Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Furia was injured while working for Ajax Construction Company. After Furia filed a petition against Ajax in the Workers’ Compensation Court, Ajax petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court to determine which insurer - Beacon Mutual Insurance Company or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company - was obligated to pay Furia’s claim. The trial judge concluded that Ajax was liable to Furia and that Beacon was primarily liable to Furia. The judge also found that Ajax had dual or overlapping coverage regarding Furia’s claim and, given the overlapping coverage, Liberty must reimburse Beacon for fifty percent of the benefits that Beacon paid to Furia. The Appellate Division vacated the trial judge’s decree and ordered that Beacon be held fully responsible for paying workers’ compensation benefits to Furia and to reimburse Liberty for any benefits paid to beacon by Liberty under the prior decree. The Supreme Court quashed the Appellate Division’s decree, holding that the Appellate Division erred in finding Beacon solely responsible for the payment of Furia’s benefits. View "Ajax Construction Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, after more than fifteen years of service in the City of Providence Police Department, was injured while on duty. The Department concluded that Petitioner’s injury interfered with her ability to handle a firearm. Later that month, Petitioner applied to the City of Providence Retirement Board for accidental-disability retirement. The Board voted to deny Petitioner’s application, finding that Petitioner’s condition was correctable with surgery and that Petitioner failed to mitigate her injury by undergoing surgery. The Supreme Court quashed the Board’s decision, holding that the Providence Code of Ordinances does not require an otherwise eligible employee to mitigate her injury by undergoing a surgical procedure in order to qualify for an accidental-disability pension. Remanded. View "Prew v. Employee Ret. Sys. of City of Providence" on Justia Law

Morse, a long-time fire-rescue captain, had separate work-related back injuries in 2009 and 2011. In both cases he was eventually released to work. Morse injured his back again while lifting a patient during a 2012 rescue call. After the third injury, he did not return to work. Pursuant to the Providence Code of Ordinances, Morse was evaluated by three independent medical examiners. There was disagreement concerning whether the code covers disability as the result of multiple injuries. One of the consultants found Morse not to be disabled. The Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence denied Morse’s application for an accidental disability pension, based solely on the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the decision. The board’s adoption of the unanimity rule effectively abandoned its authority to a single disagreeing physician. Because the board failed to make any factual findings with regard to the petitioner’s application, this matter was remanded to the board for reconsideration. View "Morse v. Employees Ret. Sys. of the City of Providence" on Justia Law

In 2003, Budlong, a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority bus driver, claimed that he was assaulted while on his bus route. Over a year later, Budlong identified Hall as his attacker. Budlong’s bus route went by the Halls’ Newport home about 32 times each day. Hall was ultimately acquitted. The Halls later alleged that Budlong “embarked on a pattern of harassment” and sent letters informing RIPTA of the alleged harassment. A superior court granted the Halls a temporary restraining order against Budlong and later entered mutual restraining orders. RIPTA informed the Halls that routes were assigned under a collective bargaining agreement and that this was “a private dispute,” or “a police matter.” The Halls filed suit against RIPTA, specifying incidents in which Budlong drove toward them, blocked their driveway, and engaged in other intimidating behavior. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated summary judgment in favor of RIPTA, stating the Halls’ letters put RIPTA on notice of the conflict and claims of harassing behavior, so that RIPTA had a duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting a full investigation, followed by appropriate action to ensure that its employee was not harassing the Halls. View "Hall v. City of Newport" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a number of disputes that arose after the defendant corporation, Nuzzo Campion Stone Enterprises, Inc. (NCS), was purchased by its present owner. Plaintiff James Nuzzo alleged that he was owed $133,816 in unpaid commissions on orders that had been placed prior to his termination but not actually paid for by customers of NCS until after his termination. NCS filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, alleging that Plaintiff failed to indemnify NCS for certain amounts covered by the terms of an Asset Purchase Agreement signed by the parties. The trial justice concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to the disputed commissions and that NCS was due nearly $17,000 for both “work in progress” and warranty work pursuant to the Agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in determining that Plaintiff was not entitled to commissions for orders that had been placed, but not actually paid for, prior to Plaintiff’s termination; and (2) the trial justice did not make “fundamental mistakes regarding the contract and damages” relating to the counterclaim. View "Nuzzo v. Nuzzo Campion Stone Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

After Strine Printing Company terminated Richard Bisbano’s employment, Bisbano filed an eight count complaint against Strine Printing and its president, alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination. During the pendency of that lawsuit, the parties disagreed about the exact amount of commissions that Strine owed Bisbano. The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. Bisbano subsequently filed another lawsuit against Strine Printing and Menasha Packaging Company, LLC in superior court, alleging unpaid commissions. The trial justice ruled in favor of Defendants, concluding that the three-year statute of limitations contained in Rhode Island’s Payment of Wages Act barred the claim and that res judicata barred Bisbano’s contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this action was barred by the statute of limitations contained in the Payment of Wages Act; and (2) because the statute of limitations issue is dispositive, the Court shall not address the issue of res judicata. View "Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against APG Security-RI, LLC (APG) and employees/agents of APG (collectively, Defendants) alleging that when she was employed as a security guard by APG, Defendants violated the employer drug testing statute (EDTS) by requiring her to submit to a drug test and subsequently terminating her employment based on the result of that test. Plaintiff sought damages pursuant to both the EDTS and Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-2. The hearing justice dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the three-year statute of limitations in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-14(b) governed Plaintiff’s cause of action. At issue on appeal was whether the ten-year period of limitation as provided in Conn. Gen. Stat. 9-1-13(a) or the three-year period of limitation as provided in section 9-1-14(b) applied to Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that actions brought pursuant to the EDTS and section 9-1-2 are subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in section 9-1-14(b). View "Goddard v. APG Security-RI, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, sixteen retirees from non teaching union positions with the City of Pawtucket school department, sought reimbursement of the health insurance co-payments that they paid after Defendants - the City, the school department, and the City’s school committee - allegedly breached a series of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Defendants breached the CBAs when they billed Plaintiffs for the health insurance co-payments. View "Botelho v. City of Pawtucket Sch. Dep’t" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a school bus driver employed by Durham School Services (Durham), a private bus company. Citing a “Driver Withdrawal” provision from its contract with Durham for transportation of school students, the Town of Johnston School Department formally requested to not have Plaintiff transport students of the Johnston Public Schools. Lomastro was subsequently terminated. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the interim superintendent for the Town of Johnston and the director of facilities and transportation of Johnston public schools (collectively, Defendants), claiming that Defendants intentionally interfered with her contract with her employer. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the school department invoked its contractual right to withdraw its approval of Plaintiff as a driver without justification, which prevented Plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations. Therefore, the hearing justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

Officer Tori-Lynn Heaton filed a grievance with the City of Cranston seeking to be allowed to retire from the Cranston Police Department at nineteen years, six months, and one day with her full twenty year pension. The City denied the grievance. Because Officer Heaton deferred her retirement until she had served the full twenty years, the issue in dispute at the arbitration was whether the City violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 when it refused to credit Officer Heaton with a year of service for pension purposes. The arbitrator concluded that the City violated the ‘round-up’ rule of the CBA when it declined to credit Officer Heaton with a full additional year of service. Because there was no remedy available to Officer Heaton where she in fact completed a full twenty years of service before she retired, the arbitrator transmuted the arbitration award into a declaratory judgment. The trial justice granted the City’s motion to vacate, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he fashioned an award on a dispute that was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of the arbitrator was improper and outside the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority. View "City of Cranston v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301" on Justia Law