Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Declarant Bowen Court Associates created a condominium by declaration in 1989. Declarant retained a ten-year reservation to withdraw a portion of the land from the condominium. In 1992 the owner of the property foreclosed on the property. Plaintiff Joseph Alessi later purchased the parcel. In 2001, Plaintiff sought to withdraw the parcel from the condomium, but the right to withdraw the parcel from the condominium had expired. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Defendants, Bowen Court Condominium and the president of the condominium association, contending that Defendants erroneously refused to exclude withdrawable land from the condominium. After a hearing, the trial justice granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the right to exclude withdrawable real estate from a condominium after a foreclosure expires when the declarant's right to withdraw the real estate otherwise would have expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that title to unexercised declarant rights passed to the unit owners' association as a matter of law in 1999, when the right to exclude the real estate expired. View "Alessi v. Bowen Court Condo." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Murray was charged by criminal information with a felony pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-29-5 for violating a no-contact order. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was sentenced under the terms of section 12-29-5. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that the sentence imposed on him was illegal because, in his view, the provisions of section 12-29-5 applied only to individuals with two prior misdemeanor convictions, and one of his predicate offenses was a felony. The superior court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that the provisions of section 12-29-5 did apply because Defendant had been convicted of two prior domestic violence offenses, and the statute did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's argument was not an attack on the legality of his sentence, but rather on the propriety of his conviction, and Defendant unequivocally waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal information by virtue of his decision to enter a plea of nolo contendere; and (2) the sentence in this case was not illegal because it was within the prescribed statutory limits. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Watson, together with nine Republican colleagues from the Rhode Island House of Representatives, sought a declaration that the process the General Assembly used to allocate $2.3 million in state money for legislative grants to local and private organizations in the 2008 fiscal year violated the Rhode Island Constitution. Plaintiffs brought the action in their individual capacities as taxpayers, and not in their capacities as elected officials. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claim because Rhode Island does not recognize so-called "taxpayer standing," and because Plaintiffs were unable to articulate a particularized injury that was distinct from any suffered by the general public. Watson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not have standing under the Court's precedent; and (2) the substantial public interest exception did not apply in this case. View "Watson v. Fox" on Justia Law

Gary Tassone was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Tassone subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging that his constitutional rights had been adversely impacted by the ineffective assistance of counsel and by witness perjury. The superior court denied the application without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, from this point forward, an evidentiary hearing is required in the first application for postconviction relief in all cases involving applicants sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "Tassone v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Shurron Washington sought review of an adjudication of a probation violation after a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and the hearing justice revoked the suspension of a ten-year sentence that had previously been meted out. On appeal, Defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in adjudicating him to be a probation violator because, in Defendant's view, the record raised "too many questions" about the reliability of the identification of him as the perpetrator of an alleged attack. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he declared that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

This negligence and breach of contract action arose out of Plaintiff's fall in one of Defendant's stores. Plaintiff Maureen Habershaw appealed from the superior court's grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Michaels Stores. At issue on appeal was whether an allegation that a floor was shiny, standing alone, could withstand a challenge to a claim that a plaintiff was injured as a result of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err when it granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment because there was no issue of material fact about whether a dangerous condition existed at the time of Plaintiff's fall. To the contrary, the Court held, there was a complete absence of any evidence upon which Defendant's negligence could be established. View "Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Carpio was convicted of first-degree murder of a police officer, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and felony assault with a dangerous weapon. The superior court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment for committing a crime of violence with a firearm resulting in death, and another consecutive twenty-year term for felony assault on an elderly woman. The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction; (2) the trial justice properly instructed the jury on the question of criminal responsibility; and (3) the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. View "State v. Carpio" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Kayborn Brown was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to forty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress complainant's out-of-court identification from a photographic array, as the identification was not impermissibly suggestive or improperly tainted; and (2) did not abuse its discretion under R.I. R. Evid. 403 by denying Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a fraudulent charge to the complainant's credit card that occurred shortly after the robbery, as the evidence connected Defendant to the crime. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the driver of a motor vehicle, who is an adult but underage drinker, has a duty to protect third parties from the tortious conduct of an intoxicated individual he or she has agreed to transport, who is likewise an adult but underage drinker, by preventing that individual from subsequently operating a motor vehicle. The superior court found that no such duty existed in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the factual circumstances at hand, no such duty to third parties existed on the part of the defendant driver to prevent his intoxicated passenger from later operating his own motor vehicle. View "Gushlaw v. Milner" on Justia Law

Kevin Lyons was convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation. The Supreme Court affirmed. Lyons subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that he had been prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied the application, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Lyons then filed a second application for postconviction relief, relying on an array of arguments. The superior court denied Lyons' second application, finding that each of Lyons' claims either lacked merit or were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lyons failed to carry his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that postconviction relief was warranted. View "Lyons v. State" on Justia Law