Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Warwick Wings, LLC, a Rhode Island limited liability company operating as Hooters of Warwick, faced significant damage to its building due to snow and ice in 2015. Odeh Engineers, Inc. evaluated the damage and concluded that the roof trusses needed a full rebuild. Nadeau Corporation estimated the repair costs at $1,250,000. Warwick Wings contracted Americo Mallozzi to provide architectural plans for the repairs, agreeing to pay 11% of the final construction cost, initially estimated at $137,500. Mallozzi completed several phases of the project, but Warwick Wings only paid $46,848.55 and later claimed to have terminated the contract.Warwick Wings filed a lawsuit against its insurer, Liberty Mutual, over the scope of necessary repairs. The case was settled for $785,000, but Warwick Wings did not make further payments to Mallozzi. Mallozzi then sued Warwick Wings in Providence County Superior Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking the remaining amount due under the contract. The Superior Court found in favor of Mallozzi, awarding him $63,151.45 in damages and $74,777.74 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the contract was unambiguous and called for a lump-sum payment based on the initial estimated construction cost. The trial justice's findings that Mallozzi completed 80% of the contract and that Warwick Wings breached the contract were upheld. The Court also found no error in the trial justice's award of attorneys' fees, concluding that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by Warwick Wings. View "Americo Mallozzi v. Warwick Wings, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Richard Paiva, an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), filed a suit against Lynne Corry, the warden of the maximum-security facility, in Providence County Superior Court. Paiva sought a declaratory judgment and either a writ of mandamus or an injunction based on a Department of Corrections (DOC) policy that mandates a daily minimum out-of-cell time of 8.5 hours for general population inmates, barring exigent circumstances. Paiva argued that this policy was a legislative rule with the force of law and sought declarations to that effect, along with enforcement of the policy.The defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that DOC policies do not create a private cause of action and that prison officials have discretion in matters affecting facility security. The defendant also contended that the DOC director, an indispensable party, was not named in the complaint. The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, leading to Paiva's appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court noted procedural issues, including the absence of transcripts from the lower court proceedings, which hindered appellate review. More critically, the Court found that Paiva's failure to join the DOC director as a defendant was fatal to his request for declaratory relief, as the director's interests would be affected by such a declaration. Additionally, the Court held that a writ of mandamus was inappropriate because the DOC policies involved discretionary functions, not ministerial duties. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Paiva v. Corry" on Justia Law

Brian Smith was charged with simple assault and second-degree child molestation in 2015 for an incident at a Newport Polo event where he allegedly touched two children inappropriately. He was found guilty of simple assault and sentenced to two years in prison. While this case was pending, Smith was charged with second-degree child molestation in 2015 after his niece reported that he had sexually assaulted her in 2004. Smith pled nolo contendere and was sentenced to ten years, with two years to serve. In 2016, Smith faced additional charges of second-degree child molestation involving three other victims. He pled nolo contendere to two counts and was sentenced to ten years, with six years to serve.The Sex Offender Board of Review classified Smith as a level III sex offender, indicating a high risk to reoffend. Smith objected to this classification and sought review in the Superior Court. The Superior Court magistrate affirmed the board’s classification after considering various risk-assessment tools, police narratives, and Smith’s criminal history. Smith appealed the magistrate’s decision to a Superior Court justice, who also affirmed the classification, concluding that the magistrate had not erred in his decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that Smith’s procedural due process rights were not violated, as he was given ample opportunity to challenge the board’s findings. The Court also determined that the state had established a prima facie case for the level III classification using validated risk-assessment tools and other relevant evidence. Smith’s arguments regarding the improper consideration of his nolo contendere pleas and the board’s use of unsubstantiated information were rejected. The Court concluded that the board had used reasonable means to collect information and that the state’s interest in protecting the community justified the classification. View "Rhode Island Department of Attorney General v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters, challenged the constitutionality of a 2011 Medicare Ordinance enacted by the City of Providence, which required retirees to enroll in Medicare upon eligibility and terminated city-paid health care coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. The plaintiffs, who opted out of a settlement agreement that provided certain Medicare-related benefits, sought retroactive reimbursement for out-of-pocket health care expenses incurred during the litigation.The Superior Court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, denied relief on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews II remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the specific provisions of the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not include retroactive reimbursement for health care expenses.Upon remand, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, but the Superior Court denied this request, concluding that such relief was outside the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate in Andrews II. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that the mandate in Andrews II did not contemplate or include retroactive relief for health care expenses. The Court emphasized that the mandate was prospective in nature and aligned with the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not provide for reimbursement of past expenses. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had waived claims for individual damages during the trial and had not sought such damages in their amended complaint. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NGM Insurance Company (NGM). NEPSG had been assigned the insurance claim benefits by the policyholders, Stephen and Betty Callahan, for storm-related damage to their residence. NGM initially covered some damages but denied others, leading to a series of inspections and disagreements over the loss amount. Eventually, an appraisal process was conducted, resulting in an award that NEPSG found unsatisfactory due to updated labor costs published after the award was signed.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to NGM, finding that NEPSG was not entitled to a modification of the appraisal award or a second appraisal. The court also found that NEPSG failed to establish its claims for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. NEPSG argued that the award should be modified due to a miscalculation of labor costs and that NGM acted in bad faith by using unlicensed appraisers, among other claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the appraisal award was akin to an arbitration award and thus subject to limited judicial review. NEPSG's request for modification based on post-award labor cost updates was not supported by admissible evidence. The court also found no basis for a second appraisal or for NEPSG's claims of breach of contract and bad faith, as NGM had fulfilled its contractual obligations and there was no evidence of bad faith. Additionally, the court rejected NEPSG's claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference, finding no inequitable benefit retained by NGM and no evidence of intentional harm to NEPSG's contract with the policyholders. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. NGM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter’s Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment against the City of Providence (the city) regarding entitlement to occupational cancer disability benefits under Rhode Island General Laws chapter 19.1 of title 45, “Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters.” The Association argued that its retired members were entitled to these benefits under the state law, while the city contended that benefits should be processed under a local ordinance.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the state law applied to all firefighters, including those retired from the Providence Fire Department, regardless of the city's participation in the Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS). The court relied on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local 850, which interpreted the state law to apply broadly to all firefighters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Providence System, a comprehensive retirement benefits program established by a special legislative act, supersedes the general state statute. The court referenced its prior decision in Betz v. Paolino, which established that special legislative provisions for the Providence System prevail over state statutes of general application. Consequently, the court determined that the city is not required to process applications for occupational cancer benefits under the state law but should follow the local ordinance. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment for the city. View "The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's Association v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Paula M. Montaquila, appealed a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Flagstar Bank, FSB, regarding the foreclosure sale of property located at 33 Zella Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Ms. Montaquila and her son had obtained a mortgage with Flagstar in 2008, using the property as collateral, and later executed a partial claim mortgage in 2016. Flagstar sent a notice of intent to foreclose to the property via certified mail and conducted a foreclosure sale, which Ms. Montaquila challenged, alleging that Flagstar failed to comply with statutory notice requirements by not sending the notice to her last known address at 25 Enfield Avenue.The Superior Court granted Flagstar's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was affirmed in part and vacated in part by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Flagstar had satisfied the statutory notice requirements as to Ms. Montaquila. On remand, Flagstar filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had complied with the notice requirements by sending the notice to the property address, where Ms. Montaquila was listed as an assessed owner.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding Flagstar's compliance with the statutory notice requirements. The court held that the last generally recognized address for Ms. Montaquila, relating to the real estate subject to the mortgage, was 33 Zella Street. Flagstar had complied with the statutory requirements by sending the notice to that address. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, granting summary judgment in favor of Flagstar. View "Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Charles Pona, sought review of two orders from the Superior Court that summarily dismissed his applications for postconviction relief from two murder convictions. Pona was indicted in 2000 for the murder of Hector Feliciano and later orchestrated the murder of a witness, Jennifer Rivera, in 2003. He was convicted of Feliciano's murder in 2000 and Rivera's murder in 2010 after a retrial. Pona's applications for postconviction relief alleged that the Superior Court fraudulently obtained jurisdiction over him, transforming him from a natural person into an artificial person.The Superior Court issued a notice of intention to dismiss Pona's applications, stating that his claims were specious. Pona responded, reiterating his original contentions. The hearing justice dismissed the applications without a hearing, concluding that Pona's claims were baseless and noting that Pona did not request an attorney and entered his appearances pro se.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on whether Pona was denied his statutory right to counsel as a first-time applicant for postconviction relief under § 10-9.1-5. The Court held that an indigent, first-time applicant is entitled to counsel before summary dismissal of their application, even if the claims appear meritless. The Court found that Pona's waiver of his right to counsel was not verified as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary since no hearing was conducted.The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court's orders and instructed the lower court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Pona intended to proceed pro se and if his decision was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. View "Pona v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law