Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The state Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of respondents Kathleen D. and Ronald D. with respect to their two children, Steven and Zachary, after the children were removed from the parents because Kathleen was in a medically induced coma and Ronald could not care for the children alone due to epilepsy and rheumatoid arthritis. The trial court granted the petitions to terminate respondents' parental rights, finding that DCYF had shown that (1) the children would not be able to return safely to respondents' care within a reasonable period of time, (2) DCYF had made all reasonable efforts to reunite the children with respondents, and (3) it was in the best interests of the children that respondents' parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court vacated the decree of the family court, holding (1) the trial justice clearly erred in finding the DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Kathleen with her children, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that Ronald's health conditions would meet requirements for a finding of parental unfitness or that services had been offered or received by Ronald to address this problem. View "In re Steven D. " on Justia Law

Defendants Norman Cipriano, Jr. and Jamie Bryant were convicted of receiving stolen goods with a value in excess of $500 and for conspiring to commit larceny. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial justice erred in (1) denying their motions for acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the elements of each crime, and (2) refusing to instruct the jury about impermissible pyramiding of inferences and in the judge's charge concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cipriano additionally argued that the trial justice erred in (1) refusing to pass the case after a witness testified to seeing Cipriano on a prison bus, leaving the jury to infer that Cipriano had a general criminal disposition; and (2) in denying Cipriano's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient for denying the motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the requested jury instructions were unnecessary and the trial justice adequately instructed the jury concerning reasonable doubt; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by refusing to pass the case or err by not giving a curative instruction; and (4) the trial justice did not err in declining to grant a new trial. View "State v. Cipriano" on Justia Law

Three property owner companies filed with the planning board an application for a land development project on their property. The planning board denied the plaintiffs' application after members of the state advisory commission on historical cemeteries identified certain features on the plaintiffs' property as historical cemeteries and notified the town as to the existence of the cemeteries. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the advisory commission in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the action. One property owner (appellant) appealed, alleging that (1) the advisory commission exceeded its authority under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-18.3-1 by registering the features as historical cemeteries, (2) the advisory commission violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory commission's role is purely advisory and therefore it could not register the historical cemetery within the meaning of the statute or violate plaintiffs' due process rights, and (2) because plaintiffs did not suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the advisory committee's actions, appellant failed to establish an essential element of its slander of title claim. View "Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

After plaintiff Arthur Toegemann was involved in a motor vehicle accident at a street intersection in Providence, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in superior court against the city, alleging that the city had negligently installed and maintained an unsafe, dangerous road at the intersection, which caused plaintiff's accident. Specifically, plaintiff contended the speed limit was too fast, the speed limit signs were hidden by vegetative growth, and the intersection was unsafe because it had only two stop signs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that based upon the public-duty doctrine, its decisions with respect to the traffic design of the intersection were discretionary and not actionable. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the hearing justice wrongfully applied the public-duty doctrine in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to constitute an exception to the public-duty doctrine. Accordingly, because the issues in the case were controlled by the public-duty doctrine, there was no basis for municipal liability and the grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Toegemann v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael English pled nolo contendere to four counts of first-degree child molestation, one count of second-degree molestation, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arising out of his relationship with victim, M.B. More than a decade later, the state filed a probation-violation notice, alleging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to adhere to the terms of the no-contact order after M.B. complained that defendant had come into contact with her. The hearing justice concluded that defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the superior court adjudicated defendant a violator of probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that his contact with M.B. was merely coincidental and therefore insufficient to constitute a violation of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice's determination that the state's evidence supported an adjudication of probation violation was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "State v. English" on Justia Law

Esther Randall, the mother of plaintiff Elton Randall and defendant Deborah Randall, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to her four children. After Esther's death, Deborah, as executrix of her mother's estate, filed in probate court a petition for the sale of real property in the estate. Elton then filed a claim to the property, alleging that his parents had made an agreement with him before their deaths that the premises would pass to him. The probate court granted the petition to sell the property and disallowed Elton's claim to the property. Elton appealed to the superior court. The court dismissed Elton's appeal, finding that Elton failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral contract with his parents and, therefore, Elton's claim to the property was barred by the statute of frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly err in concluding that Elton had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement with his parents. View "Randall v. Randall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Linda Pereira injured her left ankle when she fell into a depression in the grass at at park owned by the city of East Providence. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the city, alleging that the city negligently breached its duty to maintain the park in a reasonably safe condition and that it negligently failed to warn her of an unsafe condition on the premises. The defendant affirmatively alleged that the city was shielded from liability under the state Recreational Use Statute and filed a motion for summary judgment on this basis. The trial justice granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Recreational Use Statute immunized the city from liability. View "Pereira v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Martin Malinou filed a wrongful death and medical negligence action against Miriam Hospital and other medical professionals after his ninety-four year old mother died. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims were not supported by competent expert testimony and that plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof on the issues of breach of the standard of care and causation. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) given plaintiff's repeated noncompliance with discovery orders, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by precluding two doctors from testifying as expert witnesses; (2) because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his underlying claims for medical negligence and wrongful death, plaintiff did not have a viable claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or for loss of society and companionship; (3) adopting a loss-of-chance doctrine would not preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants; and (4) plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact in showing one of defendant doctors filed a false death certificate in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-18-1. View "Malinou v. The Miriam Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule. View "In re Will of Quigley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barry DuBois, an environmental officer, was seriously injured when he was bitten by a dog owned by defendant Frederick Quilitzsch while DuBois was inspecting a pigeon loft on defendant's property. DuBois and his wife filed a civil action against defendant, alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the alleged attack occurred within the enclosure of the home and the defendants had no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, and (2) any modification to the state's dog-bite law is best left to the legislature. View "DuBois v. Quilitzsch" on Justia Law