Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff John J. Tworog appealed two Family Court orders pertaining to his divorce proceedings with Defendant Dolores M. Tworog. John first appealed an order denying his motion to reopen the final judgment of divorce, alleging that the judgment was based on mistakes of fact and fraud. He also appealed an order finding him in contempt of court for not complying with the final judgment of divorce. Upon review, the Supreme Court deferred to the hearing justice's findings of fact in this case, and with no abuse of discretion, affirmed the justice's decision to deny John's motion to reopen the divorce judgment. Furthermore, the Court found the record supported the hearing justice's finding of contempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Family Court orders. View "Tworog v. Tworog" on Justia Law

Appellant Estate of Aram Dermanouelian (the Estate) appealed a superior court judgment which granted a "Motion for Summary Reversal" filed by Appellee Co-Executor Jo-Ann Dermanouelian. The effect of the Superior Court’s ruling was to reverse a Probate Court order. The Probate Court’s order that was reversed had granted a "Motion to Strike" filed by the Estate; the target of that motion to strike was the entry of appearance of an attorney whom Ms. Dermanouelian had engaged to represent her in her capacity as a co-executor of the Estate. On appeal, the Estate contended that the Superior Court erred in granting Ms. Dermanouelian’s motion for summary reversal: a co-executor may act neither unilaterally nor individually in hiring legal counsel to assist the co-executor in his or her official capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that a co-executor may individually engage counsel at any time to represent him or her in his or her capacity as a co-executor—at least when the attorney is engaged at the co-executor’s expense. "We recognize that complications will often arise when one or more co-executors personally select(s) an attorney to represent him or her in that capacity. . . . Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, in view of a co-executor’s role as a fiduciary (with all of the attendant responsibility and potential liability that that role entails) and bearing in mind the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship, it is "essential that he [or she] have the selection of the attorney who is to assist him [or her] in the performance of duties imposed on him [or her] by law." View "In re Estate of Aram Dermanouelian" on Justia Law

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award. View "Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee" on Justia Law

The dispute at the center of this case arose from a business relationship that "rapidly turned sour." Plaintiffs Charles and Marguerite Takian and Defendants Ralph and Lucia Rafaelian together purchased property in South Kingstown that included a motel, restaurant and trailer park. The couples formed a business to manage the property and Plaintiffs agreed to run the businesses. In 2002, the relationship between the parties deteriorated when Defendants alleged Plaintiffs were mismanaging the businesses. Defendants decided to sell their interest to Plaintiffs' son Randolph. As part of the sale, Defendants signed a release absolving Plaintiffs from "any and all claims arising out of the ownership of the property and operation of the business." After the sale, Defendants continued to feel "unsettled" about how the business had been operated. They investigated further and alleged to have discovered facts that suggested far more serious misdeeds in management. Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory relief, in which they sought a ruling that the release that had been executed by Defendants contemporaneous with the sale barred any further claims. Defendants counterclaimed, both on behalf of themselves and derivatively on behalf of the corporation, alleging embezzlement, misrepresentation, misappropriation, and loss of corporate opportunity. A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, after he found that the release was both valid and effective against both defendants and the corporation. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found triable issues of fact that were inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to those remaining issues. View "Takian v. Rafaelian" on Justia Law

Applicant David Higham appealed a superior court judgment that denied his second application for postconviction relief. In 2000, a jury found that Applicant committed two acts of first-degree child molestation against the seven-year-old daughter of his step son. Applicant was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty years on each count with twenty years to serve and twenty suspended with probation. In 2006, Applicant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed to represent him, but counsel later withdrew, noting in his motion that Applicant's application was "wholly frivolous" and without merit. Even though the motion to withdraw was pending, counsel appeared with applicant at a hearing in Superior Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, a stipulation, signed by both applicant and his attorney was entered on December 5, 2008. The stipulation provided that the motion for postconviction relief would be dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a reduction in sentence approved by the hearing justice. In 2009, Applicatn appeared before the parole board seeking early release. The board denied his but because he refused to acknowledge his crime or complete a sex-offender-treatment program. Applicant then filed another pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging that parole had been unlawfully denied; jury misconduct, and that he was actually innocent. Finding that none of the issues raised on appeal had merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's denial of Applicant's application for postconviction relief. View "Higham v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Applicant Randy Anderson appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his application for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Applicant contended that the hearing justice erred by (1) deeming his claim of prosecutorial misconduct to be procedurally barred; (2) finding no discovery violation on the part of the state for failing to produce certain medical records; and (3) determining that the medical records would have been “of little or no value to the factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial.” This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on January 24, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. Finding no error with the hearing justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Anderson v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was a dispute over the existence of an alleged prescriptive easement that was necessary for large commercial vehicles to get to the loading dock of a commercial building. The plaintiffs, Butterfly Realty and Dairyland, Inc., appealed the judgment entered against them on their claims for a prescriptive easement on the property of the defendant, James Romanella & Sons, Inc. (JR & Sons). Butterfly Realty purchased a parcel of land from Albert Romanella, who, at the time, was president and 50 percent shareholder of JR & Sons. On that same date, Albert Romanella also assigned to Butterfly Realty his lease for an adjacent lot. Dairyland, Inc. was the owner of another adjacent parcel. Access to the loading dock at the rear of Butterfly’s building was impossible without crossing onto JR & Sons' property to some degree because the commercial building was built so close to the common property line between the lots in question. Therefore, JR & Sons granted an express easement to Butterfly to provide access to the loading dock of Butterfly’s commercial building. After a delivery truck struck a building on JR & Sons' property, JR & Sons surveyed the area in May 2010 to determine the precise location of the express easement. Then, in an effort to encourage Butterfly to "come to some kind of agreement for * * * using all of [its] property all the time, JR & Sons installed “concrete pylons" along the southwestern borders of the express easement making it nearly impossible for trucks to continue to pull directly up to the loading dock as had been done previously. The trial justice denied Butterfly's claim for a prescriptive easement and denied both Butterfly and JR& Sons' requests for injunctive relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial justice misapplied the law with regard to Butterfly's use of the easement as "sufficiently hostile," and this misapplication sufficiently tainted the balance of the trial justice's decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Butterfly Realty et al. v. James Romanella & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Philip and Eileen Pelletier challenged a Superior Court judgment in favor of their neighbor Aphrodite Laureanno which dismissed their complaint for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The Pelletiers believed that a written and recorded agreement, entered into by the Pelletiers and Laureanno's predecessor-in-interest, created a permanent easement for parking on a small portion of Laureanno's adjacent property. Laureanno disagreed, and erected a fence, which served to obstruct the Pelletiers' long-standing parking there. After a trial on the merits, the trial justice concluded that the written agreement at issue did not grant an easement to the Pelletiers, but instead served merely as a revocable license. On appeal, the Pelletiers argued that the Superior Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice was justified in his assessment of Mrs. Pelletier's testimony regarding the parties' intent in executing the driveway agreement. Conferring the requisite substantial deference to the trial justice's credibility determination at issue, the Court did not find the trial court's assessment as arbitrary or in error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Pelletier v. Laureanno" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence. The civil suit and eventual trial took place in the wake of the death of Peter Almonte, who in 2000, killed himself approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room after an "severe psychological episode." Hospital personnel "decided" to honor Mr. Almonte's demand to be discharged, which plaintiffs alleged was a breach of the doctors' and hospital's duty arising from a patient/physician relationship. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Dr. Rita Kurl, M.D. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court rejected the jury's findings as to the absence of negligence, but granted defendants motion because the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Finding no basis upon which it could grant plaintiffs the relief they sought, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Almonte v. Kurl" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael A. Langlois appealed a Superior Court's declaratory judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association. The judgment decreed that a lease agreement that Defendant had entered into violated the "Declaration of Condominium of Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominiums." Defendant asserted on appeal that the declaration was ambiguous and that, therefore, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted it to exclude the lease agreement. Upon review of the lease agreement in question, the Supreme Court concluded the trial justice did not incorrectly interpret the language, and affirmed that court's decision. View "Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association v. Langlois" on Justia Law