Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, tenants on property owned by Baird Properties, were required to vacate the premises they leased and to remove their belongings when the property was condemned due to a lack of electricity, heating and water. Plaintiffs brought an action under the Residential Landlord and Tenants Act alleging that Baird Properties and Michael Baird purposely sabotaged utility services to the property in order to set events in motion that would force Plaintiffs to vacate the premises. After a trial, the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Plaintiffs and Baird Properties; (2) the trial justice did not err in determining that Baird tampered with essential services to the property; and (3) the award of attorney’s fees was reasonable. View "Gregoire v. Baird Props., LLC" on Justia Law

The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) condemned a parcel of real property owned by Richard Deeble and his wife for highway purposes. The Deebles subsequently died. RIDOT utilized only a portion of the condemned property in furtherance of the relocation of an interstate. Plaintiff, the Estate of Richard Deeble, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against RIDOT, asserting that should RIDOT seek to sell or lease the condemned property, the Estate was entitled to a right of first refusal to repurchase or lease the land in accordance with article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The superior court justice concluded that the provisions of article 6, section 19 did not pass to the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the rights guaranteed by article 6, section 19 terminate upon the death of the original condemnee. View "Estate of Richard J. Deeble v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

The dispute in this receivership action centered on the receiver’s sale of commercial property owned by P.T.A. Realty, LLC to NMLM Realty, LLC. NMLM’s agent, Liberty Title & Escrow Company, failed to list all the municipal taxes owed on the property, resulting in an overpayment of funds to Bank of America, N.A. NMLM filed a petition for restitution against the Bank, which Liberty incorporated in its own petition for restitution against the Bank. The Bank argued that it was insulated from a restitution claim as a third-party creditor that received the payment in good faith and without notice of Liberty’s error. A hearing justice ruled in favor of the Bank. NMLM and Liberty filed a joint notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence that, at the time the proceeds from the sale were disbursed, the Bank knew that it was receiving an overpayment of funds; and (2) therefore, the Bank received the excess funds in good faith, and NMLM and Liberty could not seek the return of their erroneous payment predicated on the theory of unjust enrichment. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. P.T.A. Realty, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

John Izzo was the owner of certain property and his mother, Carmel Izzo, held a mortgage on the property. After the failure to pay sewer fees, the property was put up for sale at a tax sale. Defendant purchased the property and filed a petition to foreclose the Izzos’ (Plaintiffs) rights of redemption on the property (the petition). After a hearing, a final decree was entered foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption to the property. Plaintiffs filed this complaint seeking entry of an order vacating the final decree foreclosing their rights of redemption, alleging inadequate notice of the petition. The trial justice granted Plaintiffs’ request, concluding that inadequate notice to Plaintiffs of the petition amounted to a denial of due process. An order subsequently implemented the trial justice’s bench decision and vacated the final decree foreclosing Plaintiffs’ rights of redemption. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice erred in finding that notice of the petition as it pertained to John was inadequate since John was estopped from raising such an argument; and (2) the notice provided to Carmel was adequate. View "Izzo v. Victor Realty" on Justia Law

The Free & Clear Company (Free & Clear) filed suit alleging that the Narragansett Bay Commission (NBC) owed it damages. NBC admitted liability, and the case proceed to trial on the issue of damages only. The jury returned a verdict for Free & Clear in the amount of $680,277, and the trial justice added prejudgment interest in the amount of $756,169. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in instructing the jury; (2) properly reviewed the testimony of Free & Clear’s expert witness when issuing his decision; (3) did not err in refusing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to portions of the testimony of Free & Clear’s expert witness; (4) did not err in denying NBC’s motion for a remittitur; (5) correctly calculated prejudgment interest; and (6) did not err by denying NBC’s motion for partial judgment as a matter of law. Further, the jury’s award of damages was not based on impermissible speculation. View "Free & Clear Co. v. Narragansett Bay Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff operated a Wendy’s restaurant in East Greenwich. One defendant had received permission to build a new McDonald’s restaurant with a drive-through window on property located down the street. Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction and a writ of mandamus to prevent the construction of the drive-through facility until McDonald’s first submitted a special-use permit application for the drive-through window to the Town of East Greenwich’s Zoning Board of Review. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice correctly concluded that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the amended East Greenwich Zoning Ordinance permitted drive-through uses as a matter of right. View "CCF, LLC v. Pimental" on Justia Law

Sophie Danforth entered into a purchase and sales agreement (PSA) with Timothy and Rebecca More, pursuant to which Danforth agreed to sell, and the Mores agreed to purchase, certain real estate. The PSA provided that $30,000 would be paid as a deposit at the time the PSA was executed. The Mores failed to appear at the scheduled closing. Thereafter, Danforth filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract, requesting that she be allowed to retain the Mores’ deposit, and seeking declaratory relief, asking the court to construe the terms of the PSA and to order the escrow agent to disburse the deposit to Danforth. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Danforth, concluding that Danforth was entitled to retain the deposit. The court further denied Danforth’s motion for attorney’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Danforth, the award of prejudgment interest to Danforth, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. View "Danforth v. More" on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the original master declaration creating Goat Island South - A Waterfront Condominium (GIS) was invalid and the second amended restated master declaration (SAR) was void ab initio. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims, ruling that some claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in earlier, related, litigation and that those claims were barred by the doctrine of estoppel by deed. The hearing justice also determined that the SAR was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ first two claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by deed; (2) the SAR is valid; (3) summary judgment in favor of the individually named GIS executive board defendants was appropriate; and (4) the hearing justice did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint. View "IDC Props., Inc. v. Goat Island S. Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

In 2011, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit at a condominium association lien foreclosure sale. In 2013, Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the unit in his name. Plaintiff also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a foreclosure by Defendant, the prior owner’s first mortgage holder. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff took title to the property subject to Defendant’s mortgage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a condominium foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to the Rhode Island Condominium Act extinguishes a prior-recorded first mortgage on the unit following the mortgagee’s failure to exercise the right of redemption provided for in R.I. Gen. Laws 34-36.1-3.21(c). Remanded. View "Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho" on Justia Law

Reyna Bernard purchased property and executed a promissory note in the principal amount secured by a mortgage on the property. The mortgage was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. A fire later destroyed the property. Manuel Rosario entered into an insurance adjusting agreement with an LLC providing that the LLC would assist with the adjustment of the loss in return for a percentage of the total recoverable loss. Thereafter, Bernard defaulted on the note, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to HSBC, leaving an unpaid deficiency on the note in the amount of $246,072. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA) subsequently initiated an interpleader action to determine the respective rights of the LLC, Bernard, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as agent for HSBC with regard to the insurance proceeds. The superior court found that Ocwen was entitled to the entirety of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the language contained in the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bernard and Rosario failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the insurance proceeds; and (2) the mortgage executed by Bernard was duly acknowledged as statutorily required and was therefore valid. View "R.I. Joint Reinsurance Ass’n v. Rosario" on Justia Law