Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant filed a pro se application for postconviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Appellant also filed a motion to appoint counsel. Counsel was appointed to investigate Appellant’s postconviction-relief claims in light of the Court’s holding in Shatney v. State. Counsel subsequently filed a Shatney report and requested that the court permit her to withdraw her appearance on Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court allowed counsel to withdraw from the case, and Appellant proceeded pro se on his postconviction relief claims. Following a hearing, the trial justice denied and dismissed Appellant’s application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not follow the appropriate procedure mandated by Shatney by not allowing Appellant an opportunity to be heard on the merits of his application before allowing the appointed attorney to withdraw. Remanded with directions to appoint counsel to Appellant in accordance with section R.I. Gen. Laws 10-9.1-5 for investigation and, if appropriate, litigation of Appellant’s allegations. View "Ramirez v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was crossing a street when she was struck by a vehicle operated by John Faelle, owned by Hertz Corporation, and purportedly rented to Anthony Carroccio. Plaintiff filed an action against Faelle, Hertz, and Carroccio. Hertz moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not consent to Faelle’s operation of the vehicle that struck Plaintiff and, alternatively, that 49 U.S.C. 30106, the Graves Amendment, precluded the vicarious liability of Hertz as the owner of the vehicle. The superior court granted Hertz’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate where (1) Hertz’s consent to Faelle’s operation of the vehicle remained an issue of material fact; and (2) the rental record did not establish the period of the rental for purposes of the Graves Amendment because it did not identify the vehicle involved in the accident. Remanded for trial. View "Marble v. Faelle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school committees of Woonsocket and Pawtucket and unnamed students, parents, and the superintendents from both districts, brought suit against the legislative and executive branches of Rhode Island’s state government challenging the state’s school funding formula. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Education Clause as well as violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights because the formula failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities. The superior court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prior case law as well as the separation of powers doctrine warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Education Clause claim; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to establish potential substantive due process claims. View "Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice (1) abused his discretion by permitting the state to admit into evidence Defendant’s prior convictions; and (2) erred in permitting the prosecutor to reveal that two of Defendant’s prior assault convictions were upon police officers. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) was not clearly wrong in admitting the prior conviction evidence; but (2) erred in permitting the state to impeach Defendant’s testimony using his prior convictions of assault against police officers, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Mercurio" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and carrying a firearm without a license. Defendants convictions arose out of a shooting inside the lobby of a hotel/nightclub. In 2011, Defendant requested a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered evidence that, sometime before trials, federal marshals had visited the apartment of one of the state’s witnesses. Defendant claimed that the visit from the marshals gave the witness a motive to falsely inculpate Defendant in the shooting. The trial justice denied Defendant’s request for a new trial, concluding that the information about the marshals did not constitute newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was neither clear error nor a misconception of material evidence in the trial justice’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "State v. Quaweay" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument. View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and other crimes arising out of a shooting outside of a nightclub. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when he denied a motion to suppress out-of-court and in-court identifications, as the photographic array displayed to the witness was not unnecessarily suggestive; and (2) the trial justice did not err when he permitted the state to use peremptory challenges to African-American prospective jurors, as the challenges did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. View "State v. Gallop" on Justia Law

In 2006, the family court entered final judgment on a divorce between Sandra Carney and Stephen Carney that incorporated by reference a marriage settlement agreement (MSA) entered into by the parties. In 2011, Stephen filed a motion to enforce the MSA or, in the alternative, to adjudge Sandra in contempt, arguing that Sandra failed to comply with the MSA because she did not pay an equitable distribution to him upon her sale of the parties’ former marital domicile. The trial justice determined that Stephen was entitled to payment from Sandra under the terms of the MSA and gave Sandra until 2012 to produce the amount of $59,375 to Stephen. The Supreme Court reversed in part the order of the family court, holding (1) the trial justice did not make sufficient factual findings on the record with respect to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement regarding the timing of the payment of the equitable distribution; and (2) the trial justice erred in her calculation of the amount Sandra owed to Stephen for the sale of the house. View "Carney v. Carney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home that a pre-closing inspection revealed had corrosion on the oil heating system in the basement. Although the boiler and oil tank were replaced prior to the sale of the home, the oil feed line buried beneath the concrete floor in the basement was not replaced. After Plaintiffs discovered an oil leak at the feed line, they initiated claims under their homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Defendant. Defendant denied Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant for breach of contract. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claim was caused by gradual corrosion of an oil fuel feed line, not by a sudden or accidental loss, and the claim was therefore barred by the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the undisputed evidence indicated that the damage to Plaintiffs’ property was caused by corrosion, which was not covered by their insurance policy, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Nunez v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of possession of a controlled substance, for which he was sentenced to five years probation. In 2011, the superior court entered a judgment of conviction declaring Defendant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and sentencing Defendant to five years of his previously suspended sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that he violated the terms of his probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in finding that Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. View "State v. Barrientos" on Justia Law