Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought a dimensional variance by the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown. After the Board denied the variance, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision and granted Plaintiffs’ variance application. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for an award of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act. The trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Board was not an “agency” within the purview of the Act and that the hearing before the Board was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as the term is defined in the Act. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment below, holding that the Board is an agency and that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ variance application was an adjudicatory proceeding on the Act. Remanded for written findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining prerequisites for relief. View "Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

The issue in these consolidated cases was the passing of the Financial Stability Act and the appointment of a Receiver for the City of Central Falls. The Supreme Court already held that the Act is constitutional, and the issues now before the Court on appeal dealt with the superior court’s holdings that (1) the Central Falls Receiver was entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees; (2) the Central Falls Mayor was not entitled to indemnification from the Receiver for costs and expenses arising out of the instant cases; and (3) denied advance attorney’s fees filed by Attorney Lawrence Goldberg. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment in all respects, holding (1) in granting the Receiver reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees, the hearing justice misapplied R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-9-11; (2) the hearing justice erred in concluding that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the Act and when he defended himself in the action filed by the Receiver and therefore was not entitled to indemnification for his legal costs; and (3) because Attorney Goldberg was properly retained by the City Council for Central Falls to represent it in the suit regarding the constitutionality of the Act, the attorney was entitled to remuneration. View "Shine v. Moreau" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to his son. After a trial held in 2014, the trial justice concluded that Father was unfit to parent his son. A final decree was subsequently entered terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence, in finding that DCYF had proven that Father was unfit to parent his son; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at reunification between Father and his son. View "In re Max M." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a license to carry a concealed weapon. The Chief of Police for the City of East Providence denied the application. Petitioner sought review of the denial of his application pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and later added a request for mandamus relief. The superior court dismissed the action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and quashed the decision denying Petitioner’s application for a license to carry a concealed weapon, holding (1) the Chief of Police's conclusions for denying the license were either insufficient or incorrect; and (2) the license denial could not properly be predicated on remote events resulting in Petitioner’s arrest on charges that were ultimately dismissed. View "Gadomski v. Taveres" on Justia Law

Frank Corrente was employed by the City of Providence during two separate time periods. Following a federal investigation, Corrente was convicted of six felony counts stemming from his employment during the second time period. After a hearing conducted pursuant to the “Honorable Service Ordinance” (HSO) of the City of Providence Code of Ordinances, the Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Providence voted to reduce Corrente’s pension benefits. The Board then filed a civil action in the superior court requesting a confirmation of its decision. The mayor and the City of Providence were allowed to intervene. The superior court subsequently entered an order confirming the Board’s decision to reduce Corrente’s pension. The intervenors appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that because this case was brought pursuant to the HSO and was adjudicated in the superior court prior to the enactment of R.I. Gen Laws 36-10.1-5, which vests the superior court with jurisdiction to review pending proceedings under a municipal ordinance, the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the final judgment was void. Remanded. View "Ret. Bd. of Employees’ Ret. Sys. of City of Providence v. Corrente" on Justia Law

Pawtucket police officer Laprade was convicted of disorderly conduct, stemming from a 2010 incident, during which two women observed the off-duty Laprade masturbating and exposing himself while driving his personal vehicle. The city charged Laprade with violations of regulations stemming from that conviction and other incidents, including sleeping while on duty. After being notified of the city’s recommendation that his employment be terminated, Laprade requested a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights Act (LEOBOR), G.L. 42-28.6-4. A committee was selected. Nine days before the scheduled hearing and one day after the statutory deadline, the city provided Laprade with a list of its witnesses and evidence. Because of the timing and a personal conflict, a member of the committee unsuccessfully sought a continuance. Although no complaint or petition had been filed, the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court issued an order stating that failure to present the list 10 days before the hearing date did not present good cause to extend the date. The committee refused to accept evidence on the first scheduled date. Ultimately the committee found that, due to procedural errors, the city had not proven its case. The superior court affirmed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated, based on procedural errorsView "City of Pawtucket v. Laprade" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and John, Alfred, and Anna Tillinghast (Defendants) executed a consent agreement regarding the actions Defendants would take to remedy alleged violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the establishment of five campsites in the Bowdish Lake Camping Area. When Defendants purportedly failed to comply with the consent agreement, the superior court appointed a master to resolve the issues in dispute. The master issued a report, and Defendants filed a motion asking the trial justice to approve the master’s report. After a hearing, the trial justice adopted the report and ordered that the master’s findings be implemented. Plaintiff, named in her official capacity as the director of the DEM, appealed. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the order confirming the master’s report was not final, the appeal was interlocutory and thus not properly before the Court. View "Coit v. Tillinghast" on Justia Law

Power Survey Company sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court contending that the Public Utilities Commission improperly interpreted and applied the Contact Voltage Statute when it approved the portion of the Narragansett Electric Company’s (NEC) contact voltage program providing for the issuance of a request for proposal for the purpose of choosing a vendor to provide the technology for the NEC’s contact voltage testing. The Supreme Court issued the writ. Respondents, the NEC and the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, moved to quash the writ on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court granted Respondents’ motions, holding that, under the facts of this case, Power Survey’s petition was untimely. View "In re Proceedings to Establish a Contact Voltage Detection & Repair Program" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully seeking reimbursement from the State Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, Plaintiffs, a school district and school department, filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the Commissioner and State Treasurer were required to reimburse them for the salary, fringe benefits, and travel expenses of the directors and guidance counselors in their vocational-technical programs. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and that the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiffs reimbursement was discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial. Plaintiffs subsequently sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a clear legal right to be reimbursed for certain costs associated with the operation of their career and technical centers. View "Chariho Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Gist" on Justia Law