Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence. The civil suit and eventual trial took place in the wake of the death of Peter Almonte, who in 2000, killed himself approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room after an "severe psychological episode." Hospital personnel "decided" to honor Mr. Almonte's demand to be discharged, which plaintiffs alleged was a breach of the doctors' and hospital's duty arising from a patient/physician relationship. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Dr. Rita Kurl, M.D. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court rejected the jury's findings as to the absence of negligence, but granted defendants motion because the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Finding no basis upon which it could grant plaintiffs the relief they sought, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Almonte v. Kurl" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael A. Langlois appealed a Superior Court's declaratory judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association. The judgment decreed that a lease agreement that Defendant had entered into violated the "Declaration of Condominium of Townhouses at Bonnet Shores Condominiums." Defendant asserted on appeal that the declaration was ambiguous and that, therefore, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted it to exclude the lease agreement. Upon review of the lease agreement in question, the Supreme Court concluded the trial justice did not incorrectly interpret the language, and affirmed that court's decision. View "Town Houses at Bonnet Shores Condominium Association v. Langlois" on Justia Law

On October 31, 2004, three-year-old Thomas J. Wright died as a result of extensive injuries that tragically had been inflicted upon him by his aunt and her boyfriend after they returned home from a night of drinking. Defendant Katherine Bunnell was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and of conspiracy to commit the offense of murder. As a result, she was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) for the murder conviction and ten years to serve at the ACI for the conspiracy conviction. Defendant appealed her conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial justice erred by excluding from evidence certain portions of an interview given by her boyfriend, Gilbert Delestre, at the Woonsocket Police Department the day before TJ died; and (2) the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial. Finding no error in the trial justice's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Rhode Island v. Bunnell" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the decedent Robert Daniel George, who was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist in 2006, qualified as an insured under an insurance policy provided by Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company, which policy was procured by The Cormack-Routhier Agency, Inc. Plaintiffs Pamela A. Riel and Glenn N. George, as co-administrators of the decedent’s estate, and Pamela A. Riel, on behalf of her and the decedent’s minor daughter, Kara George, brought a complaint against Defendants Harleysville and Cormack for declaratory and other relief, but a Superior Court justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Harleysville because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the decedent should be considered a named insured under the policy. Plaintiffs further asserted that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Cormack because, even if they failed to establish that the decedent was a named insured, they still were entitled to pursue their claims against Cormack for failing to procure adequate coverage. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Riel v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Alston (alias John Doe) appealed his conviction for conspiracy to break and enter, breaking and entering of a dwelling, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He also appealed the denial of his motions for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant contended that his right to confrontation under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions was violated by the evidentiary rulings of the trial justice, that his right to cross-examine one of the state’s witnesses was unduly restricted, and that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Rhode Island v. Alston" on Justia Law

Defendant Hamlet M. Lopez appealed a Superior Court judgment of conviction for first-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial justice erred by (1) allowing DNA evidence to be introduced against him through the testimony of a laboratory supervisor and the admission of an allele table documenting the DNA profiles of the defendant and the decedent; (2) admitting evidence of his prior instances of violence; (3) failing to instruct the jury adequately about prior inconsistent statements; and (4) imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Rhode Island v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the applicability of an assault and/or battery exclusion in a commercial general liability insurance policy. Great American E&S Insurance Company filed a declaratory-judgment action against its insured, End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. and Defendant Michael Gondusky. Gondusky previously had filed a civil suit against End Zone alleging that he had been seriously injured by two doormen who were employed by End Zone. The Superior Court entered both an order granting Great American's motion for summary judgment and a declaratory judgment decreeing that Great American "owe[d] no duty to defend or obligation to indemnify relative to the underlying action brought by Michael Gondusky against End Zone * * *." Gondusky appealed the Superior Court’s judgment. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court concluded that cause had not been shown and that this case could be decided without further briefing or argument. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Great American E&S Ins. Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife who were both injured by an uninsured motorist while riding their motorcycle. The husband, Leo Fontaine, died as a result of his injuries. The motorcycle in question was not expressly identified in the policy at issue. Plaintiff-Insurer New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC) filed suit for declaratory relief seeking clarification of the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to their policy issued to the couple. Arguing that the policy language unambiguously excluded the defendants' claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court. Defendants Karolyn Fontaine, individually and on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the policy language explicitly excluded Defendants' claims from coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were former spouses, and the issue before the Supreme Court involved the marital settlement agreement they entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around the appraisal of certain real estate of the former husband, Robert Hazard, which real estate he acquired before his marriage to Connie Hazard. Upon Connie's motion to enforce the agreement, an appraiser valued the property at significantly less than the parties' alleged understanding of the property's value at the time of the agreement. The family court granted Connie's motion and ordered Robert to pay Connie $192,500. Robert appealed, arguing that based upon a mutual mistake of fact, Connie received an unconscionable windfall and that the agreement should be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the hearing justice that a mutual mistake of material fact was not established in this case by clear and convincing evidence. View "Hazard v. Hazard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Beth DePrete, appealed from an order of the family court reflecting the court's denial of her motion seeking leave of court to relocate the parties' two minor children from Rhode Island to Texas and seeking modification of the final judgment o divorce to reflect same. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court, holding that the family court justice (1) did not overlook or misconceive the evidence and was not clearly wrong in finding it was not in the best interests of the children to allow them to relocate to Texas; and (2) properly applied the criteria set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Dupre v. Dupre in determining whether relocation served the best interests of the children. View "DePrete v. DePrete" on Justia Law