Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael English pled nolo contendere to four counts of first-degree child molestation, one count of second-degree molestation, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of his relationship with victim, M.B. More than a decade later, the state filed a probation-violation notice, alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to adhere to the terms of the no-contact order after M.B. complained that defendant had come into contact with her. The hearing justice concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the superior court adjudicated defendant a violator of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that his contact with M.B. was merely coincidental and therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's determination that the state's evidence supported an adjudication of probation violation was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "State v. English" on Justia Law

Esther Randall, the mother of plaintiff Elton Randall and defendant Deborah Randall, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to her four children. After Esther's death, Deborah, as executrix of her mother's estate, filed in probate court a petition for the sale of real property in the estate. Elton then filed a claim to the property, alleging that his parents had made an agreement with him before their deaths that the premises would pass to him. The probate court granted the petition to sell the property and disallowed Elton's claim to the property. Elton appealed to the superior court. The court dismissed Elton's appeal, finding that Elton failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral contract with his parents and, therefore, Elton's claim to the property was barred by the statute of frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly err in concluding that Elton had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement with his parents. View "Randall v. Randall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Linda Pereira injured her left ankle when she fell into a depression in the grass at at park owned by the city of East Providence. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the city, alleging that the city negligently breached its duty to maintain the park in a reasonably safe condition and that it negligently failed to warn her of an unsafe condition on the premises. The defendant affirmatively alleged that the city was shielded from liability under the state Recreational Use Statute and filed a motion for summary judgment on this basis. The trial justice granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Recreational Use Statute immunized the city from liability. View "Pereira v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Martin Malinou filed a wrongful death and medical negligence action against Miriam Hospital and other medical professionals after his ninety-four year old mother died. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims were not supported by competent expert testimony and that plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof on the issues of breach of the standard of care and causation. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) given plaintiff's repeated noncompliance with discovery orders, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by precluding two doctors from testifying as expert witnesses; (2) because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his underlying claims for medical negligence and wrongful death, plaintiff did not have a viable claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or for loss of society and companionship; (3) adopting a loss-of-chance doctrine would not preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants; and (4) plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact in showing one of defendant doctors filed a false death certificate in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-18-1. View "Malinou v. The Miriam Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule. View "In re Will of Quigley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barry DuBois, an environmental officer, was seriously injured when he was bitten by a dog owned by defendant Frederick Quilitzsch while DuBois was inspecting a pigeon loft on defendant's property. DuBois and his wife filed a civil action against defendant, alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the alleged attack occurred within the enclosure of the home and the defendants had no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, and (2) any modification to the state's dog-bite law is best left to the legislature. View "DuBois v. Quilitzsch" on Justia Law

In 2001, the planning board of the town of East Greenwich granted final plan approval to plaintiff Carmine D'Ellena's proposed subdivision. In 2004, plaintiff's attorney requested a time extension, which the planning board granted. A condition to the extension was that plaintiff connect the development to a public water supply. In 2008, plaintiff filed a petition in the superior court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asking the court to declare the board's decision regarding the extension null and void. In support of his petition, plaintiff alleged that the planning board (1) violated state law by amending a final decision without application for and notice to plaintiff, (2) violated the notice rules by failing to provide notice to the plaintiff of its action, and (3) violated the open meetings law by failing to provide notice. The superior court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished and thereby waived whatever procedural and statutory rights were his regarding the 2004 board meeting when he took the action of telling his attorney that he agreed to add the condition of public water. View "D'Ellena v. Town of East Greenwich" on Justia Law

A police surveillance operation at a street intersection led to the conviction of defendant, Geornando Vargas, for one count of delivery of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued (1) that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented by the state amounted to an improper pyramiding of inferences and therefore was legally insufficient to support defendant's conviction, and (2) the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the justice misconceived the testimony of one of the state's witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that rather than deducing guilt from an ambiguous circumstantial fact, the state established a pattern of corroborating circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonable juror in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore affirmed the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion for acquittal; and (2) the trial justice did not misconceive the evidence when ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, and therefore, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion. View "State v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant John Ferreira was convicted for one count of first-degree child molestation and three counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In an order to show cause, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the justice did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial because (1) the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material inconsistencies; (2) the justice appropriately reviewed the entire record and sufficiently outlined her reasons for denying defendant's motion; (3) the justice did not clearly err in her credibility determinations or overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence; and (4) any error committed by the trial justice in referring to portions of matters not in evidence was harmless. View "State v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Nancy Rogers and plaintiff Shelter Harbor Conservation Society owned contiguous lots in the same subdivision. The Society filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Rogerses and town officials after the town zoning official issued zoning certificates designating three of the Rogerses lots for single-family residences, alleging that the certificates were void because they were issued after a merger of the lots. The superior court eventually granted summary judgment to the Rogerses, finding the lots were unmerged pursuant to the merger provision of the zoning ordinance. The Society appealed, contending (1) the evidence contained divergent interpretations of the map depicting the Rogerses' lots, and therefore the trial justice therefore improperly weighed the evidence at the summary-judgment stage and a trial on the merits was necessary to resolve the issue; and (2) the trial justice erred when she stayed the Society's attempts to obtain discovery from the Rogerses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the map was unambiguous; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in staying deposition notices that were not intended to obtain information relevant to the issue under consideration. View "The Shelter Harbor Conservation Society, Inc. v. Rogers, et al." on Justia Law