Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, a family court justice terminated a mother's rights to her two children. The mother appealed, arguing (1) the trial justice erred in finding that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) proved by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to cooperate with services, that she was an unfit parent, and that it was in the children's best interests that mother's parental rights be terminated; and (2) the trial justice erred in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she concluded that the mother's successful completion of a drug-treatment program twenty months after her children were removed from her care was insufficient to rebut a presumption of chronic substance abuse; and (2) because the trial justice terminated the mother's parental rights on the ground of chronic substance abuse, any of DCYF's shortcomings with respect to other problems were only relevant if they contributed to the mother's inability to overcome her difficulties with substance abuse. The Court concluded that because the record gave no indication that the mother was incapable of succeeding with substance-abuse treatment the trial justice did not clearly err. View "In re Destiney L., et al." on Justia Law

Shianna Kelly was found guilty by jury of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. Kelly appealed on the ground that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice performed the correct analysis in deciding defendant's motion for a new trial and was not clearly wrong in denying the motion; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis that the judge allowed testimony after a discovery violation; and (3) the issue of whether a surveillance DVD and photographs were properly admitted at trial was not properly preserved for appellate review. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Timothy and Barbara Barrow purchased property from Herbert and Claire Weida. Before the sale the Weidas obtained permission from the adjoining landowner, Peter Dunn, to use a strip of land between their property and a stone wall on Dunn's property. After the sale the Barrows continued to use the strip of land just as the Weidas had done. The Barrows later filed suit to quiet title to the land they had been using. The Barrows argued they held title through adverse possession or, in the alternative, boundary by acquiescence. The trial justice denied the Barrows' request, concluding that the Barrows failed to prove they had met the requirements for adverse possession and failed to show boundary by acquiescence. The Supreme Court held that because the Weidas had permission from Dunn to use the strip of land, the permissive nature of that use could only become hostile when that permission was withdrawn or when the nature of the use changed. As neither event occurred in this case, the judgment of the trial justice was affirmed. View "Barrow, et al. v. D&B Valley Associates, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Rather than undertaking appeals from the assessment of taxes on its gas assets in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-26(a), plaintiff electric company sought declaratory and injunctive relief directly from the superior court. Plaintiff sued the taxing authorities of most of Rhode Island's municipalities, requesting a declaration that because the municipalities failed to tax plaintiff's gas assets as tangible personal property, they assessed illegal taxes. The trial justice dismissed all but one count of plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff did not file a timely appeal or invoke the court's equitable jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Because plaintiff elected to bypass the applicable review procedures and proceed directly to the superior court, plaintiff failed to establish that it had been assessed an illegal tax. Thus, plaintiff could not avail itself of the direct appeal to the superior court. View "Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Horton appealed from a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of the police department defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's thirteen-count complaint which alleged, among other complaints, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, tortious denial of access to public records, violations of civil rights, and failure to destroy records after exoneration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants possessed probable cause for each instance of prosecution, arrest, and imprisonment, making a grant of summary judgment appropriate; and (2) because Horton failed to provide analysis of the remaining questions in his appeal, those contentions were deemed waived for appellate review. View "Duane Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep't, et al." on Justia Law

In a financial dispute between two charter schools and a local school district about how the local share of the charter school tuition reimbursement should be computed, the commissioner of elementary and secondary education directed that enrollment during the reference year, or 2008, be used to calculate the district's share. The board of regents reversed, interpreting the Charter Public School Act of Rhode Island to mean that the district must pay sums due to charter schools using as a computational basis the current fiscal year, or 2010. The Supreme Court upheld the board's decision, holding that the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and the board's determination was not clearly erroneous. The Court also found that the board did not err when it affirmed the commissioner's decision to sever the district's asserted defense of unclean hands and treat it as a counterclaim. View "Kingston Hill Academy and The Compass Sch. v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the Town of North Providence complied with the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991 when it amended the town's zoning ordinance in 1999. The zoning law in question dealt with the notice and hearing requirements for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances. Plaintiff Generation Realty, LLC and several others owned or were prospective purchasers of land in North Providence. They brought suit against Defendants Kristen Catanzaro and other town officials, alleging that the town did not provide adequate notice of a public hearing on the 1999 amendments. Plaintiffs asserted that lack of such notice rendered the amendments null and void. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance at issue in this case was a "general amendment" under the Act, and as such, required only a public notice. The Court found that the lower court erred in deciding that the ordinance was specific, and therefore erred in ruling in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The City of Newport appealed a Superior Court order that ultimately made it liable for injuries sustained by Plaintiff Geraldine Sloat. In 2004, Ms. Sloat sued the City and State because she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Newport. She argued that the City and State were responsible for maintaining the sidewalks. The State denied liability but did not cross-claim the City. The City moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the State assumed maintenance of the sidewalk through a "Construction and Maintenance Agreement." The State responded to the City by producing another agreement that placed responsibility back on the City. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City alleged multiple technical errors at trial that lead to a misapplication of the law. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Virginia Sharkey appealed the dismissal of her legal malpractice claim against Defendant Attorney George Prescott. Plaintiff and her husband retained Attorney Prescott to prepare an estate plan. Mr. Prescott established a trust indenture that the Sharkeys executed in 1999. Subsequently, the Sharkeys signed a quitclaim deed, also prepared by Mr. Prescott, which conveyed two lots of land they owned to the trust. Plaintiff asserted that the trust was set up to care for the surviving spouse. Mr. Prescott sent Plaintiff a letter shortly thereafter, memorializing the actions he took on their behalf. Mr. Sharkey died in 2002. In 2003, Plaintiff wanted to sell one of the two lots conveyed to the trust. The local authority told Plaintiff that because both lots were conveyed to the trust, they effectively merged together, and could not be sold as she intended. In 2006, Plaintiff sought access to trust funds. The bank informed Plaintiff that she was not able to get access as she had intended. These two instances lead Plaintiff to believe that Mr. Prescott was negligent in the performance of his duties as her attorney. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against Mr. Prescott. Mr. Prescott moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Plaintiffâs claims against him were time-barred. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's case as time barred. After a review of the case, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to the letter Mr. Prescott sent memorializing the trust set-up. The Court reasoned that because Plaintiff claims she did not receive the letter, this created a "genuine issue of fact" that could not withstand a grant of summary judgment. For this, the Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, but affirmed it on all other respects. The case therefore, was remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant Memeh Kizekai appealed the conviction and sentence he received for "uttering and publishing" when he and co-Defendant Sonnah Sampson tried to cash a $7500 counterfeit check at a Pawtucket bank. Defendant argued that he should have received a new trial because the evidence presented against him was not credible or sufficient to support his conviction. Defendant and the State agreed that the case turned on whose testimony was more credible: Sampson's or Defendant's. The trial court acknowledged its role as "the 13th juror," and held that its determination was based on "whether or not the evidence placed before the court was sufficient to substantiate and sustain the verdict that the jury achieved." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "did not shirk his super juror duties." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.