Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gabrielle Mee passed away in 2008. Plaintiff, Gabrielle's niece, filed three separate cases in the superior court, alleging (1) Gabrielle’s will was executed through undue influence, fraud, and mistake in the inducement; (2) Gabrielle was unduly influenced and fraudulently induced into giving $60 million in lifetime gifts to the Legion of Christ North America, Inc.; and (3) Bank of America, N.A. breached its fiduciary duties as the trustee of multiple trusts set up by Gabrielle and her late husband. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of all Defendants on the grounds that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the actions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial justice’s decision as to Plaintiff’s lack of standing, as Plaintiff was not “a person legally interested in” Gabrielle's estate; but (2) vacated the trial justice’s decision requiring Plaintiff to pay attorneys’ fees in order to amend her reasons for appeal of the probate court decision, the imposition of attorneys’ fees in this case did not comport to what is “right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.” View "Dauray v. Mee" on Justia Law

Decedent died less than two weeks after executing her last will and testament. The will bequeathed nothing to Decedent’s heirs-at-law. After a lengthy contest that challenged the validity of the will, the will was admitted to probate. The contestant in this case, along with the remaining heirs-at-law, appealed, arguing that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the instrument and that the will was procured by undue influence. The superior court concluded that the contestant and remaining heirs-at-law failed to prove their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) failing to state specifically that the will was executed in compliance with statutory requirements; (2) concluding that the will was not the product of undue influence; (3) finding that Decedent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will; and (4) making factual findings and conclusions of law. View "In re Estate of Picillo" on Justia Law

Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent’s death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent’s children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent’s children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing. View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law

Before Decedent's death, the Department of Human Services (DHS) expended $94,162 in medical assistance payments on Decedent's behalf. Neither administratrixes of Decedent's estate notified DHS that Decedent's estate had commenced. More than three years after Decedent's death, DHS learned Decedent's estate had been opened and filed a claim out of time with the probate court, seeking reimbursement for the medical assistance payments it had paid on Decedent's behalf prior to her death. The probate court entered an order allowing the claim. The estate appealed, arguing that DHS's claim was time barred. The superior court concluded that DHS was not precluded under the statute of limitations from filing its claims for medical assistance payments and entered summary judgment in DHS's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations was not triggered until the date DHS received notice that the state had been opened, and therefore, its claim was not time-barred. View "In re Estate of Manchester" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lauren unsuccessfully petitioned for guardianship of her father, Glenn. Appellants, including Lauren, subsequently removed Glenn from his house and refused to disclose his location. On June 26, 2003, the probate court awarded temporary limited co-guardianship to Glenn's business partner, David, and to Glenn's son, Dan. Because Appellant's refused to disclose Glenn's whereabouts, the court later ordered Appellants to retrieve Glenn and bring him before the court. In 2005, the probate court adjudged Appellants to be in contempt of the court's July 26, 2003 order. The court then appointed David as permanent guardian for Glenn. Glenn died in 2007. In 2010, the probate court assessed compensatory and contempt sanctions against Appellants totaling $447,000 in the aggregate. In 2011, the trial justice dismissed Appellants' appeals for failure to timely provide the probate record. Later that year, the superior court issued an execution on the probate court order awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' appeals, as the Court could not conduct any meaningful review due to the lack of a record before it. View "Griggs v. Heal" on Justia Law

In 1989, Defendant hired a law firm and one of its attorneys (collectively, Plaintiffs) to represent Defendant in her father's probate proceedings. The retainer agreement provided that Defendant would pay Plaintiffs fifteen percent of any amounts she recovered in exchange for any settlement Plaintiffs negotiated on her behalf. Plaintiffs successfully negotiated the probate settlement under the terms of which Defendant was to receive on half the interest and principal payable under a promissory note (Victory note). In 2002, Defendant discharged Plaintiffs as her attorney. In 2005, Defendant settled her claim pertaining to the Victory note in a receivership proceeding. Defendant received more than $1 million as payment of her claim, none of which Plaintiffs received. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached her contract with them by failing to pay fifteen percent of each payment received under the receivership settlement as required by the 1989 retainer agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, reasoning that Plaintiffs earned fifteen percent of any amounts received by Defendant when they successfully negotiated the probate settlement in 1989. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at the time Defendant discharged Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' right to receive their fee from amounts eventually recovered by Defendant had vested. View "Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah" on Justia Law

After Shelley Tyre died, her parents brought a wrongful-death action against Shelley's husband, David Swain, alleging that he caused Shelley's wrongful death, that he was a slayer pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 33-1.1-1(3), and he should be subject to civil liability for a criminal act. After a jury trial, the court found in favor of Shelley's parents on all three counts. The probate judge later issued an order declaring that neither Swain, nor his heirs at law, should receive directly or indirectly from Shelley's estate pursuant to the Rhode Island Slayer's Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, David's children and Shelley's stepchildren, were precluded from inhering under Shelley's will as contingent beneficiaries because this inheritance would confer a benefit on their father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' taking under Shelley's will would unquestionably confer a benefit upon David, in direct contravention of the Slayer's Act. View "Swain v. Estate of Tyre" on Justia Law

Appellant Estate of Aram Dermanouelian (the Estate) appealed a superior court judgment which granted a "Motion for Summary Reversal" filed by Appellee Co-Executor Jo-Ann Dermanouelian. The effect of the Superior Court’s ruling was to reverse a Probate Court order. The Probate Court’s order that was reversed had granted a "Motion to Strike" filed by the Estate; the target of that motion to strike was the entry of appearance of an attorney whom Ms. Dermanouelian had engaged to represent her in her capacity as a co-executor of the Estate. On appeal, the Estate contended that the Superior Court erred in granting Ms. Dermanouelian’s motion for summary reversal: a co-executor may act neither unilaterally nor individually in hiring legal counsel to assist the co-executor in his or her official capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that a co-executor may individually engage counsel at any time to represent him or her in his or her capacity as a co-executor—at least when the attorney is engaged at the co-executor’s expense. "We recognize that complications will often arise when one or more co-executors personally select(s) an attorney to represent him or her in that capacity. . . . Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, in view of a co-executor’s role as a fiduciary (with all of the attendant responsibility and potential liability that that role entails) and bearing in mind the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship, it is "essential that he [or she] have the selection of the attorney who is to assist him [or her] in the performance of duties imposed on him [or her] by law." View "In re Estate of Aram Dermanouelian" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence. The civil suit and eventual trial took place in the wake of the death of Peter Almonte, who in 2000, killed himself approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room after an "severe psychological episode." Hospital personnel "decided" to honor Mr. Almonte's demand to be discharged, which plaintiffs alleged was a breach of the doctors' and hospital's duty arising from a patient/physician relationship. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Dr. Rita Kurl, M.D. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court rejected the jury's findings as to the absence of negligence, but granted defendants motion because the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Finding no basis upon which it could grant plaintiffs the relief they sought, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Almonte v. Kurl" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the decedent Robert Daniel George, who was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist in 2006, qualified as an insured under an insurance policy provided by Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company, which policy was procured by The Cormack-Routhier Agency, Inc. Plaintiffs Pamela A. Riel and Glenn N. George, as co-administrators of the decedent’s estate, and Pamela A. Riel, on behalf of her and the decedent’s minor daughter, Kara George, brought a complaint against Defendants Harleysville and Cormack for declaratory and other relief, but a Superior Court justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Harleysville because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the decedent should be considered a named insured under the policy. Plaintiffs further asserted that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Cormack because, even if they failed to establish that the decedent was a named insured, they still were entitled to pursue their claims against Cormack for failing to procure adequate coverage. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Riel v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co." on Justia Law