Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court determining that Plaintiff need not comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 in order to continue receiving his accidental disability pension because those sections were not applicable to his situation. Plaintiff suffered a debilitating injury while performing his duties as a police officer and was granted an accidental disability pension. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff was subject to sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24; and (2) Plaintiff may be required to undergo an independent medical examination on occasion at the direction of the Retirement Board and to submit such financial information as may be requested in accordance with section 45-21-24. View "Grasso v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court denying the motion filed by the Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education and the University of Rhode Island (collectively URI) seeking to vacate an arbitration award and confirming the award.After the American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United (the union) filed a grievance on behalf of a part-time faculty member at URI based on the rescission of the faculty member’s “special programs contract” the union filed a demand for arbitration. The arbitrator determined that URI’s rescission of the faculty member’s contract violated the collective bargaining agreement and issued an award. The superior court denied URI’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and entered final judgment confirming the award. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the grievance was arbitrable; (2) the rescission of the faculty member’s special programs contract was in violation of the CBA and required URI to pay the faculty member a $6,500 salary; but (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering URI to cease and desist from unilaterally imposing a two course per semester limit on bargaining unit employees. View "Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education v. American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court denying the motion filed by the Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education and the University of Rhode Island (collectively URI) seeking to vacate an arbitration award and confirming the award.After the American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United (the union) filed a grievance on behalf of a part-time faculty member at URI based on the rescission of the faculty member’s “special programs contract” the union filed a demand for arbitration. The arbitrator determined that URI’s rescission of the faculty member’s contract violated the collective bargaining agreement and issued an award. The superior court denied URI’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and entered final judgment confirming the award. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the grievance was arbitrable; (2) the rescission of the faculty member’s special programs contract was in violation of the CBA and required URI to pay the faculty member a $6,500 salary; but (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering URI to cease and desist from unilaterally imposing a two course per semester limit on bargaining unit employees. View "Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education v. American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United" on Justia Law

In this employment dispute, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court insofar as it granted the North Kingstown School Committee’s (“school committee”) motion to quash the subpoenas of two attorneys for the school committee, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.After the school committee voted to terminate Teacher’s employment, Teacher appealed to the commissioner of elementary and secondary education within the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE). At Teacher’s request, the RIDE hearing officer issued three subpoenas addressed to two attorneys for the school committee and a subpoena duces tecum to the North Kingstown School Department. In superior court, the school committee filed a petition to quash the three subpoenas issued by the RIDE hearing officer. The hearing justice granted in part and denied in part the motion. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the superior court’s judgment, holding that the hearing justice applied the attorney-client privilege to the attorneys’ anticipated testimony in an overly broad manner. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "North Kingstown School Committee v. Wagner" on Justia Law

At issue was a decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Providence (City) to reduce the pension benefits of Frank Corrente after he was convicted of six felony counts in a federal district court. Specifically, the Board revoked a portion of Corrente’s pension benefits and ordered him to return a portion of the benefits that he had received. This appeal concerned three appeals - one by Corrente, another by intervenors the City Mayor and the City, and the third by the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding that the intervenors satisfied the requirements to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the trial justice appropriately applied the standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act; (3) the Board’s decision to reduce, rather than revoke, Corrente’s pension benefits was not arbitrary, capricious, or affected by other errors or law; and (4) the trial justice did not err in confirming the retirement board’s decision to deny Corrente’s request for a tax credit on pension benefits that he had received but was required to return to the Board. View "Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of City of Providence v. Corrente" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants in this employment discrimination action.Plaintiff, a former employee of the Town of Lincoln School Department, filed a complaint against the Town of Lincoln, Lincoln School Committee, and the Town’s Finance Director, alleging that she was discriminated against because she advocated for education services for her disabled son, who was a student in the Lincoln school system. The case went to trial. After both sides rested, the trial justice granted Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that Lincoln’s actions were retaliation for Plaintiff’s advocacy efforts for her son. View "Azar v. Town of Lincoln" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff on a single claim of employment discrimination based on national origin. Both parties appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed all appeals, holding that the superior court justice (1) did not err in instructing the jury on the law of evidentiary presumptions and its application to this discrimination claim; (2) properly weighed the evidence and did not invade the province of the jury; and (3) did not err when she vacated the jury’s finding that Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. Further, Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a separate count in the complaint that also alleged employment discrimination. View "Yangambi v. Providence School Board" on Justia Law

Michael Beagan was terminated from his employment with Albert Kemperle, Inc. after his manager discovered a disparaging post Beagan had made about him on Facebook. The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT) denied Beagan’s application for unemployment benefits, finding that he had been discharged for “disqualifying reasons” under R.I. Gen. Laws 28-44-18. The district court affirmed the DLT’s decision. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court and remanded with directions to award Beagan unemployment benefits, holding that no legally competent evidence existed that Beagan’s Facebook post was connected to his work in the manner contemplated by section 28-44-18, and therefore, there was no legally competent evidence to support a finding that Beagan was ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training, Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s determination that Plaintiff’s reappointment to his fourth consecutive two-year term as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield did not constitute a contract of employment. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of employment contract and a violation of his constitutional rights after his employment was terminated for budgetary reasons. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his contention that a valid contract existed. View "Andoscia v. Town of North Smithfield" on Justia Law

This certified question concerned an action pending in federal court in which Plaintiff alleged that he was illegally denied a promotion in the Providence Police Department. At issue in this proceeding was Plaintiff’s count claiming that Chief of Police of the Providence Police Department was liable, in his individual capacity, for the City’s failure to have promoted Plaintiff in violation of section 28-5-7-(6) of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. Clements moved to dismiss the count, arguing that section 28-5-7(6) does not provide for individual liability. The district court then certified to the Supreme Court the question at issue here. The Supreme Court answered that section 28-5-7(6) does not provide for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer. Remanded. View "Mancini v. City of Providence" on Justia Law