that the statute was reasonably adopted to address the government's interest in reducing gun violence. After a bench trial, Ortiz was found guilty of carrying a pistol without a license and sentenced to five years imprisonment, with eighteen months to serve and the balance of the sentence suspended, with probation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Ortiz argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss. He contended that the licensing statute violated his Second Amendment rights and that he had standing to challenge the statute because he was being punished for violating it. The state argued that Ortiz lacked standing to challenge the statute because he had not applied for a license. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that Ortiz lacked standing to challenge the licensing statute because he had not applied for a license and would not have qualified for one had he applied due to his age and residency. The court declined to reach Ortiz's arguments regarding the constitutionality of the licensing statute. View "State v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff, Carol Allen, who slipped and fell on the steps of Newport City Hall during a winter storm, resulting in severe injuries. Allen alleged that the city and its employees were negligent in failing to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions. The case was heard in the Superior Court, where the trial justice ruled in favor of Allen, finding that the city and its employees had a duty to clear the steps of snow and ice, even during an ongoing storm, due to "unusual circumstances."The city and its employees appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. They argued that the trial justice erred in not applying the "Connecticut Rule," which states that a property owner's duty to clear snow and ice does not arise until a reasonable time after a storm has ended. The city argued that the storm was ongoing at the time of Allen's fall, and therefore, they did not owe her a duty to clear the steps.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with the city and its employees. The court found that the trial justice had erred in applying the "unusual circumstances" exception to the Connecticut Rule. The court clarified that "unusual circumstances" exist when a property owner's actions exacerbate the inherent risk of traveling during a storm, not when the owner fails to alleviate the danger. In this case, the city and its employees did not engage in any behavior that increased the risk to Allen. Therefore, the court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the city and its employees. View "Allen v. Sitrin" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Josephson, LLC, doing business as The Moinian Group (Moinian), filed a lawsuit against its insurance company, Affiliated FM Insurance Company (AFM), seeking coverage for losses sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moinian argued that the presence of COVID-19 at its insured properties constituted "physical loss or damage" under its insurance policy. The trial justice, however, determined that the presence of COVID-19 alone did not constitute "physical loss or damage" sufficient to implicate the coverage provisions. The trial justice also concluded that the Contamination Exclusion in the insurance policy unambiguously barred coverage because contamination, such as COVID-19, was expressly excluded under the terms of the policy.The Superior Court granted AFM's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Moinian's motion for partial summary judgment. The court determined that the presence of COVID-19 at Moinian's insured properties did not constitute "physical loss or damage" under the terms of the policy. The court also found that the Contamination Exclusion in the policy unambiguously applied to bar Moinian's claim. Moinian appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial justice's determination. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation of the Contamination Exclusion in the insurance policy. The court concluded that the exclusion for "contamination" was intended to limit coverage for a "type of risk," not a "type of loss." Therefore, the court held that Moinian's losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic were not covered under the insurance policy. View "Josephson v. Affiliated FM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gail M. McCormick, filed a personal injury lawsuit against Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc. (NICO) for injuries she sustained in a motorcycle accident on May 29, 2010. McCormick alleged that she lost control of her motorcycle due to unguarded manhole covers on a road in Cranston, Rhode Island, which NICO was contracted to repair. NICO failed to respond to the lawsuit, and a default judgment was entered against them on November 18, 2011. However, NICO later sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that they had not begun repairs on the road until after the accident occurred.The Superior Court granted NICO's motion to vacate the default judgment. The case proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in March 2022, which resulted in a verdict in favor of NICO. McCormick subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial justice.McCormick appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating the default judgment and in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment without requiring NICO to provide evidence explaining their failure to respond to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for a hearing on the assessment of damages. View "McCormick v. Narragansett Improvement Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Xavier T. Vidot, an inmate, filed a complaint against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) and its officials, alleging that they failed to provide inmates with a daily minimum of 8.5 hours outside their cells, in violation of RIDOC's internal policy and a state statute. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus, a declaration of violation, and a permanent injunction.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RIDOC's internal policies do not establish a private cause of action for inmates and that the application of these policies involves discretionary decisions. The plaintiff responded, asserting that the defendants had a ministerial legal duty to operate in accordance with RIDOC's policy and that the statute does not afford the defendants any discretion except that which is allowed by internal policies.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the policies governing these issues are internal and discretionary, as they are not codified in the statute. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that the statute outlining the duties of the director of the Department of Corrections clearly bestows upon the director a great deal of discretion in the exercise of his or her duties. The court also found that both the previous and amended versions of RIDOC's policy contemplate that RIDOC must exercise its discretion in "exigent circumstances," in the case of "emergencies," or in the event of "overriding conditions"—all for the purpose of maintaining a "safe and orderly operation of the facility." Therefore, the court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in denying relief in the form of a writ of mandamus and in granting the motion to dismiss. View "Vidot v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

The case involves North Farm Home Owners Association, Inc. (North Farm) and the Bristol County Water Authority (BCWA). North Farm, a multi-building condominium complex in Bristol, Rhode Island, had granted several easements to BCWA, a public utility responsible for providing water to residential and commercial customers in Bristol County. From 1975 to 1995, BCWA measured water service to each condominium unit individually. However, between 1993 and 1995, representatives of the parties discussed converting the individual meter system to a centralized, master meter system. This correspondence is at the heart of the dispute.The Superior Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of BCWA on counts three and four of North Farm's third amended complaint. North Farm appealed, arguing that a valid contract was formed through their 1993–1995 correspondence, that the hearing justice ignored allegations that the 2019 pass-through rate was illegal, and that the hearing justice denied North Farm’s motion to amend without a finding of prejudice.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the 1993–1995 correspondence did not establish the existence of a contract as a matter of law. The court held that the letters did not show the parties’ mutual assent to the material contract terms by means of offer and acceptance. The court also found that North Farm failed to produce sufficient evidence that a valid contract for the material terms existed. Therefore, the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment on count three of the third amended complaint was proper. The court also affirmed the hearing justice's grant of summary judgment on count four, as North Farm did not properly plead any basis for granting injunctive or compensatory relief due to BCWA’s purported unlawful discrimination. View "North Farm Home Owners Association, Inc. v. Bristol County Water Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves Miguel Tebalan Rivera who was convicted of second-degree murder and commission of a crime of violence while in possession of a knife with a blade longer than three inches. Rivera filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder.The trial court granted Rivera's application for postconviction relief, finding that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced Rivera's defense. The court found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder. The court also found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to recognize and explain to Rivera that if he did not testify, he would be waiving his right to present his claim of self-defense.The State of Rhode Island appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Rivera's trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Rivera's trial counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced Rivera's defense. The court found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder. The court also found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to recognize and explain to Rivera that if he did not testify, he would be waiving his right to present his claim of self-defense. View "Rivera v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The case involves Napoleao Pires, who was convicted for carrying a firearm without a license and possession of a controlled substance. The conviction was based on evidence obtained when a police officer, responding to a dispatch, stopped and searched Pires. The dispatch reported a man matching Pires' description walking around with a gun. Upon arrival, the officer did not observe any criminal activity or see a gun, but stopped Pires based on the dispatch information. Pires challenged the trial justice’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the seizure violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.The Superior Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and concluded that the gun and cocaine had been lawfully seized. The court found that the officer's thirty years of experience, the dispatch sending him to a high-crime area, Pires' match to the dispatch description, Pires' noncompliance to the officer’s commands, and Pires' pivot to reach for his waistband amounted to the level of reasonable suspicion required to justify the warrantless stop.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the decision on the motion to suppress and vacated the judgment of conviction. The court held that Pires was seized the moment he complied with the officer’s order to raise his hands. The court found that the state failed to submit adequate evidence to show that reasonable suspicion existed at the inception of Pires' encounter with the officer. The court concluded that Pires' Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the state failed to submit adequate evidence to show that reasonable suspicion existed at the inception of his encounter with the officer. View "State v. Pires" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, was married to Donelson C. Glassie, and they divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement, the testator was to execute a will that would treat his obligations under the agreement as a claim against his estate and bequest to the plaintiff an amount equal to said obligations. A dispute arose over what the agreement required of the testator’s will. In 1997, a Family Court justice determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a bequest of a sum equal to the testator’s obligations. The testator died in 2011, and the plaintiff filed a claim for $2,000,000 against the testator’s estate a year later, which the defendant disallowed.The case was previously reviewed by the Superior Court, which awarded the plaintiff $2,000,000, less the proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the testator’s death and attorneys’ fees. However, this judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court on multiple grounds, including that the disputed provision in the will was ambiguous and required factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to the testator’s intent.In the current review by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice made numerous prejudicial evidentiary rulings that prevented her from presenting her case. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found no error in the trial justice’s decisions to prevent the plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding a trust, to allow the defendant to withdraw certain admissions, to admit evidence of a life insurance policy, and to allow evidence of the defendant’s post-death conduct. The court also found that the plaintiff had not preserved her argument regarding the trial justice’s decision to prevent her from examining the defendant about his counterclaim. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the denial of a disability pension application by a former state trooper, James Donnelly-Taylor. The defendants are the State of Rhode Island, Division of the State Police, and the Colonel of the State Police and Governor in their official capacities. The trooper had been involved in an incident where he assaulted an individual he had arrested. Following this incident, he reported experiencing personal and work-related stress and was placed on injured-on-duty status. Later, he was indicted on one count of simple assault. He pleaded nolo contendere to the assault charge and was ordered to perform community service. The trooper remained out of work and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. He applied for a disability pension, which was denied by the superintendent of the state police.The superintendent's decision was appealed to the Superior Court, which found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case back to the superintendent for further consideration. The superintendent issued a supplemental decision, maintaining the denial of the disability pension. The Superior Court again found the superintendent's decision to be arbitrary and capricious and reversed the denial, instructing the superintendent to grant the trooper's request for a disability pension.The State of Rhode Island appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, finding that the superintendent's denial of the disability pension was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court held that the superintendent had reasonable grounds to conclude that the trooper's assault of the individual was not in the course of performance of his duties as a state police officer, and therefore his disabling injuries were not suffered in the course of performance of his duties. The case was remanded back to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rhode Island Troopers Association v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law