Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule. View "In re Will of Quigley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barry DuBois, an environmental officer, was seriously injured when he was bitten by a dog owned by defendant Frederick Quilitzsch while DuBois was inspecting a pigeon loft on defendant's property. DuBois and his wife filed a civil action against defendant, alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the alleged attack occurred within the enclosure of the home and the defendants had no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, and (2) any modification to the state's dog-bite law is best left to the legislature. View "DuBois v. Quilitzsch" on Justia Law

In 2001, the planning board of the town of East Greenwich granted final plan approval to plaintiff Carmine D'Ellena's proposed subdivision. In 2004, plaintiff's attorney requested a time extension, which the planning board granted. A condition to the extension was that plaintiff connect the development to a public water supply. In 2008, plaintiff filed a petition in the superior court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asking the court to declare the board's decision regarding the extension null and void. In support of his petition, plaintiff alleged that the planning board (1) violated state law by amending a final decision without application for and notice to plaintiff, (2) violated the notice rules by failing to provide notice to the plaintiff of its action, and (3) violated the open meetings law by failing to provide notice. The superior court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished and thereby waived whatever procedural and statutory rights were his regarding the 2004 board meeting when he took the action of telling his attorney that he agreed to add the condition of public water. View "D'Ellena v. Town of East Greenwich" on Justia Law

A police surveillance operation at a street intersection led to the conviction of defendant, Geornando Vargas, for one count of delivery of a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant argued (1) that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented by the state amounted to an improper pyramiding of inferences and therefore was legally insufficient to support defendant's conviction, and (2) the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the justice misconceived the testimony of one of the state's witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that rather than deducing guilt from an ambiguous circumstantial fact, the state established a pattern of corroborating circumstances sufficient to justify a reasonable juror in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore affirmed the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion for acquittal; and (2) the trial justice did not misconceive the evidence when ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, and therefore, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion. View "State v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant John Ferreira was convicted for one count of first-degree child molestation and three counts of second-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In an order to show cause, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the justice did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial because (1) the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material inconsistencies; (2) the justice appropriately reviewed the entire record and sufficiently outlined her reasons for denying defendant's motion; (3) the justice did not clearly err in her credibility determinations or overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence; and (4) any error committed by the trial justice in referring to portions of matters not in evidence was harmless. View "State v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Nancy Rogers and plaintiff Shelter Harbor Conservation Society owned contiguous lots in the same subdivision. The Society filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Rogerses and town officials after the town zoning official issued zoning certificates designating three of the Rogerses lots for single-family residences, alleging that the certificates were void because they were issued after a merger of the lots. The superior court eventually granted summary judgment to the Rogerses, finding the lots were unmerged pursuant to the merger provision of the zoning ordinance. The Society appealed, contending (1) the evidence contained divergent interpretations of the map depicting the Rogerses' lots, and therefore the trial justice therefore improperly weighed the evidence at the summary-judgment stage and a trial on the merits was necessary to resolve the issue; and (2) the trial justice erred when she stayed the Society's attempts to obtain discovery from the Rogerses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the map was unambiguous; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in staying deposition notices that were not intended to obtain information relevant to the issue under consideration. View "The Shelter Harbor Conservation Society, Inc. v. Rogers, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Viroth Phannavong was convicted of three counts of child molestation against his former girlfriend's daughter. At trial, defendant sought to introduce a map of Woonsocket, Rhode Island, which depicted the defendant's former home. The trial justice sustained the state's objection to the map being admitted as a full exhibit, arguing that it could not be authenticated properly. The defendant also moved for a new trial because the verdict failed to do substantial justice between the parties, a motion the trial justice denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred (1) by refusing to admit into evidence a map of Woonsocket, and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reason to disturb the trial justice's findings as (1) the map was neither properly authenticated nor was its reliability established, and (2) the trial justice clearly conducted a thorough review of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence to support the verdict. View "State v. Phannavong" on Justia Law

Defendant Nicholas Gianquitti was convicted of second-degree murder and using a firearm while committing a crime of violence. During trial, the trial justice found that there was nothing that would suggest that defendant intended to prevent entry into his home and that, therefore, there was no evidence of a breaking and entering crime in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-8. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred (1) by refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with Section 11-8-8 and denying his subsequent motion for a new trial on the same basis; and (2) by excluding expert testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that after reviewing the evidence, there was no reason to disturb the findings of the trial justice regarding defendant's Section 11-8-8 argument; and (2) because defendant failed to renew his objection on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony and did not preserve the issue for appellate review, the admissibility of expert opinion testimony was waived. View "State v. Gianquitti" on Justia Law

Defendant James Enos dated Mary for six months before they separated. After their separation they met at a restaurant where defendant began swearing at Mary. Defendant then hit Mary on the head with drinking glasses and kicked her. Defendant was convicted of domestic assault with a dangerous weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) that the evidence presented by the state was legally insufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant and Mary were in a domestic relationship; and (2) the trial justice erred when she refused to declare a mistrial after a police officer testified that after defendant was informed of his Miranda rights defendant remained silent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence, overall, indicated that defendant and Mary were in a substantive dating relationship and therefore the trial justice correctly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (2) the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial and instead opted to instruct the jury to disregard the officer's unsolicited remark. View "State v. Enos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathy Lamarque executed a mortgage with defendant Centreville Savings Bank. After defaulting on another loan for a second mortgage on the same property, defendant disclosed the balance of plaintiff's mortgage to the purchaser of plaintiff's property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for negligence and a violation of plaintiff's privacy rights. At trial, defendant moved for a judgment on partial findings, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her right to privacy was violated by defendant and that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and defendant's privacy policy created a legal duty to protect private information from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the facts of the case, plaintiff's privacy rights were not violated and defendant did not breach its duty to plaintiff. View "Lamarque v. Centreville Savings Bank" on Justia Law