Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant Kimberly St. Michel was convicted for embezzlement of funds in excess of $100 and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice did not err when he (1) prevented defense counsel from eliciting Defendant's out-of-court statement that "she didn't do any of this" through the testimony of a witness after finding that the statement was hearsay; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, as the trial justice performed the proper analysis and committed neither clear error nor overlooked or misconceived evidence in making his ruling. View "State v. St. Michel" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Kenneth Rice was convicted of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, second-degree child molestation sexual assault, and solicitation with the intent to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Rice subsequently filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court determined that certain actions on the part of Rice's trial counsel did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance but instead constituted tactical decisions made during trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court hearing justice did not err in his denial of Rice's postconviction-relief application, as the tactical decisions Rice challenged were reasonably competent and did not rise to a level of constitutionally inadequate performance by trial counsel. View "Rice v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Yi Gu was struck by Edmund Hathaway, a driver for the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), while crossing an intersection. Plaintiff brought suit against RIPTA and Hathaway (collectively, Defendants), for injuries arising from Hathaway's alleged negligence. At the close of evidence but before final arguments, the jurors walked from the courthouse to the intersection where the accident occurred to view the accident scene. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Defendants. The trial justice subsequently denied Plaintiff's motions for a new trial and for reconsideration of that decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court and remanded the case, holding that Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should have been granted due to several errors that occurred during the jury view of the scene of the collision. View "Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Defendant David Dubois was convicted of five counts of second-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) properly weighed the potential impact of potentially inflammatory statements from witnesses and did not exceed the bounds of his discretion in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial; (2) did not abuse his discretion in limiting defense counsel's direct examination of two witnesses as the disallowed evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible; and (3) erred in listing lewd disposition as one of the grounds for which the jury could consider testimony concerning uncharged incidents of sexual assault, but did not err in instructing the jury that the testimony was admissible for the limited purpose of demonstrating Defendant's sexual intent. View "State v. Dubois" on Justia Law

Defendant John Lomba was charged with three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and one count of simple assault. After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of the three felony counts but convicted of simple assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of simple assault where there were ample facts from which a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with malice or wantonness; and (2) did not improperly exclude evidence relating to Defendant's claim of self-defense or unfairly limit his cross-examination of both complaining witnesses. View "State v. Lomba" on Justia Law

The Town of Little Compton filed a complaint against the town firefighters union, contending that the union, or its representative, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when the union allowed its nonlawyer business agent to represent it at a labor arbitration hearing. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee concluded that the union representative's action constituted a technical violation of the statute governing the unauthorized practice of law. Mindful that this type of lay representation of unions in labor arbitrations is a common practice, the Committee petitioned the Supreme Court on how to proceed. The Supreme Court held that, although the conduct involved in this case may have been the practice of law pursuant to the statute, because of the long-standing involvement of nonlawyer union employees at public grievance arbitrations, the Court would not limit this involvement at this time. View "In re Town of Little Compton" on Justia Law

Former spouses disputed the property settlement agreement that was entered into in connection with their divorce. The dispute centered around a minority interest in Prime Time Manufacturing, Inc. The agreement specified that Husband would retain his twenty-five percent ownership interest in Prime Time. After the agreement was approved but before final judgment was entered, Joseph learned that his ownership interest was worth significantly more than the value upon which the parties had agreed. Sharon Esposito moved to reform the agreement or vacate the judgment, which motion was denied by the family court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the agreement was fair and equitable when the parties entered into it, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sharon's motion to vacate. View "Esposito v. Esposito" on Justia Law

Defendant Heriberto Rosario was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial because the evidence was too contradictory and incredible to sufficiently support the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for a new trial because the record showed that the justice did not overlook or misconceive any material and relevant evidence, nor was he clearly mistaken in choosing which testimony to accept and reject. View "State v. Rosario" on Justia Law

National Grid filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in which it sought additional revenues for its electricity distribution operations in Rhode Island, requesting an increase in electric distribution rates sufficient to enable it to collect additional revenues of $75.3 million. The PUC subsequently issued a report and order that (1) reduced National Grid's increase in its revenue requirement to $15.9 million, (2) set the common equity component of National Grid's capital structure at 42.75 percent, and (3) reduced by half the company's request to establish a variable pay scheme for certain of its employees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the PUC's decision to disallow fifty percent of the incentive compensation proposed by National Grid; and (2) vacated the portion of the order that used the capital structure of National Grid plc, the twice removed parent of National Grid, to determine an appropriate capital structure for National Grid. View "Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a patient to the hospital while working as an EMT/firefighter for the city. After he had delivered his patient but while he was still at the hospital, a nurse asked Plaintiff to assist her with a disorderly patient. While attempting to place a spit mask on the patient, Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, the hospital and the company that provided security to the hospital, alleging they were negligent when they failed to restrain the patient and that that failure caused Plaintiff's injuries. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the firefighter's rule. At issue on appeal was whether the rule applies only when an injury arises from the same circumstances that originally brought the firefighter to the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the firefighter's rule barred Plaintiff's claim where (1) Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment as an on-duty EMT/firefighter; (2) Plaintiff reasonably could have anticipated that he would be injured in this manner; and (3) Defendants' negligence in improperly restraining the aggressive patients caused Plaintiff to be summoned to the scene where he was injured. View "Higgins v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law