Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering. Over the next several years, the state filed five notices of probation violation against Defendant. The fourth notice of violation, the subject of this appeal, alleged that Defendant had violated R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-2 by breaking and entering a residence. The sentencing magistrate revoked five years of Defendant's previous suspended sentence and retained eight years of that suspended sentence, with probation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for modification or reduction of his sentence and a separate motion to vacate his sentence. A sentencing magistrate denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's appeal, holding (1) because Defendant had been released from prison, the issues that were raised about his admission of probation violation and the length of time that he was required to serve for violation of the conditions of his probation were moot; and (2) the sentencing magistrate erred when she calculated the time that remained on Defendant's suspended sentence and probation. Remanded. View "State v. Isom" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver it in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (CSA), manufacturing marijuana, and conspiracy to violate the CSA. Defendants moved to dismiss the criminal information as to all counts, relying on an affirmative defense and dismissal provision set forth in the Medical Marijuana Act. The superior court dismissed the criminal information, determining that Defendants lawfully possessed an authorized amount of marijuana plants and usable marijuana. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that because, in contravention of the plain terms of the Act, no evidentiary hearing was held to show Defendants were in possession of an amount of medical marijuana that conformed to the limits set forth in the Act, the court's dismissal was premature. Remanded. View "State v. DeRobbio" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a sergeant with the police department, applied for accidental disability benefits for post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder. The Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (retirement board) denied Petitioner's application. The superior court affirmed the retirement board's decision on the basis of his conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Petitioner failed to timely file her appeal and because the facts would not justify equitable tolling of the deadline for filing an appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded with directions that Petitioner's appeal be considered as timely pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to toll the deadline. View "Rivera v. Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault and disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not commit reversible error in refusing to (1) holding a posttrial evidentiary hearing to determine if the jury was racially biased or if certain juror misconduct had occurred; (2) permit the all fifteen jurors who heard the evidence to be seated on the deliberating panel, as no more than twelve jurors may be seated unless both parties agree; and (3) instruct the jury that aggressive actions of the police could constitute a defense to the charge of disorderly conduct. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The director of the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (Department) petitioned the superior court for an emergency transfer of Irving Briggs, a sentenced inmate, from the forensic unit of the Eleanor Slater Hospital, where Briggs was receiving mental-health services, back to the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) where he had previously been incarcerated. The superior court allowed an emergency transfer in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing, finding that potential harm could occur to others if Briggs were to remain at the forensic unit. After a post-transfer evidentiary hearing, a mental health advocate filed a motion to impose sanctions, alleging that the Department contrived a materially inaccurate set of facts to secure an immediate discharge of Briggs from the hospital. The trial justice declined to find a conspiracy among the Department staff and administration to remove Briggs from the forensic unit at any and all costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when it denied to impose sanctions; and (2) Briggs's argument that his emergency transfer to the ACI violated his procedural due process rights was moot. View "In re Briggs" on Justia Law

Defendants, the city zoning board of review and the members of that board voted at a February 23, 2009 meeting to approve a request for an extension of time in which to substantially complete certain improvements to property. The request was referenced in one of the items contained in the agenda posted with respect to the board's meeting. Plaintiffs alleged that the agenda item violated the Rhode Island Open Meeting Act because it was a vague and indefinite notice to the public and one lacking in specificity. The superior court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the agenda item provided sufficient notice and thus did not violate the Act. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the agenda item did not fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon, and thus the agenda item did not comply with the standard established by the Act. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs with instructions that the action taken by the zoning board be declared null and void. View "Anolik v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Newport" on Justia Law

The Lloyds owned property abutting property owned by the Bardorfs. Both properties were zoned R-10. The Bardorfs filed an application for a special-use permit proposing the removal of a deck and an existing two-story addition on the rear of their home and the construction of an addition and a deck. The Lloyds objected to the application. The city's zoning board of review (board) granted the special-use permit. The superior court affirmed the board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the board and trial justice did not err in applying the standard governing a special-use permit to the Bardorfs' application, as the appropriate form of relief for a party seeking to expand a dimensionally noncomforming structure is a special-use permit; (2) neither the superior court nor the board erred in allowing the Bardorfs to utilize expanded lot coverage authorized by a 1992 dimensional variance; (3) because the zoning ordinance does not contemplate a calculation of building mass or three-dimensional spaces in the criteria for alterations of dimensionally noncomforming structures, the trial justice did not err in finding the addition would intensify the nonconformity associated with lot building coverage; and (4) legally competent evidence supported the trial justice's findings. View "Lloyd v. Zoning Bd. of Review for City of Newport" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was crossing a street by foot when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging negligence, and Defendant's employer (Employer). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The trial justice denied Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, concluding that reasonable minds could differ over the evidence. Plaintiff appealed, contending her motion for a new trial should have been granted because the evidence preponderated against the jury's verdict. The supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in ruling that reasonable minds could disagree about whether Defendant could or should have seen Plaintiff before his vehicle struck her, and the trial justice did not overlook material evidence when she did not specifically address photographs taken immediately after the accident. View "Mead v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to eight felony counts relating to his unethical conduct as a member of the town council. On the day of his sentencing, the U.S. district court entered an order of forfeiture requiring Defendant to forfeit $46,000 to the federal government, representing the bribe money Defendant received to perform official acts as town council member. While Defendant was employed, he had contributed $30,554 to the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI). While a member of the town council, Defendant had contributed $5,490 to the Municipal Employees' Retirement System (MERS). Both ERSRI and MERS were administered by the Retirement Board of ERSRI (Board). After the Board refused to refund Defendant's contributions to ERSRI, Defendant filed a complaint against the Board, contending that the Board was obligated to return his contributions to him. The trial justice (1) revoked Defendant's MERS pension in its entirety, and (2) ordered the Board to return to Defendant the contributions he had made to ERSRI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because the federal court issued neither a judgment nor an order of restitution against Defendant, the Board had no statutory basis upon which it could refuse Defendant's demand for a return of his contributions. View "Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pleaded guilty to several criminal offenses and was sentenced to a term of probation. In 2009, Defendant was adjudged to be in violation of his probation. The superior court subsequently executed six years of Defendant's previously imposed sentence. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the superior court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the hearing justice's finding that Defendant failed to keep the peace or remain on good behavior, and thus, the hearing justice did not rule in an arbitrary or capricious manner in finding that Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. View "State v. Lopes" on Justia Law