Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a financial dispute between two charter schools and a local school district about how the local share of the charter school tuition reimbursement should be computed, the commissioner of elementary and secondary education directed that enrollment during the reference year, or 2008, be used to calculate the district's share. The board of regents reversed, interpreting the Charter Public School Act of Rhode Island to mean that the district must pay sums due to charter schools using as a computational basis the current fiscal year, or 2010. The Supreme Court upheld the board's decision, holding that the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and the board's determination was not clearly erroneous. The Court also found that the board did not err when it affirmed the commissioner's decision to sever the district's asserted defense of unclean hands and treat it as a counterclaim. View "Kingston Hill Academy and The Compass Sch. v. Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the Town of North Providence complied with the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act of 1991 when it amended the town's zoning ordinance in 1999. The zoning law in question dealt with the notice and hearing requirements for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances. Plaintiff Generation Realty, LLC and several others owned or were prospective purchasers of land in North Providence. They brought suit against Defendants Kristen Catanzaro and other town officials, alleging that the town did not provide adequate notice of a public hearing on the 1999 amendments. Plaintiffs asserted that lack of such notice rendered the amendments null and void. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance at issue in this case was a "general amendment" under the Act, and as such, required only a public notice. The Court found that the lower court erred in deciding that the ordinance was specific, and therefore erred in ruling in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The City of Newport appealed a Superior Court order that ultimately made it liable for injuries sustained by Plaintiff Geraldine Sloat. In 2004, Ms. Sloat sued the City and State because she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Newport. She argued that the City and State were responsible for maintaining the sidewalks. The State denied liability but did not cross-claim the City. The City moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the State assumed maintenance of the sidewalk through a "Construction and Maintenance Agreement." The State responded to the City by producing another agreement that placed responsibility back on the City. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the City alleged multiple technical errors at trial that lead to a misapplication of the law. Upon careful consideration of the arguments, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Virginia Sharkey appealed the dismissal of her legal malpractice claim against Defendant Attorney George Prescott. Plaintiff and her husband retained Attorney Prescott to prepare an estate plan. Mr. Prescott established a trust indenture that the Sharkeys executed in 1999. Subsequently, the Sharkeys signed a quitclaim deed, also prepared by Mr. Prescott, which conveyed two lots of land they owned to the trust. Plaintiff asserted that the trust was set up to care for the surviving spouse. Mr. Prescott sent Plaintiff a letter shortly thereafter, memorializing the actions he took on their behalf. Mr. Sharkey died in 2002. In 2003, Plaintiff wanted to sell one of the two lots conveyed to the trust. The local authority told Plaintiff that because both lots were conveyed to the trust, they effectively merged together, and could not be sold as she intended. In 2006, Plaintiff sought access to trust funds. The bank informed Plaintiff that she was not able to get access as she had intended. These two instances lead Plaintiff to believe that Mr. Prescott was negligent in the performance of his duties as her attorney. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against Mr. Prescott. Mr. Prescott moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Plaintiffâs claims against him were time-barred. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's case as time barred. After a review of the case, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to the letter Mr. Prescott sent memorializing the trust set-up. The Court reasoned that because Plaintiff claims she did not receive the letter, this created a "genuine issue of fact" that could not withstand a grant of summary judgment. For this, the Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, but affirmed it on all other respects. The case therefore, was remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant Memeh Kizekai appealed the conviction and sentence he received for "uttering and publishing" when he and co-Defendant Sonnah Sampson tried to cash a $7500 counterfeit check at a Pawtucket bank. Defendant argued that he should have received a new trial because the evidence presented against him was not credible or sufficient to support his conviction. Defendant and the State agreed that the case turned on whose testimony was more credible: Sampson's or Defendant's. The trial court acknowledged its role as "the 13th juror," and held that its determination was based on "whether or not the evidence placed before the court was sufficient to substantiate and sustain the verdict that the jury achieved." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "did not shirk his super juror duties." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Defendant Jose Torres appealed the denial of his motion for post conviction relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the grand jury indictment wrongly charged him with murder. Although he ultimately pled to a lesser charge of manslaughter, Defendant contended that his conviction should be vacated because of an "inherently flawed indictment"--a defect not waived by his plea agreement. "[B]y voluntarily pleading guilty to a charge that was amended with his consent, [Defendant] waived any argument that the State could not have proven him guilty of murder." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff Veronica Coates appealed the Superior Courtâs dismissal of her complaint against Defendant Ocean State Jobbers, Inc. Plaintiff argued that she should have been granted a continuance in the case because the Defendant refused to provide her with documents she needed to try her case and also because of her physical disabilities. The Supreme Court did not find that the lower court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffâs request for a continuance. Subsequently the Court affirmed the Superior Courtâs decision that dismissed Plaintiffâs case.

In 2001, the president of Ocean State Job Lot conducted an inspection of one of the companyâs stores. He expressed his displeasure over placement of a price sticker, and removed it, forcefully placing it on the shoulder of Plaintiff-Employee Irene DaPonte. Plaintiff filed suit alleging a violation of her privacy rights through an âunreasonable intrusion on her physical solitude or seclusion.â Even though the trial judge thought the presidentâs actions were highly inappropriate, she nevertheless dismissed Plaintiffâs case because she could not find a legal basis for it under state law. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court held that it âshare[d] the trial justiceâs conclusion that even though there was a strong gloss of inappropriateness, and indeed offensiveness, attached to [the presidentâs] action,â the trial judge was ânot clearly wrong in her decision.â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs dismissal of Plaintiffâs case.

A dispute arose when four siblings disagreed over how the estate of their mother should be divided. Elizabeth Cullen, sister and trustee of the estate, filed a petition to discharge her duties and to distribute the trustâs assets. Her brothers Daniel and Albert McManus, and sister Jane Martino, objected. They counterclaimed, alleging that Ms. Cullen misappropriated trust funds by failing to include a bank account as part of the trustâs assets. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the siblings. Ms. Cullen appealed. The bank account at issue was a âjoint accountâ on which Ms. Cullen was a co-signor with her mother. Ms. Cullen argued that the account, by virtue of her as a named co-signor, granted her the right-of-survivorship, and that the money in the account passed to her alone. The Supreme Court found that without the official âright-of-survivorshipâ designation from the bank, the account did not give Ms. Cullen survivorship rights. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision in favor of the siblings.

Defendants Earl Blamires, his wife Sylvia, and his son Brian all appealed a Superior Court decision that affirmed a trial courtâs judgment in favor of Plaintiff Val-Gioia Properties, LLC. In 2004, police responded to a complaint that Defendants were dumping a considerable amount of debris onto Plaintiffâs land. Plaintiffs sought damages for clean-up costs. None of the Defendants attended the original trial date, but instead sent letters to the court and opposing counsel explaining their reasons for not attending. Plaintiffs argued that the letters were not proper answers to the suit, and subsequently Plaintiffs received a default judgment. From there, the case went back and forth between the trial and superior Courts for various technical issues and appeals all arguing the validity of the default judgment. In October, 2008, a final judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants appealed. After reviewing the trial and appellate records, the Supreme Court found that Defendants indeed did serve a proper answer in the case, and that the default judgment should not have been entered. The Court vacated the original default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.