Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose regarding the sale of property located at 301 Harris Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, 1100 North Main LLC, sought to purchase property from the Providence Firefighters Realty Corp. (the Firefighters), contingent on the Firefighters acquiring replacement property. The Firefighters entered into negotiations with the defendant, Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc., to purchase the Harris Avenue property. After several communications, the Firefighters signed a draft purchase and sales agreement for the property, but the defendant refused to execute it and reportedly accepted another offer. The plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking declaratory, equitable, or monetary relief based on the alleged contract, and recorded two notices of lis pendens against the Harris Avenue property.In the Providence County Superior Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, quash the lis pendens, and sought sanctions. The plaintiff argued that the attorneys’ communications constituted assent and that a purported assignment from the Firefighters gave the plaintiff standing. Before the Superior Court justice issued a decision, the plaintiff attempted to amend its complaint to add factual allegations and clarify standing. The trial justice dismissed the complaint and quashed the lis pendens, finding that the allegations failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and did not establish standing. The motion to amend was denied as futile, as no enforceable contract was found.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether a binding contract existed under the statute of frauds and whether denial of the motion to amend was proper. The Supreme Court held that the unsigned purchase and sales agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds and no binding contract existed. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint, quashing of the lis pendens, and denial of the motion to amend. View "1100 North Main LLC v. Shoreby Hill Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to land operated as an automotive recycling facility by the defendants. They alleged that environmental contamination from the facility affected their property. The litigation began in 2006, and after years of procedural developments, the first jury trial in 2012 resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court later found that the trial justice had erroneously excluded expert testimony and ordered a new trial.A second jury trial was held in 2020 in the Rhode Island Superior Court. During this trial, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to statements made by defense counsel in his opening, arguing that certain factual assertions were inaccurate. Plaintiffs also objected to the testimony of defense witness Karen Beck, claiming her expert opinion should not include references to a report she had not relied on when forming her initial conclusions. The trial justice issued a curative instruction addressing the opening statement objections and limited Beck’s testimony to certain aspects of the disputed report. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, except for a $10,000 punitive damages award against one defendant, which was later vacated by amended judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, and subsequent procedural delays occurred regarding the transmission of the appellate record.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether the plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed for procedural delay and whether the trial justice erred regarding the curative instruction and Beck’s testimony. The court held that dismissal was unwarranted since plaintiffs timely ordered transcripts and took reasonable steps regarding the record. The court further held that plaintiffs had waived their objection to the curative instruction by failing to object at trial, and that the limitations placed on Beck’s testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The amended judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Paolino v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants executed a promissory note in 2006 for a $28,000 loan from Sovereign Bank, secured by a second mortgage on their property in Smithfield, Rhode Island. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee, acting as nominee for the lender and its successors. After a series of assignments, the mortgage was ultimately assigned to the plaintiff. It is undisputed that the original promissory note was lost and that the plaintiff never possessed it. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court seeking to foreclose on the property after the defendants defaulted on the loan.The defendants responded by arguing that, under Rhode Island law and relevant precedent, only the party that lost the promissory note could enforce it, and that the plaintiff’s lack of possession of the note precluded foreclosure. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that as the assigned mortgagee, it was entitled to foreclose despite not possessing the note. The Superior Court, referencing prior Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions, found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the default and concluded that the mortgagee need not hold the note to foreclose. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims, and authorized foreclosure, subject to further court order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that under Rhode Island law, a mortgagee with the power of sale may foreclose on a property even if it does not possess the promissory note, so long as it is the properly assigned mortgagee. The Court rejected the defendants’ arguments based on statutory provisions regarding lost notes, reaffirming that possession of the note is not required for foreclosure by the mortgagee. View "Porch Swing Holdings LLC v. Mallory" on Justia Law

Capital Video Corporation (CVC) obtained a judgment against Joseph A. Bevilacqua in 2002 for $178,000 plus interest. CVC requested and received an original execution in December 2002, which lapsed. In 2004, CVC obtained an alias execution, recorded it against property jointly owned by Bevilacqua and his wife, Donna Bevilacqua. In 2005, CVC obtained another alias execution, recorded it against another jointly owned property, and later partially discharged it. In 2020, CVC requested a replacement execution, which was issued and recorded against a property in North Providence. This property was later transferred to Donna Bevilacqua and then to her trust. In 2022, CVC obtained another pluries execution and scheduled a constable’s sale of the property. Donna Bevilacqua intervened, seeking to prevent the sale.The Superior Court invalidated the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions, finding that they were not issued within the six-year limitation period set by § 9-25-3. The court determined that the 2020 execution was not issued within six years of the 2005 alias execution and that the 2022 execution was invalid because it assumed the validity of the 2020 execution.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The Court held that the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions were invalid because they were not issued within the six-year period required by § 9-25-3. Additionally, CVC failed to properly apply for a replacement execution and did not provide proof that the 2005 alias execution was lost or destroyed. The Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in ordering the release and discharge of the 2020 and 2022 pluries executions. View "Capital Video Corp. v. Bevilacqua" on Justia Law

Zoey Watch Hill, LLC applied for a dimensional variance to expand a nonconforming structure on its property in Westerly, Rhode Island. The property, a small, irregularly shaped lot with a house built in 1938, did not meet current zoning requirements. Zoey proposed lifting the house to create additional living space and sought variances for all setbacks. The Westerly Zoning Board of Review approved the application, finding that the unique characteristics of the lot and the inadequacy of the existing house created a hardship justifying the variance.The Watch Hill Fire District (WHFD) appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing that Zoey failed to demonstrate that there was no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial use of the property. The Superior Court affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct standard of "more than a mere inconvenience" and that substantial evidence supported the board's findings. The court also found that the proposed project was the least relief necessary and that Zoey's hardship was not self-created or primarily for financial gain.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case on a writ of certiorari. The Court held that the Superior Court and the zoning board applied the correct standard for granting a dimensional variance. The Court clarified that the "more than a mere inconvenience" standard was appropriate and that the "no other reasonable alternative" language from a definitional statute did not alter this standard. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the zoning board's decision to grant the dimensional variance to Zoey. View "Watch Hill Fire District v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Nordstroms applied for a dimensional variance to the Westerly Zoning Board of Review to demolish their existing house and build a new three-story house on their property, which is a preexisting nonconforming lot. The property did not meet the minimum lot size and frontage requirements of the Medium-Density Residential 30 (MDR-30) district. The board approved the application, granting variances for side yard setbacks, despite objections from neighboring landowners.The Superior Court consolidated appeals from RH McLeod Family LLC and 4 Spray Rock, LLC, who argued that the board did not follow the correct legal standard and violated the zoning ordinance. The trial justice affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct legal standard and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The trial justice also determined that the zoning ordinance allowed the Nordstroms to obtain a dimensional variance to build a new nonconforming structure after demolishing the existing one.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the trial justice's interpretation of the zoning ordinance. The Court held that the plain language of § 260-32(C)(2) of the Westerly Zoning Ordinance prohibits the rebuilding or replacement of a demolished nonconforming structure unless it conforms to the dimensional requirements of the ordinance. The Court concluded that the ordinance does not allow for the possibility of obtaining a dimensional variance in such cases. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "RH McLeod Family LLC v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Daniel B. Struebing and Amanda L. Lyons, appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Jeremy J. Fournier and Jennifer M. Fournier, in a case involving claims of trespass and adverse possession. The plaintiffs argued that a "seizure" by the United States government of their property interrupted the statutory period for the defendants' adverse possession claim. They also contended that the hearing justice improperly acted as a factfinder and overlooked a federal court's determination regarding the forfeiture of the property.The Superior Court initially denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment due to concerns about federal jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings. However, after the federal court clarified that it did not retain jurisdiction over the property dispute, the Superior Court granted the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment. The court found that the defendants had satisfied the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, having maintained and used the disputed area exclusively for over ten years.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the federal government's actions did not constitute a seizure that interrupted the adverse possession period. The court also agreed that the defendants had established their adverse possession claim by clear and convincing evidence, noting their continuous and exclusive use of the property since 2008. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claims of trespass and slander of title were rendered moot. View "New Phase Realty, LLC v. Fournier" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Kristina Urbonas and Arunas Aniukstis, purchased property at 5 Bowser Court in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant, NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (NRI), acquired adjacent property at 51 Kingston Avenue. A dispute arose when NRI's representative, John Gullison, conducted renovations and removed part of the plaintiffs' cobblestone landing, claiming it encroached on NRI's property. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over the disputed land based on the doctrine of acquiescence, adverse possession, and an easement by prescription.The Superior Court awarded title to the plaintiffs for the disputed land, finding that the plaintiffs had acquired the land through the doctrine of acquiescence. The court also granted title to other abutters of Bowser Court, even though they had not requested such relief. NRI appealed, arguing that the trial justice misapplied the doctrine of acquiescence and erred in awarding title to other abutters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial justice erred in granting relief to the other abutters who had not requested it. The court also determined that the doctrine of acquiescence was not applicable because the disputed boundary was not solely on the parties' adjoining lots but also bordered Bowser Court. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had established an easement by prescription over the five-foot strip of land, as they had used the walkway openly, continuously, and hostilely for the statutory period.The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in part, recognizing the plaintiffs' easement by prescription, and vacated the part of the judgment granting relief to the other abutters. View "Urbonas v. Gullison" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dino J. Guilmette, owned a property in North Providence, Rhode Island, and executed a mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation in 2006. The mortgage was later assigned to Wells Fargo, with PHH Mortgage Services as the servicing company. Guilmette requested a modification of his mortgage in 2014, resulting in a Shared Appreciation Modification Agreement. This agreement increased the principal balance and included a provision for a shared appreciation amount if the property value increased and was sold.Guilmette sold the property in 2022 and disputed the calculation of the shared appreciation amount provided by PHH. He argued that PHH's calculation was incorrect and that they overcharged him by $40,708.33. Guilmette filed a breach of contract action, claiming that PHH did not properly calculate the shared appreciation amount according to the modification agreement.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, PHH and Wells Fargo, concluding that the modification agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court found that the defendants correctly calculated the shared appreciation amount based on the terms of the agreement and the attached disclosure statement, which provided specific examples of the calculation method.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the modification agreement was unambiguous and that the defendants' calculation of the shared appreciation amount was correct. The court emphasized that the disclosure statement, which was part of the agreement and signed by Guilmette, clearly illustrated the calculation method, and there was no ambiguity in the contract terms. View "Guilmette v. PHH Mortgage Services FKA Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeanette Runey, filed a lawsuit against her neighbor, Wayne S. Faring, over a boundary dispute involving a shared driveway between their properties. The plaintiff owns property at 930 East Wallum Lake Road, while the defendant owns property at 860-900 East Wallum Lake Road. In 2019, the defendant initiated an action to determine ownership of the driveway, claiming easement by prescription, necessity, implication, and/or estoppel. The plaintiff counterclaimed for declaratory relief. In 2021, a Superior Court justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that she had title to the disputed land, and the defendant did not. Neither party appealed this decision.The plaintiff then sought a preliminary injunction to remove the defendant’s personal property from the disputed land. The defendant opposed, claiming adverse possession. A different Superior Court justice denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal after it had been docketed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the proper method to seek review of the denial of a preliminary injunction is through a petition for writ of certiorari, not a direct appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.The Supreme Court also expressed concern over the motion justice’s disregard for the unappealed April 7, 2022 judgment, emphasizing the importance of res judicata, which bars the relitigation of issues that were or could have been tried in an earlier action. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Runey v. Faring" on Justia Law