Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff North End Realty, a developer, filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the town planner, finance director, and members of the town council of East Greenwich, after the town mandated that North End pay a $200,000 fee-in-lieu before it could record any subdivision approval it might receive from the planning board and begin to develop property. The hearing justice ruled that North End had failed to establish there was a likelihood of success of its claim and entered judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, North End made several arguments, one of which was that the town did not have the requisite statutory authority to impose the fee-in-lieu. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the town may not legally impose a fee-in-lieu in the absence of enabling authority from the general assembly. Remanded with directions to issue an order enjoining the town from imposing, assessing, or collecting the fee-in-lieu. View "North End Realty, L.L.C. v. Mattos" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged easement on plaintiffs' property used by defendant development company. Plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief, alleging that defendant had violated the warranty covenants in the deed that conveyed the property in dispute from defendant to plaintiffs. The trial court ruled that the easement was valid. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees, damages and costs. The superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for the successful defense of title under a general warranty deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that warranty covenants do not entitle the grantee to recover attorneys' fees from the grantor for a successful defense of title even where it is the grantor who attacks the title. View "Nunes v. Meadowbrook Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harodite Industries filed a complaint against defendant Warren Electric for negligence and other causes of action, seeking damages for the failure of a gasket in the oil pre-heater that Harodite purchased from defendant. After conducting discovery, Harodite filed a motion to amend its complaint. The hearing justice denied Harodite's motion. Plaintiff then filed a motion for a stay pending a ruling on the petition for writ of certiorari it intended to file with the Supreme Court. Defendant objected to the motion, arguing that the court should apply a Massachusetts statute of limitations to plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. The hearing justice held that Rhode Island's ten-year statute of limitations should apply and granted Harodite's motion for a stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the superior court, holding (1) the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying Harodite's motion to amend its complaint; and (2) the hearing justice correctly determined that Rhode Island's statute of limitations would be the relevant statute of limitations with respect to the allegations set forth in Harodite's proposed amended complaint, and therefore, those allegations would not be barred by the statute of limitations. View "Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corp." on Justia Law

The state public utilities commission approved a power-purchase agreement (PPA) between National Grid and Deepwater Wind, the respondents. Under the PPA, Deepwater Wind agreed to construct an offshore wind farm in state waters and then sell the generated electricity to National Grid, a statewide power distributor. National Grid, in turn, pledged to purchase the generated electricity and apportion the cost of building the wind farm to in-state ratepayers over the course of the twenty-year contract. Dissatisfied with National Grid's cost-distribution plan, petitioners Toray Plastics and Polytop challenged the commission's assessment that the PPA met all statutory preconditions for approval. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's decision, concluding that the commission accurately interpreted and applied the law by making findings that were lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence, and sufficiently specific for the Court to ascertain that the evidence upon which the commission based its findings reasonably supported the result. View "In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Grieder assaulted plaintiff Michael Trainor and pled nolo contendere to one count of simple assault and battery and one count of felony assault. Plaintiff sued defendant in superior court, seeking damages for his injuries. Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $1.5 million, but defendant refused to render payment in full to plaintiff. In the current case, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in superior court, attempting to recover his due. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that there had been no return of the execution on the judgment. The hearing justice ruled that since defendant had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the court on prior occasions, he had waived it, and therefore, the defendant's motion was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) defendant waived the requirement that there be a return of the execution on the judgment. View "Trainor v. Grieder" on Justia Law

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

The state Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of respondents Kathleen D. and Ronald D. with respect to their two children, Steven and Zachary, after the children were removed from the parents because Kathleen was in a medically induced coma and Ronald could not care for the children alone due to epilepsy and rheumatoid arthritis. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate respondents' parental rights, finding that DCYF had shown that (1) the children would not be able to return safely to respondents' care within a reasonable period of time, (2) DCYF had made all reasonable efforts to reunite the children with respondents, and (3) it was in the best interests of the children that respondents' parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court vacated the decree of the family court, holding (1) the trial justice clearly erred in finding the DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Kathleen with her children, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that Ronald's health conditions would meet requirements for a finding of parental unfitness or that services had been offered or received by Ronald to address this problem. View "In re Steven D. " on Justia Law

Defendants Norman Cipriano, Jr. and Jamie Bryant were convicted of receiving stolen goods with a value in excess of $500 and for conspiring to commit larceny. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial justice erred in (1) denying their motions for acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the elements of each crime, and (2) refusing to instruct the jury about impermissible pyramiding of inferences and in the judge's charge concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cipriano additionally argued that the trial justice erred in (1) refusing to pass the case after a witness testified to seeing Cipriano on a prison bus, leaving the jury to infer that Cipriano had a general criminal disposition; and (2) in denying Cipriano's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient for denying the motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the requested jury instructions were unnecessary and the trial justice adequately instructed the jury concerning reasonable doubt; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by refusing to pass the case or err by not giving a curative instruction; and (4) the trial justice did not err in declining to grant a new trial. View "State v. Cipriano" on Justia Law

Three property owner companies filed with the planning board an application for a land development project on their property. The planning board denied the plaintiffs' application after members of the state advisory commission on historical cemeteries identified certain features on the plaintiffs' property as historical cemeteries and notified the town as to the existence of the cemeteries. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the advisory commission in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the action. One property owner (appellant) appealed, alleging that (1) the advisory commission exceeded its authority under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-18.3-1 by registering the features as historical cemeteries, (2) the advisory commission violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory commission's role is purely advisory and therefore it could not register the historical cemetery within the meaning of the statute or violate plaintiffs' due process rights, and (2) because plaintiffs did not suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the advisory committee's actions, appellant failed to establish an essential element of its slander of title claim. View "Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After plaintiff Arthur Toegemann was involved in a motor vehicle accident at a street intersection in Providence, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in superior court against the city, alleging that the city had negligently installed and maintained an unsafe, dangerous road at the intersection, which caused plaintiff's accident. Specifically, plaintiff contended the speed limit was too fast, the speed limit signs were hidden by vegetative growth, and the intersection was unsafe because it had only two stop signs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that based upon the public-duty doctrine, its decisions with respect to the traffic design of the intersection were discretionary and not actionable. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the hearing justice wrongfully applied the public-duty doctrine in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to constitute an exception to the public-duty doctrine. Accordingly, because the issues in the case were controlled by the public-duty doctrine, there was no basis for municipal liability and the grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Toegemann v. City of Providence" on Justia Law