Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, the family court terminated the parental rights of Respondent to her three children. The court found that Respondent was unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to her children in that she allowed conduct to be committed towards her children of a cruel and abusive nature, and she subjected her children to aggravated circumstances of sexual abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court, holding (1) even if the trial justice erred in permitting witnesses to testify about hearsay statements made by the children, the error was harmless because clear and convincing evidence supported the trial justice's findings; and (2) the trial justice did not err in failing to address whether the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had met its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between Respondent and her children before DCYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights, as DCYF was under no obligation to attempt reunification of the family. View "In re Rita F." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought permits from the City of Providence so they might restore electrical meters at the property they owned. The property was located in an area of the City that was zoned for no more than two-family dwelling units. The City conducted an inspection of the property, which revealed the property was being used as a three-family dwelling, and therefore, it was not in compliance with zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs filed an appeal of the City official's determination that their property was an illegal three-family dwelling. The zoning board affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed and sought a declaration that their use of the property was a legal nonconforming use. The trial justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not abuse his discretion in declining to declare that Plaintiffs' property was a legal nonconforming use; (2) did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the City; and (3) did not err in declining to allow Plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine of laches as a basis for ruling that the City should not be permitted to enforce the provision of the zoning ordinance that prohibits using the property in a three-family manner. View "Cigarrilha v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff underwent surgery for a tumor in his neck. Analysis of the tumor on the same day revealed it was a form of cancer. Plaintiff alleged he learned he had cancer on June 21, 2005. Plaintiff and his wife filed a medical malpractice action against several doctors and health care facilities for failing to diagnose and treat Plaintiff's cancer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the three-year statute of limitations began to run on June 2, 2005, when a separate medical doctor diagnosed the mass in Defendant's neck as a cervical tumor, and had expired before Plaintiffs filed suit on June 9, 2008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when Plaintiff was diagnosed as having a cervical tumor and that diagnosis was shared with Plaintiff, a "reasonable person in similar circumstances" would have discovered that the wrongful conduct of Defendants caused Plaintiff's injuries. View "Bustamante v. Oshiro" on Justia Law

After she slipped and fell on an icy surface, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligence by Defendant in failing property to maintain its property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding, among other things, that Defendant, a commercial lessor, did not have a duty of care to Plaintiff, an invitee of a tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance to conduct further discovery was waived, and even if the issue not been waived, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in declining to grant a continuance. View "Berard v. HCP, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in a civil action brought by the State against various former lead pigment manufacturers and the Lead Industries Association. In this opinion, the Court considered appeals from two superior court rulings concerning the apportionment of co-examiners' fees in particular and the payment of costs in general. The Court first considered the State's appeal from an order granting the motion of certain defendants for the reimbursement of all previously paid fees, costs, and expenses related to the engagement of the co-examiners. At issue here was whether the State was responsible for such expenses under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court then addressed certain defendants' appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of allowable costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in concluding that the State waived its sovereign immunity because it filed the underlying lawsuit and in ordering the State to reimburse the defendants for the costs associated with the co-examiners; and (2) the totality of the circumstances supported the trial justice's determination that each party should bear its own costs. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n " on Justia Law

This case arose from a public-nuisance lawsuit filed by the State in 1999 against Sherwin-Williams and other paint companies not relevant to this appeal. Defendants prevailed on appeal. The parties then began to dispute the expenses involved with defending the lead-paint cases. Sherwin-Williams filed a motion for a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of and the use of an internal company document through which the State sought to demonstrate that Sherwin-Williams had benefited from significant insurance coverage when it defended the underlying lawsuit. The superior court denied the order. Sherwin-Williams appealed, arguing that the disclosure of the document would offend the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's denial of Sherwin-Williams' motion, holding that the document was protected under the work-product doctrine and that this doctrine was not waived. Remanded with directions to enter an appropriate protective order. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against the City of Providence for personal injuries she suffered after a school bus she was operating fell into a sinkhole on a city roadway. The trial court found that the City was negligent and awarded Plaintiff $59,239 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in admitting certain affidavits into evidence because the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to under oath in the presence of a notary and therefore met legislative requirements; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in ruling that the collateral-source rule excluded evidence of Plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. View "Morel v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and four counts of second-degree child molestation assault. Defendant subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his counsel committed prejudicial error when he provided Defendant's confidential psychiatric records to the state without Defendant's knowledge or consent. The superior court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disclosure and use of the psychiatric records was not enough to prejudice Defendant to the extent of undermining confidence in the outcome of the case; and (2) the postconviction relief justice did not err in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective to a constitutional dimension for other alleged deficiencies. View "Hazard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault and one count of simple assault for his assault against three developmentally disabled women. The cumulative result of Defendant's sentences was life imprisonment followed by a consecutive term of sixteen years to serve. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reduce his sentence, arguing that the sentence was disproportionate and excessive. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, explaining that the fact that each of the victims in this case was developmentally disabled was the driving force behind the sentence imposed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in imposing this sentence and denying Defendant's motion to reduce. View "State v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to one felony count of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant complied with her conditions of probation. Defendant was subsequently charged with two misdemeanor offenses, both of which were dismissed. Defendant moved to have the records related to the two misdemeanor charges sealed and to have the law-enforcement-identification records related to those charges destroyed. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a nolo plea, followed by a sentence of probation, is considered a conviction for the purposes of the expungement statute. Defendant appealed, arguing that she was not convicted of a felony as defined by R.I. Gen. Laws 12-18-3. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court, holding that, for purposes of the sealing statute, Defendant was not convicted of a felony, she met all the statutory requirements of the sealing statutes, and she was entitled to the benefits provided in those enactments. View "State v. Poulin" on Justia Law