Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation of a clause concerning the allocation of real estate taxes contained in a written lease between Inland American Retail Management and Cinemaworld of Florida. Inland and Cinemaworld were successors-in-interest to a ground lease for the rental of what is now a movie theater in a shopping center. Under the terms of the lease, Cinemaworld incurred certain liabilities and expenses. Pursuant to a clause in the lease, Cinemaworld was required to pay an amount equal to the real estate taxes "levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed" against the movie theater. Inland filed a complaint for breach of the lease for Cinemaworld's alleged failure to make timely payments as required by the lease. The superior court granted partial summary judgment in Cinemaworld's favor with respect to its motion seeking an accounting, ruling that the formula allocating Cinemaworld's reasonable share of real estate taxes should be based on the square footage of its leased premises. Inland appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the interpretation of the parties' lease. View "Inland Am. Retail Mgmt. LLC v. Cinemaworld of Fla., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purchase and sales agreement agreeing to buy Defendant's property and deposited ten percent of the purchase price with Defendant's real estate agent until closing. Defendant signed the agreement but also made certain handwritten alterations to the contract. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's handwritten alterations were material changes that constituted a counter-offer, not an acceptance of Plaintiffs' offer to purchase the property. The jury found there was never a valid contract between the parties and Plaintiffs were entitled to the return of their deposit. The trial court added prejudgment interest to the judgment. Defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs were not entitled to interest on their deposit. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the award of prejudgment interest in this case, holding that Plaintiffs' deposit did not fall within the category of "pecuniary damages" under R.I. Gen. Laws 9-21-10(a), and therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest. View "Andrews v. Plouff" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation arose from a real estate dispute between Plaintiff and several neighbors of Plaintiff (collectively, Codefendants). Codefendants retained attorneys (Attorney Defendants) to represent them in the property dispute. Attorney Defendants filed a notice of intent on behalf of Codefendants asserting Codefendants' right to their own property. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants and later amended his complaint setting forth claims against Attorney Defendants for slander and title and intentional interference with prospective advantage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Attorney Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his claim of slander of title; and (2) the notice of intent could not be said to constitute an improper act of interference, and therefore, Attorney Defendants were entitled to summary judgment with respect to the intentional interference claim. View "Beauregard v. Gouin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought permits from the City of Providence so they might restore electrical meters at the property they owned. The property was located in an area of the City that was zoned for no more than two-family dwelling units. The City conducted an inspection of the property, which revealed the property was being used as a three-family dwelling, and therefore, it was not in compliance with zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs filed an appeal of the City official's determination that their property was an illegal three-family dwelling. The zoning board affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed and sought a declaration that their use of the property was a legal nonconforming use. The trial justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not abuse his discretion in declining to declare that Plaintiffs' property was a legal nonconforming use; (2) did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the City; and (3) did not err in declining to allow Plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine of laches as a basis for ruling that the City should not be permitted to enforce the provision of the zoning ordinance that prohibits using the property in a three-family manner. View "Cigarrilha v. City of Providence" on Justia Law

After she slipped and fell on an icy surface, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligence by Defendant in failing property to maintain its property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding, among other things, that Defendant, a commercial lessor, did not have a duty of care to Plaintiff, an invitee of a tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance to conduct further discovery was waived, and even if the issue not been waived, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in declining to grant a continuance. View "Berard v. HCP, Inc." on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, as nominee for two lenders (collectively, Plaintiffs), held mortgages on Lot 456. For the property owner's failure to pay his water bill, the Pawtucket Water Supply Board (PWSB) auctioned the lot. PWSB issued a deed conveying the title in the property to Amy Realty. Amy Realty subsequently discovered that the property PWSB had intended to auction had been mistakenly listed as Lot 486 on the tax sale notices and deed. Amy Realty then obtained a corrective deed from the PWSB conveying title to Lot 456. Amy Realty subsequently filed a petition to foreclose on Plaintiffs' rights of redemption in Lot 456. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to vacate the final decree of disclosure, alleging that the corrective deed changing the lot number from 486 to 456 was invalid and this infirmity rendered the foreclosure decree void. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the corrective deed obtained in this case was null and void because it was not recorded within sixty days of the tax sale; and (2) the final foreclosure decree may be vacated because the tax sale was invalid. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. DePina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants owned abutting property. The parties disputed a parcel of land located on the northernmost portion of Defendants' surveyed property. Plaintiffs asserted that, since 1972, they used this area as their own in the belief that it was part of their yard. Specifically, Plaintiffs placed an inflatable children's pool, built a tree fort, and hung a hammock from trees in the disputed area. Plaintiffs filed this action for adverse possession in 2009. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in holding that an agreement in which Defendants granted Plaintiffs permission to place a hammock on the disputed land was a concession to Defendants' superior title in that land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in considering the agreement as an objective manifestation of Defendants' superior title. View "DiPippo v. Sperling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed $249,900 from Lehman Brothers Bank to finance the purchase of a home, and he signed an adjustable rate note that evidenced the debt. Plaintiff and his wife (Plaintiffs) then executed a mortgage on the property that secured the loan. Even though the note was made payable to the lender, the mortgage was granted to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for the lender and the lender's subject and assigns. Plaintiffs subsequently defaulted on the note, and MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced an action seeking to prevent MERS from exercising the power of sale contained in the mortgage, arguing that only a mortgagee was permitted to exercise the power of sale and that MERS was merely a nominee-mortgagee without the authority to foreclose. The superior court denied Plaintiffs' request and entered judgment on behalf of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MERS had both contractual and statutory authority to foreclose and exercise the power of sale. View "Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Defendants, the city zoning board of review and the members of that board voted at a February 23, 2009 meeting to approve a request for an extension of time in which to substantially complete certain improvements to property. The request was referenced in one of the items contained in the agenda posted with respect to the board's meeting. Plaintiffs alleged that the agenda item violated the Rhode Island Open Meeting Act because it was a vague and indefinite notice to the public and one lacking in specificity. The superior court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the agenda item provided sufficient notice and thus did not violate the Act. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the agenda item did not fairly inform the public of the nature of the business to be discussed or acted upon, and thus the agenda item did not comply with the standard established by the Act. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs with instructions that the action taken by the zoning board be declared null and void. View "Anolik v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Newport" on Justia Law

The Lloyds owned property abutting property owned by the Bardorfs. Both properties were zoned R-10. The Bardorfs filed an application for a special-use permit proposing the removal of a deck and an existing two-story addition on the rear of their home and the construction of an addition and a deck. The Lloyds objected to the application. The city's zoning board of review (board) granted the special-use permit. The superior court affirmed the board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the board and trial justice did not err in applying the standard governing a special-use permit to the Bardorfs' application, as the appropriate form of relief for a party seeking to expand a dimensionally noncomforming structure is a special-use permit; (2) neither the superior court nor the board erred in allowing the Bardorfs to utilize expanded lot coverage authorized by a 1992 dimensional variance; (3) because the zoning ordinance does not contemplate a calculation of building mass or three-dimensional spaces in the criteria for alterations of dimensionally noncomforming structures, the trial justice did not err in finding the addition would intensify the nonconformity associated with lot building coverage; and (4) legally competent evidence supported the trial justice's findings. View "Lloyd v. Zoning Bd. of Review for City of Newport" on Justia Law