Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in a civil action brought by the State against various former lead pigment manufacturers and the Lead Industries Association. In this opinion, the Court considered appeals from two superior court rulings concerning the apportionment of co-examiners' fees in particular and the payment of costs in general. The Court first considered the State's appeal from an order granting the motion of certain defendants for the reimbursement of all previously paid fees, costs, and expenses related to the engagement of the co-examiners. At issue here was whether the State was responsible for such expenses under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court then addressed certain defendants' appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of allowable costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in concluding that the State waived its sovereign immunity because it filed the underlying lawsuit and in ordering the State to reimburse the defendants for the costs associated with the co-examiners; and (2) the totality of the circumstances supported the trial justice's determination that each party should bear its own costs. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n " on Justia Law

This case arose from a public-nuisance lawsuit filed by the State in 1999 against Sherwin-Williams and other paint companies not relevant to this appeal. Defendants prevailed on appeal. The parties then began to dispute the expenses involved with defending the lead-paint cases. Sherwin-Williams filed a motion for a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of and the use of an internal company document through which the State sought to demonstrate that Sherwin-Williams had benefited from significant insurance coverage when it defended the underlying lawsuit. The superior court denied the order. Sherwin-Williams appealed, arguing that the disclosure of the document would offend the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's denial of Sherwin-Williams' motion, holding that the document was protected under the work-product doctrine and that this doctrine was not waived. Remanded with directions to enter an appropriate protective order. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against the City of Providence for personal injuries she suffered after a school bus she was operating fell into a sinkhole on a city roadway. The trial court found that the City was negligent and awarded Plaintiff $59,239 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in admitting certain affidavits into evidence because the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to under oath in the presence of a notary and therefore met legislative requirements; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in ruling that the collateral-source rule excluded evidence of Plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. View "Morel v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries when he was shot by Defendant, a police officer. Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendant seeking damages. The jury entered a verdict in Defendant's favor, finding Plaintiff did not prove that Defendant acted unreasonably under the circumstances when he shot and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial justice allowed Defendant to introduce into evidence a redacted police department database report that included Plaintiff's basic biographical information, his mug shot, and a reference to his arrest for possession of a shotgun in 1992. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the redacted report. View "Thomas v. Proctor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action against Bishop Hendricken High School and its agents alleging negligence, contending that the school failed to supervise its students and failed to protect its students by using safety glass in a bathroom window. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that the school did not breach its duty to provide a safe learning environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact regarding Defendants' duty to supervise; and (2) Plaintiff presented no evidence that would show it was foreseeable that a student could be injured as a result of the school's failure to install safety glass. View "Daniels v. Fluette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was crossing a street by foot when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging negligence, and Defendant's employer (Employer). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The trial justice denied Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, concluding that reasonable minds could differ over the evidence. Plaintiff appealed, contending her motion for a new trial should have been granted because the evidence preponderated against the jury's verdict. The supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in ruling that reasonable minds could disagree about whether Defendant could or should have seen Plaintiff before his vehicle struck her, and the trial justice did not overlook material evidence when she did not specifically address photographs taken immediately after the accident. View "Mead v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. James Gallo treated Plaintiff in 2003 and 2004. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Gallo and West Bay Psychiatry Associations, including claims for slander for remarks uttered in two separate proceedings. The first alleged slander occurred when Gallo's deposition was taken in connection with Plaintiff's case before the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC). The second alleged slander occurred when Gallo testified before the Rhode Island Department of Education (RIDE) regarding Plaintiff's alleged wrongful termination from her teaching position. The superior court entered summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's slander claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion justice did not err in finding (1) Plaintiff's claim for slander based on Gallo's WCC deposition testimony was time-barred; and (2) Plaintiff's claim for slander based on Gallo's RIDE testimony was immunized from defamation claims by the testimonial privilege because it qualified as having occurred in a judicial proceeding. View "Francis v. Gallo" on Justia Law

A motor vehicle collision involving Plaintiff and Defendant occurred when Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle and Defendant was driving a car belonging to his girlfriend. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and his girlfriend, alleging that Defendant had been negligently operating the car at the time of the collision. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the incident was in actuality a rear-end collision caused by Plaintiff. The superior court granted Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff had struck the car from the rear. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient conflicting evidence on the issue of negligence for this case to be submitted to a fact-finder. View "DeMaio v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against Sportsman's Inn, Inc., a hotel and lounge, and DLM, Inc., the corporation that leased the premises to the hotel, alleging that he was shot as a result of the failure of Defendants to provide adequate security at the business. Several months later, Plaintiff learned that the property where the hotel was located was for sale, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The trial justice granted Plaintiff's motion to enjoin the sale of the property, concluding that Plaintiff had established a likelihood of success that the corporate formalities should be disregarded and that Sportsman's Inn had breached its duty of reasonable care to him. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in finding Plaintiff had demonstrated there was a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the negligence claim and that the corporate veil should be pierced. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order granting a preliminary injunction, holding that Plaintiff did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying negligence claim and that a "piercing of the corporate veil" analysis was unnecessary at this stage of the litigation. View "Vasquez v. Sportsman's Inn, Inc." on Justia Law