Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Town of Little Compton filed a complaint against the town firefighters union, contending that the union, or its representative, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when the union allowed its nonlawyer business agent to represent it at a labor arbitration hearing. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee concluded that the union representative's action constituted a technical violation of the statute governing the unauthorized practice of law. Mindful that this type of lay representation of unions in labor arbitrations is a common practice, the Committee petitioned the Supreme Court on how to proceed. The Supreme Court held that, although the conduct involved in this case may have been the practice of law pursuant to the statute, because of the long-standing involvement of nonlawyer union employees at public grievance arbitrations, the Court would not limit this involvement at this time. View "In re Town of Little Compton" on Justia Law

Former spouses disputed the property settlement agreement that was entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around a minority interest in Prime Time Manufacturing, Inc. The agreement specified that Husband would retain his twenty-five percent ownership interest in Prime Time. After the agreement was approved but before final judgment was entered, Joseph learned that his ownership interest was worth significantly more than the value upon which the parties had agreed. Sharon Esposito moved to reform the agreement or vacate the judgment, which motion was denied by the family court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the agreement was fair and equitable when the parties entered into it, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sharon's motion to vacate. View "Esposito v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Defendant Heriberto Rosario was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because the evidence was too contradictory and incredible to sufficiently support the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial because the record showed that the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material and relevant evidence, nor was he clearly mistaken in choosing which testimony to accept and reject. View "State v. Rosario" on Justia Law

National Grid filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in which it sought additional revenues for its electricity distribution operations in Rhode Island, requesting an increase in electric distribution rates sufficient to enable it to collect additional revenues of $75.3 million. The PUC subsequently issued a report and order that (1) reduced National Grid's increase in its revenue requirement to $15.9 million, (2) set the common equity component of National Grid's capital structure at 42.75 percent, and (3) reduced by half the company's request to establish a variable pay scheme for certain of its employees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC's decision to disallow fifty percent of the incentive compensation proposed by National Grid; and (2) vacated the portion of the order that used the capital structure of National Grid plc, the twice removed parent of National Grid, to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid. View "Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a patient to the hospital while working as an EMT/firefighter for the city. After he had delivered his patient but while he was still at the hospital, a nurse asked Plaintiff to assist her with a disorderly patient. While attempting to place a spit mask on the patient, Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, the hospital and the company that provided security to the hospital, alleging they were negligent when they failed to restrain the patient and that that failure caused Plaintiff's injuries. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the firefighter's rule. At issue on appeal was whether the rule applies only when an injury arises from the same circumstances that originally brought the firefighter to the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the firefighter's rule barred Plaintiff's claim where (1) Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment as an on-duty EMT/firefighter; (2) Plaintiff reasonably could have anticipated that he would be injured in this manner; and (3) Defendants' negligence in improperly restraining the aggressive patients caused Plaintiff to be summoned to the scene where he was injured. View "Higgins v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

George Bouffard pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering associated for an incident occurring in 2000 and was adjudged a violator of his suspended and probationary sentences associated with two earlier cases, in 1991 and 1997. After Bouffard was released from incarceration, he faced another breaking-and-entering charge in 2006. The superior court determined that Bouffard violated his probation imposed in the 1997 and the 2000 case. Meanwhile, the State dismissed the underlying breaking-and-entering charge set forth in the 2006 case. Two days later, Bouffard filed a motion to correct what he alleged to be an illegal sentence imposed in the 1997 case. After a hearing, the hearing justice (1) deemed the challenged sentence as illegal or illegally imposed; but (2) restructured Bouffard's sentencing package to maintain the sentence levied for the 2006 violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice appropriately modified the original sentence despite any dispute about its illegality or illegal imposition; and (2) Bouffard's modified sentence fit "both crime and criminal" as required by State v. Goncalves at the time of re-bundling given the state's ultimate dismissal of the underlying breaking-and-entering charge in the 2006 case. View "State v. Bouffard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professional limousine driver, was injured when he was struck by a car while unloading luggage from a limousine at an airport. Plaintiff reached settlements with his employer's insurance company and the driver whose car struck him but remained less-than-fully compensated for his injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed an underinsured-motorist claim with his Insurer under the terms of his personal automobile policy. Insurer denied the claim, citing two exclusions from the policy's provisions for uninsured-motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed suit, and the superior court ruled that the exclusions were void on grounds of public policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Insurer's denial of coverage was both lawful and not inconsistent with public policy. Remanded. View "Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Gilbert Delestre was found guilty of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) instructing the jury concerning the concept of aiding and abetting, as the instruction considered in its entirety did not relieve the State of its burden and did not violate Defendant's due process rights; and (2) declining to give a unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the murder charge, as the jury was not required to unanimously agree as to whether Defendant was guilty of second-degree murder as a principal, as an aider or abettor, or as a coconspirator. View "State v. Delestre" on Justia Law

Defendant Louis Giuliano, Jr. contested the will of Testator, Louis Guiliano, Sr. The jury found the will was properly executed, and the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the executrix and the primary beneficiary of Testator's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to submit a single transcript of dubious relevance; (2) refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial where there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that Testator possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will, declining to instruct the jury on those issues, and denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on those grounds; and (4) excluding from evidence an inventory of Testator's estate. View "Lett v. Giuliano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant executed an agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to purchase from Defendant an unimproved parcel of real property. The agreement included a due diligence clause, which provided Plaintiff with a ninety-day due-diligence period in which perform inspections and inquiries. After the due-diligence period had expired and the parties had not closed on the property, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking specific performance of its agreement with Defendant as well as damages. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief that the agreement be declared null and void and asserting a claim for breach of contract. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant's counterclaim, finding it had been Plaintiff's burden to contact Defendant to close and that Plaintiff had failed to do so without any explanation for its lack of diligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in its judgment where Plaintiff presented no evidence either explaining its silence or supporting its contention that it was, after the due-diligence period, ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract. View "Empire Acquisition Group, LLC v. Atlantic Mortgage Co." on Justia Law