Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brown University appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Beverly Haviland in her action for declaratory relief. The issue arose over placement of Haviland in a tenured teaching position as a condition to the employment contract her husband, another tenured professor would receive. The husband would not accept a position with Brown unless the university made room for his plaintiff. Through a series of letters ad negotiations, plaintiff accepted Brown's offer of employment. When her contract was due for renewal, issues arose over promises made in those letters and negotiations that became the subject of this dispute. Brown contended that there was no justiciable issue in this case because plaintiff could not demonstrate an injury in fact, as she did not face any actual or imminent loss of employment. Brown also asserted that the trial justice erred in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact contract between the plaintiff and Brown because insufficient evidence was presented to establish an enforceable promise of de facto tenure. Further, Brown contended that no tenure-like standard of review applied to plaintiff because only the Brown Corporation was vested with the authority to grant tenure and none of the University administrators who communicated with plaintiff were vested with actual or apparent authority to provide the plaintiff with de facto tenure. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Brown's arguments and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in this case. View "Haviland v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Laurel Y. Hazard appealed the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, East Hills, Inc., declaring that the plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of laches from prosecuting a claim of ownership to an undeveloped eight-acre tract of land in South Kingstown, Rhode Island and finding that the defendant had established ownership of the tract of land by adverse possession and in accordance with the Rhode Island Marketable Record Title Act. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that her claim should not have been barred by the doctrine of laches, that the defendant failed to satisfy the requisite elements of adverse possession of the subject property, and that a 1909 boundary agreement entered into by the defendant's predecessor in interest was defective and was improperly relied upon by the special master as a title transaction for purposes of establishing marketable record title. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial justice's conclusion that defendant proved the requisite elements of the complete-defense of laches, and therefore did not reach plaintiff's subsequent issues. View "Hazard v. East Hills, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the State of Rhode Island Tax Administrator, filed this collection action against Defendants William J. and Marielle Reilly, in pursuit of more than $1 million in assessed-but-unpaid personal income taxes. In their answer, Defendants denied that they owed any personal income taxes for the assessed years. Eventually Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by a justice of the Superior Court. Defendants timely appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the motion justice erred because: (1) they were nonresidents who were not subject to Rhode Island income tax; (2) that the period of limitation for filing a tax collection action had expired; and (3) that the equitable doctrine of laches should bar the tax administrator's suit under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed; Defendants were not entitled to judicial review of the tax administrator's assessment of taxes for the contested tax years because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court agreed with Plaintiff that "a taxpayer cannot 'simply wait to be sued for the income tax to then raise objection to the assessment or payment in [the] collection proceeding.'" View "Sullivan v. Reilly" on Justia Law

Defendant Raymond McWilliams was found guilty on one count of first-degree robbery and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon. In light of his "impressive" criminal history, the trial justice sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree robbery, to be served consecutively to eleven-and-one-half years that previously had been executed because he violated probation on a previously imposed sentence on a prior second-degree murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to life in prison for the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for the robbery and the previously imposed probation-violation sentence. Because he qualified as a habitual offender the trial justice imposed an additional ten years imprisonment to run consecutively to the previously imposed sentences. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant asserted that the trial justice erred by: (1) providing a supplemental jury instruction that contradicted Rhode Island law; (2) refusing to recuse from presiding as the trial justice because of comments he had made during a joint probation-violation hearing and bail hearing; (3) admitting into evidence defendant's prior conviction for second-degree murder; (4) denying his motion for acquittal; and (5) denying his motion for a new trial. After review, the Court concluded that Defendant's arguments were without merit, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Rhode Island v. McWilliams" on Justia Law

In early 2008, over the course of a lengthy jury trial, the state presented approximately thirty witnesses, including known criminals, against Defendant Michael Ciresi who was once a decorated North Providence police officer. Defendant was charged with multiple counts ranging from the receipt of stolen goods to burglary. Ultimately Defendant was convicted on all but one of the counts with which he was charged. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting numerous instances of Defendant's uncharged misconduct under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Defendant also challenges the trial justice's decision to allow the joinder of two separate indictments against him, as well as the trial justice's subsequent denial of his motion to sever the indictments for trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court: "[b]ased on the defendant's failure to demonstrate any basis upon which [the Court] might conclude that he suffered prejudice arising from the consolidation of the indictments against him for trial," the Court held that the trial justice's joinder and denial of Defendant's motion to sever did not prejudice his constitutional right to a fair trial. The Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice and affirmed his rulings. View "Rhode Island v. Ciresi" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant Mary Y. Seguin challenged a Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Jessup & Conroy, P.C. (the law firm), on her counterclaim in this collection action. In late 2001, Seguin retained the law firm to represent her in two Rhode Island Family Court matters, a divorce action involving her former husband, Marc Seguin, and a paternity action involving her former boss at a prior place of employment. The law firm entered its appearance in both cases. Soon thereafter, Defendant received a large cash settlement from her former employer. Mr. Seguin successfully entreated a Family Court justice to impound the settlement as a marital asset and to place the funds in an escrow account with the children's guardian ad litem. Over the next year, litigation ensued in both Family Court matters; ultimately, the law firm withdrew as counsel for Defendant in the two cases, citing Defendant's repeated requests that the law firm file baseless motions, as well as her refusal to pay over $30,000 in legal fees for services rendered. Defendant and her former husband signed an addendum to their property-settlement agreement, which stipulated that any funds held in escrow were to be deposited in equal shares into irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of the minor daughter fathered by Mr. Seguin. That August, both Seguin and Mr. Seguin requested, via correspondence to the law firm, that the law firm release all escrowed funds to them personally. However, the law firm declined to honor that request based on the addendum's provision that the escrow funds be deposited into irrevocable trusts. After a repeated request from Defendant and her former husband coupled with the imposition of a Family Court sanction upon Defendant in the paternity action, the law firm filed a motion for instructions in the divorce action, seeking guidance from the Family Court in regard to distribution of the escrow funds at issue. A Family Court justice ordered the law firm to provide an accounting of the funds and to deposit them into irrevocable trusts as set forth in the addendum. The law firm complied by providing an accounting of the funds and deposited the money into two trust accounts. Subsequently, the law firm filed a complaint against Defendant seeking to recover unpaid legal fees. In response, Defendant filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim, setting forth fifteen counts against the law firm, including: (1) false advertising; (2) deceptive trade practices; (3) fraud; (4) wire fraud; (5) mail fraud; (6) RICO violations; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) breach of fiduciary duty by trustee; (9) breach of trust; (10) grand theft; (11) tampering with/altering legal records; (12) legal malpractice; (13) negligence; (14) breach of contract; and (15) breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After hearing from both parties, the motion justice concluded that Defendant had failed to meet her burden in opposing Plaintiff's motion. Defendant appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Defendant indeed failed to meet her burden to defeat Plaintiff's motion. View "Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case. View "Iozzi v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law

The facts of this case were "clear and undisputed; in point of fact, they are a textbook example of a mechanic's-lien dispute." Plaintiff, GSM Industrial, Inc., was a subcontractor that entered into an agreement with AirPol, Inc., a general contractor, to install an air-pollution-control mechanism on property owned by Defendant Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, Inc. When AirPol failed to pay GSM the balance of its fee, GSM filed a complaint to enforce a mechanic's lien against Grinnell. The particular issue before the Supreme Court was whether a notarial acknowledgment in a subcontractor's notice of intention satisfied the statutory requirement that such a statement be "under oath." A justice of the Superior Court ruled that a Pennsylvania notary public's "acknowledgement" was insufficient to satisfy the oath requirement, and, as a result, the notice was fatally defective. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "GSM Industrial, Inc. v. Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the Plaintiff Allen Drescher's appeal of a Superior Court judgment declaring that he failed to establish an easement by prescription over a right-of-way owned by Defendant Sigurd W. Johannessen. At trial, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in his attempt to prove that the right-of-way at issue also constituted a dedicated public road. Though mindful of Plaintiff's intermittent use of the disputed right-of-way for almost twenty-five years to access his property, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial justice's determination that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. Likewise, the Court held that the trial justice arrived at the proper conclusion in finding that the right-of-way was not a public road. View "Drescher v. Johannessen" on Justia Law

The controversy at the center of this case arose from a newspaper article written by Defendant Katherine Gregg that sparked an "acrimonious and childish on-air rant" by Defendant Dan Yorke, a well-known radio talk show host, about Plaintiff Robert I. Burke, a local restaurateur. The article described an annual St. Patrick's Day lunch hosted by William Murphy, the then-Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Rhode Island General Assembly, at one of Burke's restaurants. The lunch, a private event, was in large measure a "roast" of local public figures. In a story published by the Providence Journal, Gregg was openly critical of an "off the record" rule that allowed members of the media to attend the event, but banned them from disclosing the jokes made during the lunch. Her article attributed the creation and enforcement of the policy to both Burke and Murphy. Apparently incensed by the article, Yorke used his talk show as a platform to hurl a series of crude and disparaging remarks at Burke. Burke filed a complaint alleging various counts of libel and slander against Gregg, the Providence Journal Company, Yorke, and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation. Two other plaintiffs also joined in the action: BOEA, Inc. and the Food & Beverage Corporation. Food & Beverage Corp., which operated Burke's restaurant and is a parent corporation of BOEA, alleged its own counts of libel, slander, and interference with contractual relations against Yorke and Citadel. BOEA, the entity that operates Federal Reserve Special Events, alleged libel, slander, and breach of contract against Yorke and Citadel. All defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and those motions were granted by a justice of the Superior Court. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. "It is beyond question that Burke was justifiably offended by Yorke's . . . broadcast. Yorke's rambling diatribe would without a doubt ruffle the sensibilities of any listener at whom it was directed. Nevertheless, 'it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste * * *.' Therefore, his opinions unquestionably represented his interpretation of the facts presented in her article. Furthermore, as discussed above, even if Gregg's assertion that Burke was responsible for the 'off the record' rule was false or inaccurate, [the Court] concluded that as a matter of law it was not defamatory. Therefore, Yorke's comments were based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, and [the Court] affirm[ed] the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing those claims." The Court vacated the decision pertaining to the breach of contract claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Burke v. Gregg" on Justia Law