Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Vermont Mutual Insurance Company issued a homeowners insurance policy to Joanne St. Vil for property in Rumford, Rhode Island. St. Vil filed a claim for windstorm damage, which Vermont Mutual paid after an inspection. St. Vil later engaged New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG) for additional repairs, leading to a dispute over the scope of damages. St. Vil assigned her insurance claim to NEPSG, which demanded an appraisal. Vermont Mutual objected to NEPSG's appraiser, Steven Ceceri, due to his financial interest but proceeded with the appraisal, reserving the right to dispute the award. The appraisal resulted in a final award of $144,855.37, which Vermont Mutual contested.The Superior Court denied Vermont Mutual's petition to vacate the appraisal award and granted NEPSG's cross-petition to confirm it. The court ruled that the policy did not require the appraiser to be disinterested, referencing a similar case it had previously decided.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appraisal process in Vermont Mutual's policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. The Court found that Steven Ceceri had a direct financial interest in the award, establishing evident partiality. The Court also determined a causal nexus between Ceceri's conduct and the final award, as the award was not unanimous and significantly higher than Vermont Mutual's appraiser's estimate. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for a new appraisal. View "Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. New England Property Services Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Alexandria Kazarian, filed a negligence lawsuit against New London County Mutual Insurance Company after a trip-and-fall accident near property owned by the defendant’s insured, Irene Swiney. Kazarian alleged that Swiney allowed a vehicle to be parked in a manner that obstructed the sidewalk, causing her to walk into the street and trip over an unsecured gas cap, resulting in injury. After Swiney passed away, New London was substituted as the defendant.In the Superior Court, a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of New London. Kazarian’s motion for a new trial was denied. She argued that Swiney was negligent for allowing the vehicle to obstruct the sidewalk and that a master-servant relationship existed between Swiney and the vehicle owner, making Swiney liable. The trial justice denied the motion, stating it was within the jury’s purview to evaluate the evidence and witness credibility.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. Kazarian contended that the trial justice erred in denying her motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. She also argued that the trial justice’s use of the word “redacted” in response to a jury question was prejudicial. The Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could differ on whether the vehicle obstructed the sidewalk and whether it was a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk. The Court also noted that Kazarian failed to object contemporaneously to the alleged golden rule violation and the grass-growth argument during the trial, thus waiving those issues.The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that the trial justice conducted an appropriate analysis and did not err in his decisions. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "Kazarian v. New London County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NGM Insurance Company (NGM). NEPSG had been assigned the insurance claim benefits by the policyholders, Stephen and Betty Callahan, for storm-related damage to their residence. NGM initially covered some damages but denied others, leading to a series of inspections and disagreements over the loss amount. Eventually, an appraisal process was conducted, resulting in an award that NEPSG found unsatisfactory due to updated labor costs published after the award was signed.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to NGM, finding that NEPSG was not entitled to a modification of the appraisal award or a second appraisal. The court also found that NEPSG failed to establish its claims for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. NEPSG argued that the award should be modified due to a miscalculation of labor costs and that NGM acted in bad faith by using unlicensed appraisers, among other claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the appraisal award was akin to an arbitration award and thus subject to limited judicial review. NEPSG's request for modification based on post-award labor cost updates was not supported by admissible evidence. The court also found no basis for a second appraisal or for NEPSG's claims of breach of contract and bad faith, as NGM had fulfilled its contractual obligations and there was no evidence of bad faith. Additionally, the court rejected NEPSG's claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference, finding no inequitable benefit retained by NGM and no evidence of intentional harm to NEPSG's contract with the policyholders. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. NGM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Josephson, LLC, doing business as The Moinian Group (Moinian), filed a lawsuit against its insurance company, Affiliated FM Insurance Company (AFM), seeking coverage for losses sustained due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moinian argued that the presence of COVID-19 at its insured properties constituted "physical loss or damage" under its insurance policy. The trial justice, however, determined that the presence of COVID-19 alone did not constitute "physical loss or damage" sufficient to implicate the coverage provisions. The trial justice also concluded that the Contamination Exclusion in the insurance policy unambiguously barred coverage because contamination, such as COVID-19, was expressly excluded under the terms of the policy.The Superior Court granted AFM's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Moinian's motion for partial summary judgment. The court determined that the presence of COVID-19 at Moinian's insured properties did not constitute "physical loss or damage" under the terms of the policy. The court also found that the Contamination Exclusion in the policy unambiguously applied to bar Moinian's claim. Moinian appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial justice's determination. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation of the Contamination Exclusion in the insurance policy. The court concluded that the exclusion for "contamination" was intended to limit coverage for a "type of risk," not a "type of loss." Therefore, the court held that Moinian's losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic were not covered under the insurance policy. View "Josephson v. Affiliated FM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entered favor of Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company in this breach of contract action, holding that, under the circumstances, the court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff made a claim for loss under its homeowners policy with Allstate after a water loss Plaintiff's property suffered. While Plaintiff sought to invoke a provision in the policy that either party could seek appraisal in the event of a dispute as to the amount of the loss Allstate refused to proceed to appraisal. Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract in his first action. Allstate counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the parties were required to submit the matter to appraisal. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Allstate without prejudice. Thereafter, Plaintiff demanded that Allstate move forward with the appraisal process. Allstate refused, asserting that Plaintiff's demand was untimely under the policy. Plaintiff then commenced the instant action seeking relief in the form of a judgment ordering Allstate to designate an appraiser and to complete the appraisal process. Final judgment entered for Allstate. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that Plaintiff's initial demand for appraisal was not time-barred, and therefore, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment for Allstate. View "Romeo v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment and final judgment in favor of third-party defendants, Western Surety Company and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (collectively, the Sureties) in this case concerning the scope of the sureties' liability under a performance and payment bond issued in conjunction with a public works project, holding that there was no error.The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) was sued by Apex Development Company in this action alleging that RIDOT and its contractors trespassed and damaged Apex's private property. RIDOT filed a third-party complaint against the Sureties and others, seeking full indemnity and contribution. A hearing justice granted summary judgment for the Sureties, and a final judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RIDOT was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error on appeal. View "Apex Development Co., LLC v. State of R.I. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting Insurer's motion for summary judgment in this insurance dispute, holding that Insured was entitled to judgment as to counts one, four, and five of its complaint.Insured, a company that sold and serviced residential heating and air-conditioning systems, was sued by a former customer who alleged negligence and demanded remediation from property damaged by 170 gallons of home heating oil that leaked into his basement. Insured demanded that Insurer defend and indemnify against the claim. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the relevant insurance policy's definition of "pollution" was ambiguous as applied to Insured's claims; and (2) the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer and in denying Insured's motion for summary judgment as to certain counts of the complaint. View "Regan Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Arbella Protection Insurance Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the superior court granting declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the trial justice abused his discretion by granting Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment.These consolidated appeals arose from two civil actions in which the trial court granted summary judgment against the Town of Johnston and its finance director. The trial justice determined that certain accounts bearing the names of the respective plaintiffs constituted deferred compensation, declared the accounts to be Plaintiffs' property, and ordered that the associated funds be remitted to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish as a factual matter that they had an agreement with the Town to defer compensation. View "Faella v. Town of Johnston" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the denial of Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment and the grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendant was required to provide him with full insurance coverage and indemnification for his claims in his underlying personal injury lawsuit. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendant as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error. View "Dulong v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law