Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Deborah Dawkins was treated by defendant David Siwicki during an emergency room visit after the plaintiff fell and injured her left wrist. The plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice lawsuit, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment by the defendant. The plaintiff was initially treated by the defendant and subsequently underwent multiple surgeries over the span of several years, which the plaintiff alleged were necessary because of the defendant's alleged negligent treatment of her injury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, raising a number of arguments before the Supreme Court, many of which centered around the defense of the plaintiff's comparative negligence based on the defendant's contention that cigarette smoking impeded her treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, finding the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in the arguments raised by the plaintiff regarding pretrial ruling matters, alleged trial errors, and posttrial motions. View "Dawkins v. Siwicki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Providence filed a complaint against John Doe et al. and Jane Doe et al., unknown defendants, for trespassing on city-owned land by setting up an encampment. The complaint sought injunctive relief enjoining defendants from trespassing on the property. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed, arguing (1) the trial court improperly denied their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) because other remedies at law may exist, the grant of equitable relief was inappropriate, and (3) the preliminary injunction failed for indefiniteness because it applied only to unknown persons and therefore was unenforceable at a contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction and R.I. Gen. Laws 8-8-3(a)(2) did not divest the court of jurisdiction, (2) because the trespass was continuous injunctive relief was appropriate, and (3) the terms of the order were specific enough to enable someone reading the injunctive order to understand what he or she may not do under it. View "City of Providence v. John Doe, et al." on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant Edgar Goulet killed his dog by shooting it with a sawed-off shotgun. One year later, the state, by way of criminal information, charged defendant with one count of malicious killing of an animal and one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. At trial, among other motions, defendant filed a motion to sever to the two counts of the information. The motion to sever was denied. After a jury trial defendant was convicted on both counts. The defendant appealed. The issues properly before the Supreme Court were (1) defendant's assertion that the trial justice erred when he denied defendant's motion to sever, and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims relating to the police officers' searches of the defendant's yard and home. The Court affirmed, concluding (1) the defendant did not make a sufficient showing that he would be prejudiced to the extent that he would not receive a fair trial if the two counts were not severed, and thus the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant's motion; and (2) the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims as to the propriety of the warrantless search were without merit. View "State v. Goulet" on Justia Law

Citizens Bank filed a complaint against Howard Issler, seeking to recover funds allegedly owned to the bank in connection with a line of credit that the bank had extended to him. After judgment was entered against Howard and execution was returned unsatisfied, Citizens filed for a writ of attachment. Kymberly Issler, who had a joint account with Howard, then intervened in the civil action, objecting to the attachment and to the release of any funds to Citizens. A hearing officer granted the attachment. Citizens then filed a motion to charge garnishee to reach funds in the personal account. After a hearing, an order was entered granting Citizens' motion to charge garnishee and denying Kymberly's objection to the attachment of funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, according to precedent, a bank has a right to use funds in a joint account to set off the debt of one account holder, regardless of whether that holder contributed any funds to the account. The Court then held that Citizens had a right to set off Howard's debt with the funds in the joint account to which he and Kymberly were signatories. View "RBS Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Issler" on Justia Law

Defendant Raymond Staffier was charged with four counts of second-degree child molestation. The case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict of not guilty was returned on count one with a finding of guilt on the remaining three counts. Defendant filed a pro se appeal, arguing that the trial justice erred (1) by denying his motion for a new trial because the inconsistent verdicts fail to do substantial justice and that this inconsistency cannot logically be explained, and (2) by allowing one of the state's witnesses to testify in contravention of a sequestration order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the trial justice considered the evidence and ultimately found that the verdict was strongly supported by the evidence, the justice's inquiry rightfully ended when she agreed with the jury's verdict; and (2) because any violation of the sequestration order was unintentional, the testimony did not undermine the purpose of the sequestration order, and any potential harm to the defendant was addressed by the trial justice, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she allowed the testimony. View "State v. Staffier" on Justia Law

In 2007, a family court justice terminated a mother's rights to her two children. The mother appealed, arguing (1) the trial justice erred in finding that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) proved by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to cooperate with services, that she was an unfit parent, and that it was in the children's best interests that mother's parental rights be terminated; and (2) the trial justice erred in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she concluded that the mother's successful completion of a drug-treatment program twenty months after her children were removed from her care was insufficient to rebut a presumption of chronic substance abuse; and (2) because the trial justice terminated the mother's parental rights on the ground of chronic substance abuse, any of DCYF's shortcomings with respect to other problems were only relevant if they contributed to the mother's inability to overcome her difficulties with substance abuse. The Court concluded that because the record gave no indication that the mother was incapable of succeeding with substance-abuse treatment the trial justice did not clearly err. View "In re Destiney L., et al." on Justia Law

Shianna Kelly was found guilty by jury of entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. Kelly appealed on the ground that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice performed the correct analysis in deciding defendant's motion for a new trial and was not clearly wrong in denying the motion; (2) the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis that the judge allowed testimony after a discovery violation; and (3) the issue of whether a surveillance DVD and photographs were properly admitted at trial was not properly preserved for appellate review. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Timothy and Barbara Barrow purchased property from Herbert and Claire Weida. Before the sale the Weidas obtained permission from the adjoining landowner, Peter Dunn, to use a strip of land between their property and a stone wall on Dunn's property. After the sale the Barrows continued to use the strip of land just as the Weidas had done. The Barrows later filed suit to quiet title to the land they had been using. The Barrows argued they held title through adverse possession or, in the alternative, boundary by acquiescence. The trial justice denied the Barrows' request, concluding that the Barrows failed to prove they had met the requirements for adverse possession and failed to show boundary by acquiescence. The Supreme Court held that because the Weidas had permission from Dunn to use the strip of land, the permissive nature of that use could only become hostile when that permission was withdrawn or when the nature of the use changed. As neither event occurred in this case, the judgment of the trial justice was affirmed. View "Barrow, et al. v. D&B Valley Associates, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Rather than undertaking appeals from the assessment of taxes on its gas assets in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-26(a), plaintiff electric company sought declaratory and injunctive relief directly from the superior court. Plaintiff sued the taxing authorities of most of Rhode Island's municipalities, requesting a declaration that because the municipalities failed to tax plaintiff's gas assets as tangible personal property, they assessed illegal taxes. The trial justice dismissed all but one count of plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff did not file a timely appeal or invoke the court's equitable jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Because plaintiff elected to bypass the applicable review procedures and proceed directly to the superior court, plaintiff failed to establish that it had been assessed an illegal tax. Thus, plaintiff could not avail itself of the direct appeal to the superior court. View "Narragansett Electric Co. v. Minardi, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Horton appealed from a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of the police department defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's thirteen-count complaint which alleged, among other complaints, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, tortious denial of access to public records, violations of civil rights, and failure to destroy records after exoneration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants possessed probable cause for each instance of prosecution, arrest, and imprisonment, making a grant of summary judgment appropriate; and (2) because Horton failed to provide analysis of the remaining questions in his appeal, those contentions were deemed waived for appellate review. View "Duane Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep't, et al." on Justia Law