Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff applied to the Town Planning Board for the Town of Hopkinton for a preliminary plan approval of a minor subdivision. The Town Planner stated that he would certify the subdivision application as complete once Plaintiff submitted proof that it had paid certain outstanding personal property taxes. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Town Planner to certify its subdivision application as complete (the mandamus count) and amended its complaint to add a count seeking a declaration that the requirement for an applicants such as Plaintiff to pay “property taxes” refers only to real property taxes (the declaratory judgment count). The trial justice dismissed the mandamus count but for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies but summarily ruled that the declaratory judgment count survived. The trial justice subsequently denied, sua sponte, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the trial justice abused his discretion when he sua sponte invoked the administrative exhaustion doctrine in the course of denying Plaintiff declaratory relief where neither party had briefed or argued that doctrine. View "Bruce Brayman Builders, Inc. v. Lamphere" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Equity One, Inc. As security for the note, Plaintiff executed a mortgage on the property in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The note was twice transferred, eventually landing in the possession of Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. was retained to service the loan. Meanwhile, MERS, as nominee for Equity One, assigned its interest in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. After Litton and Deutsche Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed an action alleging that the assignment from MERS to Deutsche Bank was invalid for lack of authority. When Plaintiff sought to depose a MERS designee, MERS filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment. The superior court denied the motion. MERS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Litton and Deutsche Bank then moved for summary judgment, which the hearing justice granted. The Supreme Court (1) quashed the order denying MERS’ motion for a protective order, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment in question; and (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Litton and Deutsche Bank, holding that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage. View "Genao v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

This controversy arose from an easement over a right-of-way that ran along a driveway on Plaintiff’s lots allowing access to Poppasquash Road from Defendant’s property. When Defendant and her family began using the right-of-way across Plaintiff’s lots to access the road from their property, Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet title to the right-of-way and damages for trespass. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that she had an express easement permitting her to travel on the right-of-way. The trial justice granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Defendant had established the existence of an express easement appurtenant. View "Kinder v. Westcott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff executed a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage on her real estate. The mortgage deed named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. The note was transferred to USA Residential Properties, LLC, and Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC became the servicer for the loan. MERS then assigned its interest in the mortgage to ACT Properties, LLC, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to USA Residential. When Rushmore initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties was invalid because the signer was unauthorized. When Plaintiff filed a notice to depose a MERS designee as to the authority of the official who executed the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties, MERS moved for a protective order seeking to restrict discovery, arguing that Plaintiff had no standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. The hearing justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court quashed the hearing justice’s decision, holding that because Plaintiff merely alleged that the assignment was voidable, as opposed to void, and because she was not a party to the assignment, she lacked standing to challenge it and was not entitled to engage in discovery pertaining to the authority issue. View "Cruz v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In order to finance her purchase of a home, Plaintiff executed a note payable to New Century Mortgage Corporation. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee. New Century, the lender, subsequently filed for bankruptcy and filed a notice of rejection of executory contract regarding its membership agreement with MERS and its status as a MERS member. MERS then assigned the mortgage to UBS Real Estate Securities, and UBS assigned the mortgage to USA Residential Properties. Thereafter, USA Residential and its loan servicer, Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, commenced foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this complaint against MERS, UBS, USA Residential, and Rushmore, declaring that the mortgage assignments were void and the foreclosure sale was invalid. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignments of the mortgage and, alternatively, that the assignments were valid and the foreclosure proper. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage on her home and adequately stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "DiLibero v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

AIDG Properties, LLC, a real-estate holding company managed by Anjan Dutta-Gupta, purchased property. AIDG obtained loans from BankNewport (Defendant) to finance the purchase and to perform improvements. Dutta-Gupta personally guaranteed the loans. Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and Tecta America New England, LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) served as subcontractors on the project. Plaintiffs substantially completed the renovations, and BankNewport deposited the loan proceeds into AIDG’s account. After Dutta-Gupta was arrested, Defendant declared Dutta-Gupta to be in default and accelerated the loans. Defendant then set off the deposit it made previously by reversing it. As a result, AIDG was unable to pay Plaintiffs for the work they had performed. Defendant, who was granted possession of the property, later foreclosed. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to recover compensation for their work under the theory of unjust enrichment. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due to the absence of a relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the lack of any allegation that Defendant engaged in any type of misconduct or fraud, Defendant’s retention of the property, including the improvements, was not inequitable under the Court’s jurisprudence on unjust enrichment. View "Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. BankNewport" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in order to purchase certain real property. To secure payment obligations under the note, Plaintiffs executed a mortgage on the property. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for the original lender, assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), which was then authorized to service the note for Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). When Plaintiffs failed to make timely payments, OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs filed an action against MERS and OneWest seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to OneWest was invalid and to quiet title to the property. OneWest eventually held a sale, and the property was sold to Fannie Mae. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) MERS validly assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest, and therefore, OneWest had the statutory power of sale; (2) Plaintiffs defaulted under the terms of the note; and (3) Fannie Mae, as the buyer at the foreclosure sale, held the record title to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed such that granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was appropriate. View "Breggia v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In Nye I, before final judgment entered awarding a judgment parcel to Plaintiff, Defendants transferred via quitclaim deed to their family trust a property that the judgment parcel was located within. In Nye II, the Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the transfer of the disputed property. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the transfer of the disputed property to the trust before final judgment entered in Nye I served to render the final judgment a nullity. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud claims and dismissed Plaintiff’s quiet title claim on the basis that Plaintiff was ordered to, and failed to, comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 34-16-2 by submitting an abstract of title or similar report concerning the status of the title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice was correct in granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s fraud and negligence claims and in dismissing Plaintiff’s quiet title claim. View "Nye v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Supreme Court held that Seattle Savings Bank had the right to foreclose on certain property that Defendant inherited from his mother. In 2007, the Bank executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Because Defendant refused to vacate the property, Fannie Mae filed a trespass and ejectment complaint. Defendant, in turn, argued that Fannie Mae was not entitled to possession of the property. The trial court awarded Fannie Mae possession of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Fannie Mae had the right to possess the property. View "Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Malinou" on Justia Law

A mortgage deed designated Desmond Leone as the mortgagor of his home and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee, acting as nominee for the lender, Equity One, Inc. MERS later assigned its interest in the mortgage to Assets Recovery Center Investments, LLC (ARC). When Leone failed to make timely payments to the lender, ARC, which Equity One had authorized to act on its behalf, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Leone subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to ARC was invalid and also sought to quiet title to the property. A hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants - MERS, Equity One, and ARC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly found that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the matter was ripe for summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Leone v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys." on Justia Law