Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of EquiFirst, secured by a mortgage on real estate. The mortgage designated EquiFirst as the Lender and named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee and the Lender’s nominee. MERS, as EquiFirst’s nominee, assigned the mortgage to Sutton Funding, which assigned the mortgage to Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (Bank of New York). Bank of New York subsequently initiated a foreclosure sale, at which it prevailed as the highest bidder. Plaintiff filed suit in the superior court challenging the validity of the two mortgage assignments. The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that the assignments were valid, and additionally dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(7) for failing to join an indispensible party, Bank of New York. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the basis of Rule 12(b)(7), holding that hearing justice’s dismissal on Rule 12(b)(7) grounds was appropriate where Plaintiff failed to join Bank of New York to the action. View "Rosano v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent’s death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent’s children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent’s children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing. View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home. To finance the transaction, Plaintiffs executed a note payable to Accredited Home Lenders. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. MERS assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Because Plaintiffs stopped making their payments as set forth in the note Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property. Accredited REO Properties purchased the property. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking orders declaring that they were owners of the property as a matter of law and that the foreclosure sale, conveyance, and assignment were void. Defendants - MERS, Deutsche Bank, Accredited REO Properties, Accredited Home Lenders, and others - filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a legal and valid foreclosure occurred in this case. View "Moura v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick Carrozza, Sr. filed a petition seeking to impose a resulting trust on four properties and caused notices of lis pendens to be filed with respect to each of the properties at issue. Counterclaimants, in turn, filed a counterclaim alleging slander of title. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Counterclaimants with respect to the resulting trust issue. After a trial on the slander of title counterclaim, the trial justice held the counterclaim defendants - Frederick Sr. and his three living children - liable for slander of title. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in all respects except that part of the judgment awarding $845,00 in punitive damages, holding that the award of punitive damages should be reduced to $422,500. View "Carrozza v. Voccola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Builder, performed work on a property in the City of Providence owned by Owner and leased by Lessee. A dispute subsequently arose regarding payment, and Plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against Owner, Lessee, and Builder. After Owner and Lessee deposited a bond, with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as surety, the superior court discharged the lien. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to add Liberty as a defendant. Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment on the mechanics’ lien claim. The trial justice denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in entering judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee because they, as well as Builder and Liberty, were all directly liable to it for any rights it had under the lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the mechanics’ lien statute mandates the dismissal and discharge of the lien once a bond, which replaces the property as security for the claim, is deposited with the registry of the court. View "Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, limited liability entities that owned property in the Town of Coventry, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the legality of sewer assessments assessed by Coventry. A hearing justice dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for their failure to follow the correct administrative appeal process. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding (1) the hearing justice erred in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not followed the R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-26 tax appeal process, as section 44-5-26 did not apply in this case; and (2) the appeal process set forth in section 19 of Coventry’s sewer enabling act is the process by which residents of Coventry may appeal sewer assessments or charges levied by Coventry pursuant to its authority under the enabling act. View "Commerce Park Assocs. 1, LLC v. Houle" on Justia Law

A stone wall demarcated the boundary between Plaintiff's and Defendant's property. After Plaintiff discovered that a large portion of the stone wall had been destroyed and a significant number of trees on his property were missing, Plaintiff sought to recover damages from Defendant for the unauthorized removal of his trees and the theft of portions of the stone wall. After a jury trial, the trial court granted judgments as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial justice abused her discretion in precluding expert testimony on the subject of historic stone walls, and the exclusion constituted reversible error; and (2) the trial justice committed prejudicial error in granting a judgment as a matter of law in Defendant's favor. View "Morabit v. Hoag" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she possessed a prescriptive easement and an easement by implication over Defendant's property. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that she had an easement giving her the right to use a paved driveway on Defendant's property. The trial court justice found that Plaintiff had acknowledged Defendant's superior title, that she had not occupied the disputed property with hostility and under a claim of right, that she had used the disputed property openly but not notoriously, and that she did not establish an easement by implication. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court with respect to Plaintiff's claim of an easement by implication; but (2) vacated the judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim of a prescriptive easement, holding that the superior court erred in finding that Plaintiff (i) had not established that she used the disputed property in a hostile manner under a claim of right, and (ii) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her use of the disputed property was notorious in nature. Remanded. View "Caluori v. Dexter Credit Union" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff failed to pay taxes on property she owned, Defendant purchased the property at a tax sale. Over a year after the tax sale, Defendant filed a petition to foreclose Plaintiff's right of redemption. The superior court granted Defendant's motion and entered a final decree foreclosing Plaintiff's right of redemption and vesting legal title in the property to Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action seeking to vacate the final decree. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish under R.I. Gen. Laws 44-9-24 that she did not receive notice of the petition to foreclose or that no taxes were owed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not deprived of due process because of an irregularity in the notices of the petition to foreclose because the irregularity was neither substantial nor misleading; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that a final decree could not have entered without a default having first entered against her was unavailing because the explicit language of section 44-9-30 clearly provides that a default is not a prerequisite to the entry of a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption. View "Johnson v. QBAR Assocs." on Justia Law

Property Owner owned two adjacent lots, a house lot and a vacant lot. Property Owner mortgaged certain real property to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Property Owner then conveyed its house lot to an individual who, in turn, granted a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). Aurora Loan Services, LLC was the servicer for MERS. Aurora later informed Option One that it intended to foreclose on the house lot. Option One filed a complaint seeking a declaration that Option One had a valid first lien encumbrance on the house lot that was superior to the Aurora mortgage. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Option One. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Option One mortgage was a valid first lien on the house lot where (1) there was no dispute the Option One mortgage was properly recorded in the town records so any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, including Aurora, was charged with constructive notice of the Option One mortgage; and (2) a prior deed reference in the Option One mortgage description was sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee on notice that the Option One mortgage was intended to encumber both the house lot and the vacant lot. View "Option One Mortgage Corp. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC" on Justia Law