Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff was injured while riding a public bus operated by the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) after the bus driver braked abruptly when a car cut in front of the bus. The plaintiff alleged the driver acted negligently, causing her injuries, and sought damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering. The incident occurred on May 29, 2016. The plaintiff testified that the driver was distracted and speeding, while the driver stated he was operating safely and only stopped suddenly to avoid a collision after being cut off by another vehicle. The plaintiff did not immediately seek medical attention but visited the emergency room days later, where she was diagnosed with a shoulder fracture and chest contusions. RIPTA contested liability and argued that the plaintiff had preexisting conditions.The Rhode Island Superior Court conducted a jury trial, during which the court made several evidentiary rulings, allowed RIPTA to amend its answer to assert the sudden emergency doctrine, and dismissed a juror who had scheduling conflicts. The court also issued jury instructions on spoliation after it was revealed that bus video footage was not preserved. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied after addressing both procedural and substantive arguments.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, the spoliation instruction was proper, and the amendment of RIPTA’s answer and the jury instructions were permissible. The Court found that the plaintiff had waived or failed to preserve several arguments and that no reversible error occurred regarding the dismissal of the juror or the denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Two individuals died in a 2012 plane crash involving a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee 6 aircraft powered by a Lycoming engine manufactured by Avco Corporation in the early 1970s. The engine had undergone overhauls in 1983 and 2004, with several component parts serviced or replaced during those processes. The estates and families of the decedents brought suit in Rhode Island Superior Court against Avco, alleging strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Avco asserted a defense under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which bars certain claims against aircraft manufacturers after eighteen years, subject to specific exceptions for misrepresentation and newly installed parts.The Providence County Superior Court addressed the applicability of GARA’s exceptions. The court found that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to plead, with the required specificity, facts showing that Avco knowingly misrepresented or withheld information from the FAA as required by GARA’s misrepresentation exception. As a result, discovery on this theory was limited. On the rolling provision, the court allowed discovery on specific parts allegedly replaced within eighteen years prior to the crash but found plaintiffs failed to prove that any such part was both manufactured by Avco and causally related to the accident. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Avco on all claims.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that GARA requires plaintiffs to plead specific facts to invoke the misrepresentation exception, which the plaintiffs had not done. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the application of GARA’s rolling provision, as they did not establish that any newly installed part made by Avco caused the crash. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of Avco. View "Williams v. Avco Corporation" on Justia Law

On August 12, 2014, Eva Pena was injured while attempting to board a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) bus in Providence. She alleged that the bus driver closed the doors on her, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. After her death in 2019, her estate continued the suit, claiming negligence by RIPTA. At trial, testimony was presented from multiple witnesses, including Pena’s deposition, the bus driver, a RIPTA supervisor, and Pena’s son. Central to the dispute was the supervisor’s account of a conversation with Pena, which had been facilitated by an unidentified Spanish interpreter at the scene.The Providence County Superior Court admitted the supervisor’s testimony and report about what Pena allegedly said through the interpreter, overruling objections that this constituted inadmissible hearsay. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA, finding that the plaintiff had not proven negligence. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice erred in allowing hearsay testimony via the unidentified interpreter. The trial court denied the motion, finding the issue unsettled under Rhode Island law and suitable for appellate clarification.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s denial of a new trial. The Supreme Court held that admitting the supervisor’s testimony and report regarding Pena’s statements, relayed through the unidentified interpreter, was an abuse of discretion because it constituted inadmissible hearsay lacking reliability and trustworthiness. The Court found that this evidence was not cumulative and its admission affected the substantial rights of the parties. The case was remanded for a new trial consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Fernandez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

In March 2010, a motor vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 95 South in Cranston, Rhode Island, involving Julie DeOliveira, her daughter Maxine, and a truck driven by Greg Trecaso, who was insured by Star Insurance Company. Julie and Maxine claimed that Mr. Trecaso negligently operated his truck, causing their injuries. After Mr. Trecaso and his business were dismissed from the case due to lack of service, Star Insurance remained as defendant. The case proceeded to a jury trial where the key dispute was whether Mr. Trecaso’s actions caused the accident, as described by conflicting accounts from Julie, Maxine, Mr. Trecaso (via deposition), and a police officer.The Providence County Superior Court admitted contested evidence, including Mr. Trecaso’s deposition and a police report, over plaintiffs’ objections. During trial, the jury heard testimony from the plaintiffs, Mr. Trecaso’s deposition, and Trooper Hanley, who investigated the accident. The jury found that neither Julie nor Maxine proved by a preponderance of evidence that Star Insurance’s insured was negligent. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied by the Superior Court, as was Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed several alleged errors, including evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, statements by defense counsel, and the verdict sheet. The Court applied an abuse of discretion standard to evidentiary and procedural rulings and found no error by the trial justice. The Court concluded that the jury instructions were proper, the verdict sheet was not misleading, and the empty chair doctrine was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and the judgment in favor of Star Insurance Company, declining to address the defendant’s cross-appeal. View "DeOliveira v. Trecaso" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, William Boggs, was injured on August 9, 2016, while transferring liquid asphalt from a tanker truck to a distribution truck in Framingham, Massachusetts. He was sprayed with liquid asphalt, resulting in burns and permanent injuries. Boggs was employed by All States Asphalt, Inc. (All States), which accepted his workers' compensation claim. Boggs filed a complaint against Johnston Asphalt, LLC, alleging negligence in maintaining the truck that caused his injuries.The Kent County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnston Asphalt on February 27, 2024. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that Johnston Asphalt owed no duty to Boggs. The court noted that the truck was owned and maintained by All States, and the only person who worked on the truck was an All States employee, Michael Kelly. The court also rejected Boggs' argument to pierce the corporate veil, finding no evidence that Johnston Asphalt and All States were not separate entities.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that Boggs failed to present competent evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding Johnston Asphalt's duty of care. The court found that the single piece of mail addressed to Kelly at Johnston Asphalt's address was insufficient to establish that Kelly was an employee of Johnston Asphalt. The court also upheld the lower court's decision not to pierce the corporate veil, as Boggs did not meet the burden of proof required to disregard the corporate entity. View "Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Sara Roman, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court alleging she sustained injuries from slipping on untreated snow and ice at Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School in Providence. She claimed negligence against the City of Providence and K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc., which had a contract with the city for snow removal.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. The first hearing justice ruled in favor of the city, applying the Connecticut Rule, which states that a landlord or business invitor's duty to remove snow and ice arises only after the storm has ceased and a reasonable time has passed. The second hearing justice ruled in favor of K. Scott, determining that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because it was not authorized to begin snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It vacated the judgment in favor of the city, finding that a question of material fact remained as to whether the plaintiff slipped on preexisting ice or freshly accumulated snow, which would affect the city's duty under the Connecticut Rule. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of K. Scott, holding that K. Scott did not owe a duty to the plaintiff at the time of the incident because it was not authorized to perform snow removal until after the plaintiff's fall. View "Roman v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

Ms. Rajmonda Mile attended her daughter’s wedding at Kirkbrae Country Club on September 9, 2018, where she allegedly slipped and fell. She filed a lawsuit against Kirkbrae in Providence County Superior Court and requested any photographs or videotapes of the incident. Kirkbrae acknowledged possessing a surveillance video of the incident but claimed it was protected under attorney work product privilege, referencing the case Cabral v. Arruda.The Superior Court denied Ms. Mile’s motion to compel the production of the video, agreeing with Kirkbrae’s assertion that the video was protected under the work product doctrine. Ms. Mile then sought review from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the video was actual evidence of the incident and not created in anticipation of litigation.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the video was not protected under the work product privilege because it was recorded by Kirkbrae’s surveillance system at the time of the incident and not at the request of an attorney. The court emphasized that the burden of proving the applicability of the work product privilege lies with the party seeking to withhold the evidence. Since Kirkbrae failed to meet this burden, the trial justice’s denial of the motion to compel was deemed an error.The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to compel the production of the video. View "Mile v. Kirkbrae Country Club" on Justia Law

Judith Clinton filed a complaint in the Superior Court for Washington County against Chad Babcock, Lisa Nelson, Regina Foster Bartlett, and Caryn Sullivan, alleging defamation and other misconduct that caused her reputational damage, emotional distress, and monetary losses. Clinton later amended her complaint to include Maria DiMaggio and Toastmasters International, adding a breach of contract claim against the latter. The Superior Court allowed Clinton to file a second amended complaint but denied her third and fourth motions to amend.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to enforce a dismissal stipulation and vacated a scheduling order. Clinton, who had been representing herself after unsuccessful attempts to secure new counsel, signed a Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal with all defendants, which was filed on December 13, 2022. Subsequently, the defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal on December 27, 2022, without notifying Clinton, who then alleged fraudulent conduct. The trial justice initially vacated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal and scheduled a trial date but later reconsidered this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly reinstated the Stipulated Agreement of Dismissal, noting that the agreement was binding and could not be set aside without the consent of all parties, absent extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or mutual mistake. The court found no evidence of duress or other factors that would justify vacating the agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's decision to treat the defendants' motions as motions to reconsider, given the lack of proper notice to the defendants at the initial hearing. View "Clinton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Willie Gray, filed a complaint for personal injuries sustained in a fire at a multifamily residential property in Providence on January 12, 2018. The property was allegedly owned by Dexter Jackson, whose negligence was claimed to have caused the fire. The City of Providence was also named as a defendant for being aware of several housing code violations at the property from January 2015 through January 2018. The plaintiff failed to provide adequate responses to the defendant's discovery requests, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders to produce more responsive answers.The Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to compel and later a motion to enter final judgment against the plaintiff due to non-compliance with discovery orders. The plaintiff did not object to these motions and failed to appear at the hearing for the renewed motion for entry of final judgment. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion to vacate the order granting final judgment, citing a lack of objection and failure to comply with discovery requirements.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to comply with discovery obligations and failed to do so. The trial justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief. The appeal was considered interlocutory, but the Court proceeded to evaluate the merits due to the futility of remanding for default judgment against Jackson, who had not participated in the litigation. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Gray v. City of Providence" on Justia Law