Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant executed an agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to purchase from Defendant an unimproved parcel of real property. The agreement included a due diligence clause, which provided Plaintiff with a ninety-day due-diligence period in which perform inspections and inquiries. After the due-diligence period had expired and the parties had not closed on the property, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking specific performance of its agreement with Defendant as well as damages. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief that the agreement be declared null and void and asserting a claim for breach of contract. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant's counterclaim, finding it had been Plaintiff's burden to contact Defendant to close and that Plaintiff had failed to do so without any explanation for its lack of diligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in its judgment where Plaintiff presented no evidence either explaining its silence or supporting its contention that it was, after the due-diligence period, ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract. View "Empire Acquisition Group, LLC v. Atlantic Mortgage Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over real property. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought an action against Defendant, a dentist, for trespass and private nuisance, and to quiet title. Plaintiffs stated in their complaint that they were the exclusive owners of the disputed property and that Defendant intentionally encroached upon this property without their consent. Defendant counterclaimed for adverse possession. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant's use of the property did not meet the "open and notorious" element of adverse possession. View "McGarry v. Coletti" on Justia Law

Plaintiff North End Realty, a developer, filed a complaint in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the town planner, finance director, and members of the town council of East Greenwich, after the town mandated that North End pay a $200,000 fee-in-lieu before it could record any subdivision approval it might receive from the planning board and begin to develop property. The hearing justice ruled that North End had failed to establish there was a likelihood of success of its claim and entered judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, North End made several arguments, one of which was that the town did not have the requisite statutory authority to impose the fee-in-lieu. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the town may not legally impose a fee-in-lieu in the absence of enabling authority from the general assembly. Remanded with directions to issue an order enjoining the town from imposing, assessing, or collecting the fee-in-lieu. View "North End Realty, L.L.C. v. Mattos" on Justia Law

This case involved an alleged easement on plaintiffs' property used by defendant development company. Plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief, alleging that defendant had violated the warranty covenants in the deed that conveyed the property in dispute from defendant to plaintiffs. The trial court ruled that the easement was valid. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand, plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees, damages and costs. The superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for the successful defense of title under a general warranty deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that warranty covenants do not entitle the grantee to recover attorneys' fees from the grantor for a successful defense of title even where it is the grantor who attacks the title. View "Nunes v. Meadowbrook Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Three property owner companies filed with the planning board an application for a land development project on their property. The planning board denied the plaintiffs' application after members of the state advisory commission on historical cemeteries identified certain features on the plaintiffs' property as historical cemeteries and notified the town as to the existence of the cemeteries. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the advisory commission in superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed the action. One property owner (appellant) appealed, alleging that (1) the advisory commission exceeded its authority under R.I. Gen. Laws 23-18.3-1 by registering the features as historical cemeteries, (2) the advisory commission violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) the trial justice erred when he failed to recognize a slander of title claim against defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the advisory commission's role is purely advisory and therefore it could not register the historical cemetery within the meaning of the statute or violate plaintiffs' due process rights, and (2) because plaintiffs did not suffer a pecuniary loss as a result of the advisory committee's actions, appellant failed to establish an essential element of its slander of title claim. View "Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

In 2001, the planning board of the town of East Greenwich granted final plan approval to plaintiff Carmine D'Ellena's proposed subdivision. In 2004, plaintiff's attorney requested a time extension, which the planning board granted. A condition to the extension was that plaintiff connect the development to a public water supply. In 2008, plaintiff filed a petition in the superior court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asking the court to declare the board's decision regarding the extension null and void. In support of his petition, plaintiff alleged that the planning board (1) violated state law by amending a final decision without application for and notice to plaintiff, (2) violated the notice rules by failing to provide notice to the plaintiff of its action, and (3) violated the open meetings law by failing to provide notice. The superior court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff voluntarily relinquished and thereby waived whatever procedural and statutory rights were his regarding the 2004 board meeting when he took the action of telling his attorney that he agreed to add the condition of public water. View "D'Ellena v. Town of East Greenwich" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Nancy Rogers and plaintiff Shelter Harbor Conservation Society owned contiguous lots in the same subdivision. The Society filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Rogerses and town officials after the town zoning official issued zoning certificates designating three of the Rogerses lots for single-family residences, alleging that the certificates were void because they were issued after a merger of the lots. The superior court eventually granted summary judgment to the Rogerses, finding the lots were unmerged pursuant to the merger provision of the zoning ordinance. The Society appealed, contending (1) the evidence contained divergent interpretations of the map depicting the Rogerses' lots, and therefore the trial justice therefore improperly weighed the evidence at the summary-judgment stage and a trial on the merits was necessary to resolve the issue; and (2) the trial justice erred when she stayed the Society's attempts to obtain discovery from the Rogerses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the map was unambiguous; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in staying deposition notices that were not intended to obtain information relevant to the issue under consideration. View "The Shelter Harbor Conservation Society, Inc. v. Rogers, et al." on Justia Law

Timothy and Barbara Barrow purchased property from Herbert and Claire Weida. Before the sale the Weidas obtained permission from the adjoining landowner, Peter Dunn, to use a strip of land between their property and a stone wall on Dunn's property. After the sale the Barrows continued to use the strip of land just as the Weidas had done. The Barrows later filed suit to quiet title to the land they had been using. The Barrows argued they held title through adverse possession or, in the alternative, boundary by acquiescence. The trial justice denied the Barrows' request, concluding that the Barrows failed to prove they had met the requirements for adverse possession and failed to show boundary by acquiescence. The Supreme Court held that because the Weidas had permission from Dunn to use the strip of land, the permissive nature of that use could only become hostile when that permission was withdrawn or when the nature of the use changed. As neither event occurred in this case, the judgment of the trial justice was affirmed. View "Barrow, et al. v. D&B Valley Associates, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendants Earl Blamires, his wife Sylvia, and his son Brian all appealed a Superior Court decision that affirmed a trial courtâs judgment in favor of Plaintiff Val-Gioia Properties, LLC. In 2004, police responded to a complaint that Defendants were dumping a considerable amount of debris onto Plaintiffâs land. Plaintiffs sought damages for clean-up costs. None of the Defendants attended the original trial date, but instead sent letters to the court and opposing counsel explaining their reasons for not attending. Plaintiffs argued that the letters were not proper answers to the suit, and subsequently Plaintiffs received a default judgment. From there, the case went back and forth between the trial and superior Courts for various technical issues and appeals all arguing the validity of the default judgment. In October, 2008, a final judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants appealed. After reviewing the trial and appellate records, the Supreme Court found that Defendants indeed did serve a proper answer in the case, and that the default judgment should not have been entered. The Court vacated the original default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Michael West sought to develop six two-family homes on land in a residential neighborhood. After gaining initial support for his proposal by the local zoning officer, the full zoning commission denied Petitionerâs plan. The Boardâs decision was later affirmed by the Board of Appeals and the Superior Court. Because Petitioner thought he was in compliance with the zoning ordinances, he challenged the Superior Courtâs interpretation of the zoning ordinance to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, Petitioner asked the Court to resolve what he perceived as a conflict between the zoning ordinance and the municipalityâs comprehensive plan. The Supreme Court found no error with the lower courtâs interpretation of the local zoning ordinance, nor did it find a conflict with the local zoning ordinances and the municipalityâs comprehensive plan. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.