Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An East Providence zoning officer issued a notice of violation, finding violations of a use variance that was granted in 1998 to the owner and operator of a construction and demolition debris processing facility known as Pond View Recycling. The East Providence Zoning Board of Review upheld the notice of violation. The owner and operator of Pond View appealed. The superior court reversed, concluding that the zoning board’s decision was “clearly erroneous and made upon unlawful procedure.” The City of East Providence and the zoning board sought review. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for the City, holding that the zoning board’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the trial justice erred by reversing the decision of the zoning board. View "Kenlin Props., LLC v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Morse, a long-time fire-rescue captain, had separate work-related back injuries in 2009 and 2011. In both cases he was eventually released to work. Morse injured his back again while lifting a patient during a 2012 rescue call. After the third injury, he did not return to work. Pursuant to the Providence Code of Ordinances, Morse was evaluated by three independent medical examiners. There was disagreement concerning whether the code covers disability as the result of multiple injuries. One of the consultants found Morse not to be disabled. The Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence denied Morse’s application for an accidental disability pension, based solely on the board’s self-imposed “unanimity rule,” requiring that all three physicians agree that the applicant was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the decision. The board’s adoption of the unanimity rule effectively abandoned its authority to a single disagreeing physician. Because the board failed to make any factual findings with regard to the petitioner’s application, this matter was remanded to the board for reconsideration. View "Morse v. Employees Ret. Sys. of the City of Providence" on Justia Law

Five corporate plaintiffs sued the East Greenwich Fire District and the Town of East Greenwich alleging that Defendants’ imposition and collection of development impact fees from developers who applied for a building permit to develop land within the Town violated Rhode Island’s Development Impact fee Act (RIDIFA). The fire district adopted the schedule of impact fees by a resolution rather than through an ordinance. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Defendants did not have the authority to impose development impact fees and, if they did, the process by which they imposed the fees was deficient. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the resolution adopted by the fire district was invalid because it did not comply with either RIDIFA’s mandate that the fees be imposed through an ordinance or the Town’s notice and public-hearing requirements for the enactment of ordinances. View "5750 Post Road Med. Offices, LLC v. East Greenwich Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a dimensional variance by the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown. After the Board denied the variance, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision and granted Plaintiffs’ variance application. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for an award of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act. The trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Board was not an “agency” within the purview of the Act and that the hearing before the Board was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as the term is defined in the Act. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment below, holding that the Board is an agency and that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ variance application was an adjudicatory proceeding on the Act. Remanded for written findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining prerequisites for relief. View "Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

The issue in these consolidated cases was the passing of the Financial Stability Act and the appointment of a Receiver for the City of Central Falls. The Supreme Court already held that the Act is constitutional, and the issues now before the Court on appeal dealt with the superior court’s holdings that (1) the Central Falls Receiver was entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees; (2) the Central Falls Mayor was not entitled to indemnification from the Receiver for costs and expenses arising out of the instant cases; and (3) denied advance attorney’s fees filed by Attorney Lawrence Goldberg. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment in all respects, holding (1) in granting the Receiver reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees, the hearing justice misapplied R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-9-11; (2) the hearing justice erred in concluding that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the Act and when he defended himself in the action filed by the Receiver and therefore was not entitled to indemnification for his legal costs; and (3) because Attorney Goldberg was properly retained by the City Council for Central Falls to represent it in the suit regarding the constitutionality of the Act, the attorney was entitled to remuneration. View "Shine v. Moreau" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to his son. After a trial held in 2014, the trial justice concluded that Father was unfit to parent his son. A final decree was subsequently entered terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence, in finding that DCYF had proven that Father was unfit to parent his son; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at reunification between Father and his son. View "In re Max M." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a license to carry a concealed weapon. The Chief of Police for the City of East Providence denied the application. Petitioner sought review of the denial of his application pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and later added a request for mandamus relief. The superior court dismissed the action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and quashed the decision denying Petitioner’s application for a license to carry a concealed weapon, holding (1) the Chief of Police's conclusions for denying the license were either insufficient or incorrect; and (2) the license denial could not properly be predicated on remote events resulting in Petitioner’s arrest on charges that were ultimately dismissed. View "Gadomski v. Taveres" on Justia Law

Frank Corrente was employed by the City of Providence during two separate time periods. Following a federal investigation, Corrente was convicted of six felony counts stemming from his employment during the second time period. After a hearing conducted pursuant to the “Honorable Service Ordinance” (HSO) of the City of Providence Code of Ordinances, the Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Providence voted to reduce Corrente’s pension benefits. The Board then filed a civil action in the superior court requesting a confirmation of its decision. The mayor and the City of Providence were allowed to intervene. The superior court subsequently entered an order confirming the Board’s decision to reduce Corrente’s pension. The intervenors appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that because this case was brought pursuant to the HSO and was adjudicated in the superior court prior to the enactment of R.I. Gen Laws 36-10.1-5, which vests the superior court with jurisdiction to review pending proceedings under a municipal ordinance, the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the final judgment was void. Remanded. View "Ret. Bd. of Employees’ Ret. Sys. of City of Providence v. Corrente" on Justia Law

Pawtucket police officer Laprade was convicted of disorderly conduct, stemming from a 2010 incident, during which two women observed the off-duty Laprade masturbating and exposing himself while driving his personal vehicle. The city charged Laprade with violations of regulations stemming from that conviction and other incidents, including sleeping while on duty. After being notified of the city’s recommendation that his employment be terminated, Laprade requested a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights Act (LEOBOR), G.L. 42-28.6-4. A committee was selected. Nine days before the scheduled hearing and one day after the statutory deadline, the city provided Laprade with a list of its witnesses and evidence. Because of the timing and a personal conflict, a member of the committee unsuccessfully sought a continuance. Although no complaint or petition had been filed, the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court issued an order stating that failure to present the list 10 days before the hearing date did not present good cause to extend the date. The committee refused to accept evidence on the first scheduled date. Ultimately the committee found that, due to procedural errors, the city had not proven its case. The superior court affirmed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated, based on procedural errorsView "City of Pawtucket v. Laprade" on Justia Law