Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, as nominee for two lenders (collectively, Plaintiffs), held mortgages on Lot 456. For the property owner's failure to pay his water bill, the Pawtucket Water Supply Board (PWSB) auctioned the lot. PWSB issued a deed conveying the title in the property to Amy Realty. Amy Realty subsequently discovered that the property PWSB had intended to auction had been mistakenly listed as Lot 486 on the tax sale notices and deed. Amy Realty then obtained a corrective deed from the PWSB conveying title to Lot 456. Amy Realty subsequently filed a petition to foreclose on Plaintiffs' rights of redemption in Lot 456. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to vacate the final decree of disclosure, alleging that the corrective deed changing the lot number from 486 to 456 was invalid and this infirmity rendered the foreclosure decree void. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the corrective deed obtained in this case was null and void because it was not recorded within sixty days of the tax sale; and (2) the final foreclosure decree may be vacated because the tax sale was invalid. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. DePina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State alleging statutory claims under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, and the Rhode Island Whistelblowers' Protection Act. The State filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Plaintiff had previously filed a nearly identical suit in federal court, which dismissed the action. The superior court denied the State's motions. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court and remanded, holding that the federal court judgment was entitled to preclusive effect, and Plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata. View "Huntley v. State" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lauren unsuccessfully petitioned for guardianship of her father, Glenn. Appellants, including Lauren, subsequently removed Glenn from his house and refused to disclose his location. On June 26, 2003, the probate court awarded temporary limited co-guardianship to Glenn's business partner, David, and to Glenn's son, Dan. Because Appellant's refused to disclose Glenn's whereabouts, the court later ordered Appellants to retrieve Glenn and bring him before the court. In 2005, the probate court adjudged Appellants to be in contempt of the court's July 26, 2003 order. The court then appointed David as permanent guardian for Glenn. Glenn died in 2007. In 2010, the probate court assessed compensatory and contempt sanctions against Appellants totaling $447,000 in the aggregate. In 2011, the trial justice dismissed Appellants' appeals for failure to timely provide the probate record. Later that year, the superior court issued an execution on the probate court order awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' appeals, as the Court could not conduct any meaningful review due to the lack of a record before it. View "Griggs v. Heal" on Justia Law

Petitioner was severely injured when he was assaulted by a stranger in the West End of the City of Providence. Petitioner had been sent to that location by his employer, Verizon New England. Petitioner subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge denied Petitioner's request, concluding that Petitioner's injuries were noncompensable under Rhode Island's actual-risk test, which requires that there be some causal connection between the injury suffered by the employee and the employment or the conditions of employment. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decree of the appellate division and remanded, holding that Petitioner's injuries were compensable under the street-peril doctrine. View "Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting property. The parties disputed a parcel of land located on the northernmost portion of Defendants' surveyed property. Plaintiffs asserted that, since 1972, they used this area as their own in the belief that it was part of their yard. Specifically, Plaintiffs placed an inflatable children's pool, built a tree fort, and hung a hammock from trees in the disputed area. Plaintiffs filed this action for adverse possession in 2009. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in holding that an agreement in which Defendants granted Plaintiffs permission to place a hammock on the disputed land was a concession to Defendants' superior title in that land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in considering the agreement as an objective manifestation of Defendants' superior title. View "DiPippo v. Sperling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action against Bishop Hendricken High School and its agents alleging negligence, contending that the school failed to supervise its students and failed to protect its students by using safety glass in a bathroom window. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that the school did not breach its duty to provide a safe learning environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact regarding Defendants' duty to supervise; and (2) Plaintiff presented no evidence that would show it was foreseeable that a student could be injured as a result of the school's failure to install safety glass. View "Daniels v. Fluette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed $249,900 from Lehman Brothers Bank to finance the purchase of a home, and he signed an adjustable rate note that evidenced the debt. Plaintiff and his wife (Plaintiffs) then executed a mortgage on the property that secured the loan. Even though the note was made payable to the lender, the mortgage was granted to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for the lender and the lender's subject and assigns. Plaintiffs subsequently defaulted on the note, and MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced an action seeking to prevent MERS from exercising the power of sale contained in the mortgage, arguing that only a mortgagee was permitted to exercise the power of sale and that MERS was merely a nominee-mortgagee without the authority to foreclose. The superior court denied Plaintiffs' request and entered judgment on behalf of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MERS had both contractual and statutory authority to foreclose and exercise the power of sale. View "Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Defendant pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering. Over the next several years, the state filed five notices of probation violation against Defendant. The fourth notice of violation, the subject of this appeal, alleged that Defendant had violated R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-2 by breaking and entering a residence. The sentencing magistrate revoked five years of Defendant's previous suspended sentence and retained eight years of that suspended sentence, with probation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for modification or reduction of his sentence and a separate motion to vacate his sentence. A sentencing magistrate denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's appeal, holding (1) because Defendant had been released from prison, the issues that were raised about his admission of probation violation and the length of time that he was required to serve for violation of the conditions of his probation were moot; and (2) the sentencing magistrate erred when she calculated the time that remained on Defendant's suspended sentence and probation. Remanded. View "State v. Isom" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver it in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (CSA), manufacturing marijuana, and conspiracy to violate the CSA. Defendants moved to dismiss the criminal information as to all counts, relying on an affirmative defense and dismissal provision set forth in the Medical Marijuana Act. The superior court dismissed the criminal information, determining that Defendants lawfully possessed an authorized amount of marijuana plants and usable marijuana. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that because, in contravention of the plain terms of the Act, no evidentiary hearing was held to show Defendants were in possession of an amount of medical marijuana that conformed to the limits set forth in the Act, the court's dismissal was premature. Remanded. View "State v. DeRobbio" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a sergeant with the police department, applied for accidental disability benefits for post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder. The Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (retirement board) denied Petitioner's application. The superior court affirmed the retirement board's decision on the basis of his conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Petitioner failed to timely file her appeal and because the facts would not justify equitable tolling of the deadline for filing an appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded with directions that Petitioner's appeal be considered as timely pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to toll the deadline. View "Rivera v. Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law