Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the driver of a motor vehicle, who is an adult but underage drinker, has a duty to protect third parties from the tortious conduct of an intoxicated individual he or she has agreed to transport, who is likewise an adult but underage drinker, by preventing that individual from subsequently operating a motor vehicle. The superior court found that no such duty existed in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the factual circumstances at hand, no such duty to third parties existed on the part of the defendant driver to prevent his intoxicated passenger from later operating his own motor vehicle. View "Gushlaw v. Milner" on Justia Law

Kevin Lyons was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed. Lyons subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that he had been prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied the application, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Lyons then filed a second application for postconviction relief, relying on an array of arguments. The superior court denied Lyons' second application, finding that each of Lyons' claims either lacked merit or were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lyons failed to carry his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that postconviction relief was warranted. View "Lyons v. State" on Justia Law

A jury found Applicant Rudy Sifuentes guilty of first-degree murder in a manner involving torture and aggravated battery, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Applicant subsequently filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of his constitutional rights. The superior court denied Applicant's application. Applicant appealed, arguing that the hearing justice erred in denying his application by accepting "the memoranda of investigating counsel in lieu of evidence." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances, the hearing justice properly adequately followed the procedures set forth in Rhode Island's Postconviction Remedy Statute and properly denied Applicant's postconviction-relief application. View "Sifuentes v. State" on Justia Law

This insurance-coverage dispute arose after a driver of a leased vehicle struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. The vehicle, a BMW, was owned by BMW Financial Services. The pedestrian and her family sued the driver and BMW Financial for damages. Citizens Insurance Company provided a personal automobile policy listing the driver as an insured and BMW Financial as an additional insured lessor. A separate business auto insurance policy was issued by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Companies to BMW Financial. The case settled, with Citizens and Empire paying their policy limits. Citizens reimbursed Empire for a portion of the costs Empire expended in legal expenses defending BMW Financial in the civil action but refused to provide Empire with any further reimbursement. Empire subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that Citizens was liable for reimbursement of all attorneys' fees it incurred. The superior court granted Empire's motion for summary judgment. Citizens appealed, arguing that Empire was entitled only to a pro-rata apportionment of defense costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would be improper to resort to a pro-rata apportionment of liability. View "Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Cos. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am./Hanover Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Gromkiewicz entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of first-degree robbery and was sentenced to twenty years incarceration, thirteen years suspended with probation. The superior court subsequently adjudged Defendant to be in violation of his probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred by finding that he had violated his probation by failing to keep the peace and remain on good behavior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice acted well within her discretion when she assessed the credibility of the testifying witnesses and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that Defendant violated the terms of his probation. View "State v. Gromkiewicz" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the 2003 fire that occurred at the Station nightclub, wherein one hundred people died. The nightclub was co-owned by Plaintiffs, Michael and Jeffrey Derderian. A grand jury returned separate criminal indictments against Plaintiffs on charges of involuntary manslaughter. Prior to the fire, Essex Insurance Company had issued an insurance policy to Michael. Plaintiffs demanded, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-28-5 and the policy, that Essex afford them a defense against the criminal prosecutions. When Essex refused, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Essex, seeking a declaratory judgment that the grand jury indictments against them constituted a suit as defined in the Essex policy and that, accordingly, Essex had a duty to provide them with a defense in the related criminal proceedings. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Essex. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the policy clearly showed that the parties' intention when entering into the contract was that Essex would provide Plaintiffs with a defense only in civil proceedings in which bodily injury or property damage were alleged, and therefore, Essex had no duty to defend Plaintiffs in their criminal prosecutions. View "Derderian v. Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over real property in the City of Newport. Plaintiffs, four individuals, filed an action to clear title to a portion of the Washington Street Extension. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, Newport and its representatives, concluding that statutory abandonment is the exclusive means by which a municipality may abandon a public highway. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the Abandonment Statute is the only method by which a municipality may abandon a public highway; and (2) because the Abandonment Statute was not complied with, the trial court correctly found that Newport had not abandoned the Washington Street Extension. View "Reagan v. City of Newport" on Justia Law

The City of Cranston, by and through its tax assessor, valued Plaintiff Narragansett Electric Company's tangible personal property located within that municipality at $23,290,814. Plaintiff appealed the tax assessment. The tax assessor and Tax Board of Review denied Plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the superior court, naming as defendants Cranston's finance director and its tax assessor. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not timely filed his appeal to the tax assessor. The hearing justice agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) because Defendants failed to plead as an affirmative defense Plaintiff's noncompliance with a condition precedent in accordance with R.I. Sup. Ct. 9(c), Defendants waived their contention that Plaintiff did not file its appeal with the tax assessor in a timely manner; and (2) therefore, the hearing justice should have exercised the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction and heard Plaintiff's appeal. View "Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Saccoccio" on Justia Law

Several years after Decedent died and his will was probated, Plaintiffs, Decedent's three children, filed a verified complaint against Defendants, two of the trustees named by Decedent to manage and control Decedent's trust estate. The complaint alleged breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for failing to transfer ownership of two businesses to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also filed a probate appeal. The superior court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss both the Plaintiffs' probate appeal and their verified complaint. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment to the extent that it dismissed two of the children's probate appeal, as it was not perfected, and the Plaintiffs' verified complaint, as it was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed one of the children's probate appeal because he was the only plaintiff to properly file an appeal in the superior court. View "Mendes v. Factor" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Krivitsky appealed pro se from two family court orders authorizing a commissioner to sell Defendant's real property to satisfy the child-support arrearage he owed to Plaintiff, Jo-An Krivitsky. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the family court, holding (1) the family court had jurisdiction to enter the appealed orders; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the family court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a commissioner to facilitate the marketing and sale of Defendant's property at a reasonable price; and (3) the hearing justice maintained the requisite judicial impartiality and Defendant's assertions that the hearing justice showed a bias toward Plaintiff and her counsel were without merit. View "Krivitsky v. Krivitsky" on Justia Law