Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Yi Gu was struck by Edmund Hathaway, a driver for the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), while crossing an intersection. Plaintiff brought suit against RIPTA and Hathaway (collectively, Defendants), for injuries arising from Hathaway's alleged negligence. At the close of evidence but before final arguments, the jurors walked from the courthouse to the intersection where the accident occurred to view the accident scene. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Defendants. The trial justice subsequently denied Plaintiff's motions for a new trial and for reconsideration of that decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court and remanded the case, holding that Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should have been granted due to several errors that occurred during the jury view of the scene of the collision. View "Yi Gu v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a patient to the hospital while working as an EMT/firefighter for the city. After he had delivered his patient but while he was still at the hospital, a nurse asked Plaintiff to assist her with a disorderly patient. While attempting to place a spit mask on the patient, Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, the hospital and the company that provided security to the hospital, alleging they were negligent when they failed to restrain the patient and that that failure caused Plaintiff's injuries. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the firefighter's rule. At issue on appeal was whether the rule applies only when an injury arises from the same circumstances that originally brought the firefighter to the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the firefighter's rule barred Plaintiff's claim where (1) Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment as an on-duty EMT/firefighter; (2) Plaintiff reasonably could have anticipated that he would be injured in this manner; and (3) Defendants' negligence in improperly restraining the aggressive patients caused Plaintiff to be summoned to the scene where he was injured. View "Higgins v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professional limousine driver, was injured when he was struck by a car while unloading luggage from a limousine at an airport. Plaintiff reached settlements with his employer's insurance company and the driver whose car struck him but remained less-than-fully compensated for his injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed an underinsured-motorist claim with his Insurer under the terms of his personal automobile policy. Insurer denied the claim, citing two exclusions from the policy's provisions for uninsured-motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed suit, and the superior court ruled that the exclusions were void on grounds of public policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Insurer's denial of coverage was both lawful and not inconsistent with public policy. Remanded. View "Henderson v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over real property. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought an action against Defendant, a dentist, for trespass and private nuisance, and to quiet title. Plaintiffs stated in their complaint that they were the exclusive owners of the disputed property and that Defendant intentionally encroached upon this property without their consent. Defendant counterclaimed for adverse possession. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant's use of the property did not meet the "open and notorious" element of adverse possession. View "McGarry v. Coletti" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed an action against Defendants, the Town of Portsmouth, its then chief of police, and a now retired lieutenant, alleging several causes of action arising from an investigation into Plaintiff's conduct during an officer training exercise. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial justice properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the claims of malicious prosecution and tortious interference with contractual relations; but (2) the trial justice erred by granting Plaintiff's R.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the chief of police and lieutenant's counterclaim for defamation arising from an inflammatory letter that Plaintiff submitted to the town council to notify the council of his forthcoming suit in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-15-5 where (i) absolute privilege did not apply in this instance because the notice required by section 45-15-5 was not part of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and (ii) baseless claims and allegations made by parties who must provide notice under section 45-15-5 are not protected by absolute immunity under McDonald v. Smith. Remanded. View "Ims v. Town of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

The insurance coverage dispute at issue in this appeal stemmed from a civil action brought by Ronald and Mildred Destremps against Viking Stone for allegedly damaging property. At the time, Viking Stone was insured by Employers, the plaintiff in the instant case. Arbella, the defendant in the instant case, had previously provided insurance coverage to Viking Stone. Employers filed a petition for declaratory judgment in superior court, seeking a declaration (1) that Arbella owed a duty to defend and indemnify Viking Stone in connection with the Destrempts' complaint, and (2) that the facts claimed in the Destrempts' complaint triggered one occurrence under the Arbella policy and that, for that reason, no coverage was afforded to Viking Stone under the Employers policy. The superior court granted Employers' motion for partial summary judgment, and Arbella appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment. Remanded. View "Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Arbella Protection Ins. Co." on Justia Law

While traveling in a vehicle insured by Travelers Insurance, Wayne DeMarco was injured in a collision. DeMarco filed a personal injury action against Travelers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of DeMarco for $2,801,939, including interest. DeMarco then commenced the instant civil action against Travelers in the superior court, demanding, inter alia, (1) a declaratory judgment ordering Travelers to pay the entire judgment from the personal injury litigation above and beyond the $1 million policy limits, and (2) a declaratory judgment pursuant to the rejected settlement offer statute requiring Travelers to pay interest on the entire amount. The superior court granted partial summary judgment in favor of DeMarco, holding (1) Travelers was liable to DeMarco for the entire judgment even in a multiple claimant context, and (2) the rejected settlement offer statute was unambiguous in providing that an insurer is liable for interest due on a judgment where it has rejected a plaintiff's written offer to settle within the policy limits. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the grant of partial summary judgment as to Travelers' liability, but (2) affirmed the ruling with respect to the applicability of the rejected settlement offer statute. Remanded. View "DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harodite Industries filed a complaint against defendant Warren Electric for negligence and other causes of action, seeking damages for the failure of a gasket in the oil pre-heater that Harodite purchased from defendant. After conducting discovery, Harodite filed a motion to amend its complaint. The hearing justice denied Harodite's motion. Plaintiff then filed a motion for a stay pending a ruling on the petition for writ of certiorari it intended to file with the Supreme Court. Defendant objected to the motion, arguing that the court should apply a Massachusetts statute of limitations to plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. The hearing justice held that Rhode Island's ten-year statute of limitations should apply and granted Harodite's motion for a stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the superior court, holding (1) the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in denying Harodite's motion to amend its complaint; and (2) the hearing justice correctly determined that Rhode Island's statute of limitations would be the relevant statute of limitations with respect to the allegations set forth in Harodite's proposed amended complaint, and therefore, those allegations would not be barred by the statute of limitations. View "Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Grieder assaulted plaintiff Michael Trainor and pled nolo contendere to one count of simple assault and battery and one count of felony assault. Plaintiff sued defendant in superior court, seeking damages for his injuries. Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $1.5 million, but defendant refused to render payment in full to plaintiff. In the current case, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in superior court, attempting to recover his due. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact that there had been no return of the execution on the judgment. The hearing justice ruled that since defendant had not raised the jurisdictional issue before the court on prior occasions, he had waived it, and therefore, the defendant's motion was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) defendant waived the requirement that there be a return of the execution on the judgment. View "Trainor v. Grieder" on Justia Law

After plaintiff Arthur Toegemann was involved in a motor vehicle accident at a street intersection in Providence, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in superior court against the city, alleging that the city had negligently installed and maintained an unsafe, dangerous road at the intersection, which caused plaintiff's accident. Specifically, plaintiff contended the speed limit was too fast, the speed limit signs were hidden by vegetative growth, and the intersection was unsafe because it had only two stop signs. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that based upon the public-duty doctrine, its decisions with respect to the traffic design of the intersection were discretionary and not actionable. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the hearing justice wrongfully applied the public-duty doctrine in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to constitute an exception to the public-duty doctrine. Accordingly, because the issues in the case were controlled by the public-duty doctrine, there was no basis for municipal liability and the grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Toegemann v. City of Providence" on Justia Law