Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Free & Clear Company (Free & Clear) filed suit alleging that the Narragansett Bay Commission (NBC) owed it damages. NBC admitted liability, and the case proceed to trial on the issue of damages only. The jury returned a verdict for Free & Clear in the amount of $680,277, and the trial justice added prejudgment interest in the amount of $756,169. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in instructing the jury; (2) properly reviewed the testimony of Free & Clear’s expert witness when issuing his decision; (3) did not err in refusing to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to portions of the testimony of Free & Clear’s expert witness; (4) did not err in denying NBC’s motion for a remittitur; (5) correctly calculated prejudgment interest; and (6) did not err by denying NBC’s motion for partial judgment as a matter of law. Further, the jury’s award of damages was not based on impermissible speculation. View "Free & Clear Co. v. Narragansett Bay Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff operated a Wendy’s restaurant in East Greenwich. One defendant had received permission to build a new McDonald’s restaurant with a drive-through window on property located down the street. Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction and a writ of mandamus to prevent the construction of the drive-through facility until McDonald’s first submitted a special-use permit application for the drive-through window to the Town of East Greenwich’s Zoning Board of Review. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice correctly concluded that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the amended East Greenwich Zoning Ordinance permitted drive-through uses as a matter of right. View "CCF, LLC v. Pimental" on Justia Law

Sophie Danforth entered into a purchase and sales agreement (PSA) with Timothy and Rebecca More, pursuant to which Danforth agreed to sell, and the Mores agreed to purchase, certain real estate. The PSA provided that $30,000 would be paid as a deposit at the time the PSA was executed. The Mores failed to appear at the scheduled closing. Thereafter, Danforth filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract, requesting that she be allowed to retain the Mores’ deposit, and seeking declaratory relief, asking the court to construe the terms of the PSA and to order the escrow agent to disburse the deposit to Danforth. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Danforth, concluding that Danforth was entitled to retain the deposit. The court further denied Danforth’s motion for attorney’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Danforth, the award of prejudgment interest to Danforth, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. View "Danforth v. More" on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the original master declaration creating Goat Island South - A Waterfront Condominium (GIS) was invalid and the second amended restated master declaration (SAR) was void ab initio. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims, ruling that some claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in earlier, related, litigation and that those claims were barred by the doctrine of estoppel by deed. The hearing justice also determined that the SAR was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ first two claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by deed; (2) the SAR is valid; (3) summary judgment in favor of the individually named GIS executive board defendants was appropriate; and (4) the hearing justice did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint. View "IDC Props., Inc. v. Goat Island S. Condo. Ass’n" on Justia Law

In 2011, Plaintiff purchased a condominium unit at a condominium association lien foreclosure sale. In 2013, Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the unit in his name. Plaintiff also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent a foreclosure by Defendant, the prior owner’s first mortgage holder. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff took title to the property subject to Defendant’s mortgage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a condominium foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to the Rhode Island Condominium Act extinguishes a prior-recorded first mortgage on the unit following the mortgagee’s failure to exercise the right of redemption provided for in R.I. Gen. Laws 34-36.1-3.21(c). Remanded. View "Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho" on Justia Law

Reyna Bernard purchased property and executed a promissory note in the principal amount secured by a mortgage on the property. The mortgage was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. A fire later destroyed the property. Manuel Rosario entered into an insurance adjusting agreement with an LLC providing that the LLC would assist with the adjustment of the loss in return for a percentage of the total recoverable loss. Thereafter, Bernard defaulted on the note, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale to HSBC, leaving an unpaid deficiency on the note in the amount of $246,072. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association (RIJRA) subsequently initiated an interpleader action to determine the respective rights of the LLC, Bernard, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC as agent for HSBC with regard to the insurance proceeds. The superior court found that Ocwen was entitled to the entirety of the insurance proceeds pursuant to the language contained in the mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bernard and Rosario failed to demonstrate their entitlement to the insurance proceeds; and (2) the mortgage executed by Bernard was duly acknowledged as statutorily required and was therefore valid. View "R.I. Joint Reinsurance Ass’n v. Rosario" on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiffs purchased property from Seller, and Seller conveyed the property to Plaintiffs by deed. After the sale was finalized but before Plaintiffs were able to move into the property, Plaintiffs experienced significant flooding in the driveway, garage, and basement. The flooding and water-penetration issues persisted over the next several years. In 2010, Plaintiffs experienced extensive flooding of their property. Plaintiffs brought this action against Seller and entities involved in the sale (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. The superior court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the superior court correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ contract and negligence claims; but (2) the merger and disclaimer clause contained in the purchase and sales agreement was not drawn with sufficient specificity to bar Plaintiffs’ claim for fraud. Remanded. View "McNulty v. Chip" on Justia Law

Petitioners’ property directly abutted property identified as the Hines Road property, owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff and the Town of Cumberland came to an agreement regarding a retaining wall on the Hines Road property in close proximity to Petitioners’ property. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against the Town to litigate issues relating to the agreement. Petitioners moved to intervene in the underlying superior court action. The hearing justice denied the motion to intervene, concluding that Petitioners were not entitled to intervention as a matter of right or to permissive intervention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ status as abutting property owners did not ipso facto entitle them to intervene in this case as a matter of right; (2) the hearing justice did not err in ruling that Petitioners’ interest in the superior court action was “contingent” upon the agreement between Plaintiff and the Town; and (3) the hearing justice did not err in considering Petitioners’ failure to appeal from an adverse Board decision previously filed in regard to the agreement as one factor weighing against intervention in the underlying action. View "Hines Road, LLC v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendants in this action were business owners with abutting properties. The disputed property in this case was a diagonal path through Plaintiff’s driveway to the business located on Defendants’ premises, which was regularly traveled by large delivery trucks. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, seeking, among other relief, injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from trespassing onto, interfering with, obstructing, or blocking Plaintiff’s business. Defendants counterclaimed for trespass and also sought injunctive relief. The hearing justice granted Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, denied Defendants’ request for injunctive relief, and declared that Plaintiff owned and had the right to use and control the property in question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that Plaintiff stood to suffer irreparable harm if relief were not granted and in therefore granting Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. View "Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc." on Justia Law

When Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC (Ferris) purchased twenty-two acres of property from Huhtamaki, Inc. (Huhtamaki), the parties executed an indemnity agreement providing that, upon the occurrence of certain conditions, Huhtamaki would reimburse Ferris for environmental cleanup costs. After hazardous substances were found on the property and Ferris incurred certain costs related to the cleanup of the substances, Ferris requested indemnification from Huhtamaki. Huhtamaki refused to indemnify Ferris. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Ferris. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) finding that Ferris’s notice to Huhtamaki constituted sufficient “claim notice” pursuant to the terms of the indemnity agreement; (2) admitting certain testimony from Ferris’s expert witness; (3) admitting evidence relating to excavated soil samples where Ferris excavated the soil before Huhtamaki could test it; and (4) instructing the jury. Lastly, contrary to Huhtamaki’s argument, Ferris’s case was not built on an improper “pyramid of inferences.” View "Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC v. Huhtamaki, Inc." on Justia Law