Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

National Grid filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in which it sought additional revenues for its electricity distribution operations in Rhode Island, requesting an increase in electric distribution rates sufficient to enable it to collect additional revenues of $75.3 million. The PUC subsequently issued a report and order that (1) reduced National Grid's increase in its revenue requirement to $15.9 million, (2) set the common equity component of National Grid's capital structure at 42.75 percent, and (3) reduced by half the company's request to establish a variable pay scheme for certain of its employees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC's decision to disallow fifty percent of the incentive compensation proposed by National Grid; and (2) vacated the portion of the order that used the capital structure of National Grid plc, the twice removed parent of National Grid, to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid. View "Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a patient to the hospital while working as an EMT/firefighter for the city. After he had delivered his patient but while he was still at the hospital, a nurse asked Plaintiff to assist her with a disorderly patient. While attempting to place a spit mask on the patient, Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, the hospital and the company that provided security to the hospital, alleging they were negligent when they failed to restrain the patient and that that failure caused Plaintiff's injuries. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the firefighter's rule. At issue on appeal was whether the rule applies only when an injury arises from the same circumstances that originally brought the firefighter to the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the firefighter's rule barred Plaintiff's claim where (1) Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment as an on-duty EMT/firefighter; (2) Plaintiff reasonably could have anticipated that he would be injured in this manner; and (3) Defendants' negligence in improperly restraining the aggressive patients caused Plaintiff to be summoned to the scene where he was injured. View "Higgins v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

George Bouffard pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering associated for an incident occurring in 2000 and was adjudged a violator of his suspended and probationary sentences associated with two earlier cases, in 1991 and 1997. After Bouffard was released from incarceration, he faced another breaking-and-entering charge in 2006. The superior court determined that Bouffard violated his probation imposed in the 1997 and the 2000 case. Meanwhile, the State dismissed the underlying breaking-and-entering charge set forth in the 2006 case. Two days later, Bouffard filed a motion to correct what he alleged to be an illegal sentence imposed in the 1997 case. After a hearing, the hearing justice (1) deemed the challenged sentence as illegal or illegally imposed; but (2) restructured Bouffard's sentencing package to maintain the sentence levied for the 2006 violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice appropriately modified the original sentence despite any dispute about its illegality or illegal imposition; and (2) Bouffard's modified sentence fit "both crime and criminal" as required by State v. Goncalves at the time of re-bundling given the state's ultimate dismissal of the underlying breaking-and-entering charge in the 2006 case. View "State v. Bouffard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professional limousine driver, was injured when he was struck by a car while unloading luggage from a limousine at an airport. Plaintiff reached settlements with his employer's insurance company and the driver whose car struck him but remained less-than-fully compensated for his injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed an underinsured-motorist claim with his Insurer under the terms of his personal automobile policy. Insurer denied the claim, citing two exclusions from the policy's provisions for uninsured-motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed suit, and the superior court ruled that the exclusions were void on grounds of public policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Insurer's denial of coverage was both lawful and not inconsistent with public policy. Remanded. View "Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Gilbert Delestre was found guilty of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) instructing the jury concerning the concept of aiding and abetting, as the instruction considered in its entirety did not relieve the State of its burden and did not violate Defendant's due process rights; and (2) declining to give a unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the murder charge, as the jury was not required to unanimously agree as to whether Defendant was guilty of second-degree murder as a principal, as an aider or abettor, or as a coconspirator. View "State v. Delestre" on Justia Law

Defendant Louis Giuliano, Jr. contested the will of Testator, Louis Guiliano, Sr. The jury found the will was properly executed, and the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the executrix and the primary beneficiary of Testator's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to submit a single transcript of dubious relevance; (2) refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial where there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that Testator possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will, declining to instruct the jury on those issues, and denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on those grounds; and (4) excluding from evidence an inventory of Testator's estate. View "Lett v. Giuliano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant executed an agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to purchase from Defendant an unimproved parcel of real property. The agreement included a due diligence clause, which provided Plaintiff with a ninety-day due-diligence period in which perform inspections and inquiries. After the due-diligence period had expired and the parties had not closed on the property, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking specific performance of its agreement with Defendant as well as damages. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief that the agreement be declared null and void and asserting a claim for breach of contract. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant's counterclaim, finding it had been Plaintiff's burden to contact Defendant to close and that Plaintiff had failed to do so without any explanation for its lack of diligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in its judgment where Plaintiff presented no evidence either explaining its silence or supporting its contention that it was, after the due-diligence period, ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract. View "Empire Acquisition Group, LLC v. Atlantic Mortgage Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Giulio Lancellotta pled nolo contendere to second-degree robbery and was sentenced to twelve years in prison, which sentence was suspended, and twelve years probation. A magistrate later found that Defendant had violated his probation and sentenced him to serve seven years of his twelve-year suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he denied Defendant's motion for new counsel; (2) the magistrate did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found that the evidence presented at the probation-violation hearing was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant had violated his probation; and (3) the magistrate acted within his discretion in imposing the sentence. View "State v. Lancellotta" on Justia Law

Defendant Adrian Shepard pled nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit a felony, for which he was sentenced to ten years at the adult correctional institutions, consisting of two years to serve and eight years suspended, with probation. The superior court subsequently declared Shepard to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked three years of Shepard's suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to meet the burden of reasonable satisfaction to find that Shepard violated his probation; and (2) the revocation of three years of Shepard's suspended sentence was a sustainable exercise of the hearing justice's broad discretion. View "State v. Shepard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of domestic first-degree sexual assault and domestic assault with intent to commit sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by refusing to pass the case after the complainant testified that the police issued to her a no-contact order against Defendant where the testimony was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence and the cautionary instructions provided by the trial justice alleviated any prejudicial impact of the testimony; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by denying a second motion to pass the case when a police officer, while testifying, improperly bolstered the complainant's credibility where the improper bolstering was not sufficiently prejudicial to Defendant. View "State v. Rushlow" on Justia Law