Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, purchased property at 5 Bowser Court in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), acquired adjacent property at 51 Kingston Avenue. A dispute arose when NRI's representative, John Gullison, conducted renovations and removed part of the plaintiffs' cobblestone landing, claiming it encroached on NRI's property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over the disputed land based on the doctrine of acquiescence, adverse possession, and an easement by prescription.The Superior Court awarded title to the plaintiffs for the disputed land, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired the land through the doctrine of acquiescence. The court also granted title to other abutters of Bowser Court, even though they had not requested such relief. NRI appealed, arguing that the trial justice misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence and erred in awarding title to other abutters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice erred in granting relief to the other abutters who had not requested it. The court also determined that the doctrine of acquiescence was not applicable because the disputed boundary was not solely on the parties' adjoining lots but also bordered Bowser Court. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription over the five-foot strip of land, as they had used the walkway openly, continuously, and hostilely for the statutory period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in part, recognizing the plaintiffs' easement by prescription, and vacated the part of the judgment granting relief to the other abutters. View "Urbonas v. Gullison" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 26, 2018, David Page was shot and killed while picking up acquaintances at 100 Lowell Avenue. The Providence Police Department (PPD) responded and found Mr. Page unresponsive in his car. Surveillance footage showed a black vehicle near the scene. On July 2, 2018, during unrelated investigations, police found a black Audi linked to Kennedy Terrero. Further investigation connected this Audi to the shooting. Terrero, under a cooperation agreement, testified against Jaythan Hang and Chandanoeuth Hay, implicating them in the shooting.The Superior Court jury found Hang guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy, felony assault, and firearms offenses. Hang appealed, arguing the trial justice erred in several pretrial and trial rulings, including denying a motion for severance, admitting evidence of prior bad acts, admitting statements against interest, and allowing lay opinion testimony. He also challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy count.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's decisions. The court held that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible to show motive and intent, and the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting the corroborative evidence and testimony presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Hang" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on charges including first-degree robbery, conspiracy, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possessing pistols without licenses. He reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a maximum sentence of eighty years with fifty years to serve, twenty of which would be nonparolable, and a thirty-year suspended sentence. The defendant pled guilty, and the trial justice accepted the plea and sentenced him to a term of twenty years, a concurrent term of ten years, a consecutive term of twenty years without parole, a consecutive suspended sentence of twenty years, and a concurrent suspended sentence of ten years.The defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35, arguing that the trial justice misconceived material evidence and failed to consider mitigating factors. The state objected, asserting that the defendant had forfeited his right to file a Rule 35 motion as part of his plea agreement. The trial justice denied the motion, finding no grounds for relief, and the defendant appealed.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice did not demonstrate prejudice or personal bias against the defendant, and his decision not to recuse himself was proper. The court also held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion, as the defendant's sentence was below the statutory maximum and the agreed-upon cap. The court affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "State v. McLean" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dino J. Guilmette, owned a property in North Providence, Rhode Island, and executed a mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation in 2006. The mortgage was later assigned to Wells Fargo, with PHH Mortgage Services as the servicing company. Guilmette requested a modification of his mortgage in 2014, resulting in a Shared Appreciation Modification Agreement. This agreement increased the principal balance and included a provision for a shared appreciation amount if the property value increased and was sold.Guilmette sold the property in 2022 and disputed the calculation of the shared appreciation amount provided by PHH. He argued that PHH's calculation was incorrect and that they overcharged him by $40,708.33. Guilmette filed a breach of contract action, claiming that PHH did not properly calculate the shared appreciation amount according to the modification agreement.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, PHH and Wells Fargo, concluding that the modification agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court found that the defendants correctly calculated the shared appreciation amount based on the terms of the agreement and the attached disclosure statement, which provided specific examples of the calculation method.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the modification agreement was unambiguous and that the defendants' calculation of the shared appreciation amount was correct. The court emphasized that the disclosure statement, which was part of the agreement and signed by Guilmette, clearly illustrated the calculation method, and there was no ambiguity in the contract terms. View "Guilmette v. PHH Mortgage Services FKA Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

Jacquelin Glassie filed a claim against the estate of her father, Donelson Glassie, alleging he breached a property settlement agreement by failing to adequately fund a trust established for her benefit. The executor of Donelson's estate, Paul Doucette, disallowed the claim, leading to a lawsuit in the Superior Court. After Jacquelin's death, her sister Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin's estate, continued the lawsuit. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment for the estate, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trustee of the trust, Wells Fargo, was the proper plaintiff. Wells Fargo then assigned its claims to Alison.A jury trial in the Superior Court resulted in a verdict for Alison, awarding her $1,164,138.43 in damages, which, with prejudgment interest, totaled $2,856,572.45. The jury also rejected the estate's counterclaim that Jacquelin had forfeited her interest under Donelson's will. The defendant, Doucette, filed a notice of appeal but failed to timely order the trial transcripts, leading Alison to move to dismiss the appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case after the Superior Court granted Alison's motion to dismiss the appeal due to Doucette's failure to timely order the transcripts and follow proper procedures for an extension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that Doucette's reasons for the delay, including hopes for mediation and cost-saving, did not constitute excusable neglect. The Court noted the extensive litigation history and the trial justice's efforts to move the case forward, concluding that the deadlines were necessary and should be adhered to. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. to their four eldest children, J.R., E.R., A.R., and D.R. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved after the fourth child tested positive for cocaine at birth in March 2016. All four children were removed from the home and never returned. The parents were referred to various programs and services, but they showed minimal progress and compliance, leading to the filing of termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions in August 2017. Despite some progress in later years, including reunification with their two youngest children through the Safe and Secure Baby Court (SSBC), the parents never progressed to unsupervised or overnight visits with the four eldest children.The Family Court terminated the parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. after a trial that spanned several weeks and included testimony from multiple witnesses. The trial justice found that the parents were unfit, that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The parents appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in these findings and in admitting the guardian ad litem (GAL) report.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decrees. The Court found that the trial justice's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, including the parents' lack of compliance with service plans and the children's need for a permanent home. The Court also held that the admission of the GAL report, although hearsay, was harmless error given the overall evidence supporting the termination. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the children's best interests and the significant progress the parents had made, but ultimately upheld the termination of parental rights. View "In re J.R.; In re E.R.; In re A.R.; In re D.R" on Justia Law

In 1995, Michael Lambert was indicted for first-degree murder and later convicted of second-degree murder and committing a crime of violence while armed. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and an additional consecutive ten-year sentence for the crime of violence. His convictions were affirmed in 1997. After being denied parole multiple times, Lambert was granted parole in 2019, effective December 2020. However, in 2020, the Parole Board amended its decision, stating Lambert should have been paroled to his consecutive sentence, not the community.Lambert filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2021, claiming unlawful detention due to the Rhode Island Department of Corrections' (RIDOC) method of calculating parole eligibility. The petition was treated as an application for postconviction relief, and the Superior Court appointed counsel for Lambert. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted Lambert's motion, ordering his immediate release on parole to the community.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to aggregate Lambert's sentences for parole eligibility, referencing its recent decision in Neves v. State, which mandated aggregating sentences for parole purposes. However, the Court quashed the part of the Superior Court's judgment that ordered Lambert's immediate release to the community, stating that the Parole Board had only paroled him to his consecutive sentence, not the community. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lambert v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

Matthew O. appealed the Family Court's decision to terminate his parental rights to his two sons, N.O. and K.O. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) initially became involved with the family due to the mother's drug use. N.O. was placed in foster care, and K.O., born later, was also placed in the same foster home due to his developmental disability. Matthew worked towards reunification but faced challenges, including his mental health issues and cognitive limitations.The Family Court initially denied DCYF's first petition to terminate Matthew's parental rights, finding that DCYF had not made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children. However, DCYF filed a second petition, and after a trial, the Family Court granted the petition, concluding that Matthew was unfit to parent due to his cognitive limitations and poor judgment, and that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to provide him with services aimed at reunification.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Matthew with his children by providing tailored services and support. Despite these efforts, Matthew was unable to make sufficient progress in improving his parenting abilities. The Court also noted that Matthew's refusal to consistently engage in mental health treatment was a significant barrier to reunification. The Supreme Court concluded that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Matthew's parental rights, as they were thriving in their foster home and needed permanency. View "In re N.O." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeanette Runey, filed a lawsuit against her neighbor, Wayne S. Faring, over a boundary dispute involving a shared driveway between their properties. The plaintiff owns property at 930 East Wallum Lake Road, while the defendant owns property at 860-900 East Wallum Lake Road. In 2019, the defendant initiated an action to determine ownership of the driveway, claiming easement by prescription, necessity, implication, and/or estoppel. The plaintiff counterclaimed for declaratory relief. In 2021, a Superior Court justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that she had title to the disputed land, and the defendant did not. Neither party appealed this decision.The plaintiff then sought a preliminary injunction to remove the defendant’s personal property from the disputed land. The defendant opposed, claiming adverse possession. A different Superior Court justice denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal after it had been docketed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the proper method to seek review of the denial of a preliminary injunction is through a petition for writ of certiorari, not a direct appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.The Supreme Court also expressed concern over the motion justice’s disregard for the unappealed April 7, 2022 judgment, emphasizing the importance of res judicata, which bars the relitigation of issues that were or could have been tried in an earlier action. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Runey v. Faring" on Justia Law

In 1990, Robert Raso pled nolo contendere to multiple criminal charges, including second-degree sexual assault, arson, and various robberies. He was sentenced to forty years, with twelve years to serve and twenty-eight years suspended with probation. After serving his time, Raso was released on probation. In 2011, a probation-violation report was filed against Raso, alleging he had sexually assaulted his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, Natalie. During the probation-violation hearing, Natalie testified about the abuse, and despite a coerced recantation, the court found her original testimony credible. The court revoked Raso’s suspended sentence, ordering him to serve twenty-five years.Raso appealed the probation-violation determination, which was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Subsequently, Raso filed a motion to terminate his imprisonment under G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18(b)(5), arguing that the dismissal of the first-degree sexual assault charge indicated a lack of probable cause. The Superior Court denied this motion, finding no doubt about Raso’s culpability or probable cause.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s decision. The court found that the state’s dismissal of the first-degree sexual assault charge was motivated by a desire to spare Natalie further trauma and satisfaction with the twenty-five-year sentence, not due to a lack of probable cause or doubt about Raso’s culpability. The court emphasized that Raso had received a full evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial justices were supported by the record. The order denying the motion to terminate imprisonment was affirmed. View "State v. Raso" on Justia Law