Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Shelley Tyre died, her parents brought a wrongful-death action against Shelley's husband, David Swain, alleging that he caused Shelley's wrongful death, that he was a slayer pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 33-1.1-1(3), and he should be subject to civil liability for a criminal act. After a jury trial, the court found in favor of Shelley's parents on all three counts. The probate judge later issued an order declaring that neither Swain, nor his heirs at law, should receive directly or indirectly from Shelley's estate pursuant to the Rhode Island Slayer's Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, David's children and Shelley's stepchildren, were precluded from inhering under Shelley's will as contingent beneficiaries because this inheritance would confer a benefit on their father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' taking under Shelley's will would unquestionably confer a benefit upon David, in direct contravention of the Slayer's Act. View "Swain v. Estate of Tyre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sent a notice of claim to Defendants, a town and its finance director, for injuries she sustained on the town's sidewalk. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because the notice of the place of injury was insufficient as a matter of law because Plaintiff misidentified the location where her injury occurred and her descriptions of the location were inconsistent. The trial justice granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the notice of claim must be specific, and therefore, the notice in this case was insufficient. View "Carbone v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, broadcasted that the bus she was driving, which was full of elementary-school children, had been struck by gunfire and that panic had spread among the children. Displeased with the manner in which Plaintiff handled the situation, the Town of Johnson school department requested that Plaintiff no longer be assigned to transport Johnson students. Eventually, Plaintiff left her employment. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination against members of the Johnson public schools (Defendants), alleging that Defendants wrongfully requested that Plaintiff be terminated from her employment. In response to the trial justice's remarks, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim of tortious interference, which the trial justice denied. Thereafter, the superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint without specific findings. Remanded. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

An automobile registered to Defendant struck a parked car that was registered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant seeking damages pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 31-33-6 and 31-33-7. Section 31-33-6 provided that a vehicle owner may be liable for the acts of another person who operates the owner's car with the consent of the owner. Section 31-337 provided that the absence of consent shall be an affirmative defense and proved by the defendant. Defendant raised such an affirmative defense in her answer to Plaintiff's complaint. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Defendant's car was stolen, and Defendant did not give permission for anyone to drive the vehicle. Plaintiff appealed, contending that inconsistencies in the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant gave the unidentified driver consent to use her car the day of the collision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding the issue of consent precluded summary judgment in this case. View "Pichardo v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case. View "Iozzi v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law

The dispute at the center of this case arose from a business relationship that "rapidly turned sour." Plaintiffs Charles and Marguerite Takian and Defendants Ralph and Lucia Rafaelian together purchased property in South Kingstown that included a motel, restaurant and trailer park. The couples formed a business to manage the property and Plaintiffs agreed to run the businesses. In 2002, the relationship between the parties deteriorated when Defendants alleged Plaintiffs were mismanaging the businesses. Defendants decided to sell their interest to Plaintiffs' son Randolph. As part of the sale, Defendants signed a release absolving Plaintiffs from "any and all claims arising out of the ownership of the property and operation of the business." After the sale, Defendants continued to feel "unsettled" about how the business had been operated. They investigated further and alleged to have discovered facts that suggested far more serious misdeeds in management. Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory relief, in which they sought a ruling that the release that had been executed by Defendants contemporaneous with the sale barred any further claims. Defendants counterclaimed, both on behalf of themselves and derivatively on behalf of the corporation, alleging embezzlement, misrepresentation, misappropriation, and loss of corporate opportunity. A justice of the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, after he found that the release was both valid and effective against both defendants and the corporation. Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found triable issues of fact that were inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to those remaining issues. View "Takian v. Rafaelian" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the applicability of an assault and/or battery exclusion in a commercial general liability insurance policy. Great American E&S Insurance Company filed a declaratory-judgment action against its insured, End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. and Defendant Michael Gondusky. Gondusky previously had filed a civil suit against End Zone alleging that he had been seriously injured by two doormen who were employed by End Zone. The Superior Court entered both an order granting Great American's motion for summary judgment and a declaratory judgment decreeing that Great American "owe[d] no duty to defend or obligation to indemnify relative to the underlying action brought by Michael Gondusky against End Zone * * *." Gondusky appealed the Superior Court’s judgment. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court concluded that cause had not been shown and that this case could be decided without further briefing or argument. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Great American E&S Ins. Co. v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the extent of uninsured motorist coverage provided under an automobile insurance policy issued to a husband and wife who were both injured by an uninsured motorist while riding their motorcycle. The husband, Leo Fontaine, died as a result of his injuries. The motorcycle in question was not expressly identified in the policy at issue. Plaintiff-Insurer New London County Mutual Insurance Company (NLC) filed suit for declaratory relief seeking clarification of the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to their policy issued to the couple. Arguing that the policy language unambiguously excluded the defendants' claim for uninsured motorist benefits, NLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Superior Court. Defendants Karolyn Fontaine, individually and on behalf of the estate of her husband, Leo appealed the grant of summary judgment and contended that the pertinent policy provision was ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the policy language explicitly excluded Defendants' claims from coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cheryl Sola appealed from a superior court decision dismissing her defamation claim as time-barred and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the City of Newport and Detective Michael Caruolo, individually and in his capacity as a member of the Newport Police Department (collectively, Defendants). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even though Plaintiff included John Doe defendants, the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws 9-5-20, which tolls the statute of limitations to provide a plaintiff with an opportunity to discover an unknown defendant, were unavailable to Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff's claim accrued on the date when the statements at issue were published, not on the date on which Plaintiff was fired as a result of Caruolo's allegedly defamatory statements; and (3) Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Caruolo fraudulently concealed Plaintiff's cause of action was without merit. View "Sola v. Leighton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicola Tarzia was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine. After Tarzia successfully completed a diversion program, the State dismissed the charge. Tarzia later filed a motion to expunge the charge, which the district court granted. Later, however, Tarzia's past criminal activity was subsequently published. Tarzia filed a fifteen-count civil action against several State and City actors, alleging, inter alia, unlawful dissemination of expunged records, negligence, and failure to seal Plaintiff's records. The circuit court dismissed two counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and after a jury trial, granted judgment as a matter of law to the State and City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the remedy of civil liability did not apply to Tarzia's case; (2) there was no reason for the Court to recognize other causes of action based in common law for alleged violations of the sealing statute; (3) the information allegedly provided to a newspaper reporter did not amount to a violation of the state's right-to-privacy statute; and (4) Tarzia waived his right to challenge on appeal the district court's finding that all of the named defendants were sued in their official capacity. View "Tarzia v. State" on Justia Law