Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The plaintiff, Walter L. Bronhard, doing business as Walter L. Bronhard Real Estate, filed a lawsuit against the Thayer Street District Management Authority (TSDMA). The dispute arose after TSDMA allegedly sent an email to one of Bronhard's employees regarding the illegal dumping of boxes in Fones Alley. Bronhard's counsel claimed that TSDMA had been operating without legal authority since 2009 because it failed to file the required continuation petition within the statutory deadline, thus automatically dissolving as per the District Management Authorities Act.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of TSDMA. The court found that although TSDMA did not file the continuation petition within the statutory deadline, the time constraint was directory rather than mandatory. The court applied the factors from West v. McDonald, determining that the statute did not contain a sanction for late filing, the time limitation was not the essence of the statute, and the deadline was directed at public officers. Consequently, the court concluded that TSDMA did not automatically dissolve and had been operating lawfully.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court agreed that the time constraint in the statute was directory and not mandatory. The court held that the essence of the statute was to ensure active DMAs serve their communities, and TSDMA had substantially complied with the statute's purpose. Therefore, TSDMA's failure to meet the filing deadline did not result in its automatic dissolution. View "Bronhard v. Thayer Street District Management Authority" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a plaintiff, Carol Allen, who slipped and fell on the steps of Newport City Hall during a winter storm, resulting in severe injuries. Allen alleged that the city and its employees were negligent in failing to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions. The case was heard in the Superior Court, where the trial justice ruled in favor of Allen, finding that the city and its employees had a duty to clear the steps of snow and ice, even during an ongoing storm, due to "unusual circumstances."The city and its employees appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. They argued that the trial justice erred in not applying the "Connecticut Rule," which states that a property owner's duty to clear snow and ice does not arise until a reasonable time after a storm has ended. The city argued that the storm was ongoing at the time of Allen's fall, and therefore, they did not owe her a duty to clear the steps.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with the city and its employees. The court found that the trial justice had erred in applying the "unusual circumstances" exception to the Connecticut Rule. The court clarified that "unusual circumstances" exist when a property owner's actions exacerbate the inherent risk of traveling during a storm, not when the owner fails to alleviate the danger. In this case, the city and its employees did not engage in any behavior that increased the risk to Allen. Therefore, the court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the city and its employees. View "Allen v. Sitrin" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Xavier T. Vidot, an inmate, filed a complaint against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) and its officials, alleging that they failed to provide inmates with a daily minimum of 8.5 hours outside their cells, in violation of RIDOC's internal policy and a state statute. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus, a declaration of violation, and a permanent injunction.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RIDOC's internal policies do not establish a private cause of action for inmates and that the application of these policies involves discretionary decisions. The plaintiff responded, asserting that the defendants had a ministerial legal duty to operate in accordance with RIDOC's policy and that the statute does not afford the defendants any discretion except that which is allowed by internal policies.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the policies governing these issues are internal and discretionary, as they are not codified in the statute. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that the statute outlining the duties of the director of the Department of Corrections clearly bestows upon the director a great deal of discretion in the exercise of his or her duties. The court also found that both the previous and amended versions of RIDOC's policy contemplate that RIDOC must exercise its discretion in "exigent circumstances," in the case of "emergencies," or in the event of "overriding conditions"—all for the purpose of maintaining a "safe and orderly operation of the facility." Therefore, the court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in denying relief in the form of a writ of mandamus and in granting the motion to dismiss. View "Vidot v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the denial of a disability pension application by a former state trooper, James Donnelly-Taylor. The defendants are the State of Rhode Island, Division of the State Police, and the Colonel of the State Police and Governor in their official capacities. The trooper had been involved in an incident where he assaulted an individual he had arrested. Following this incident, he reported experiencing personal and work-related stress and was placed on injured-on-duty status. Later, he was indicted on one count of simple assault. He pleaded nolo contendere to the assault charge and was ordered to perform community service. The trooper remained out of work and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. He applied for a disability pension, which was denied by the superintendent of the state police.The superintendent's decision was appealed to the Superior Court, which found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case back to the superintendent for further consideration. The superintendent issued a supplemental decision, maintaining the denial of the disability pension. The Superior Court again found the superintendent's decision to be arbitrary and capricious and reversed the denial, instructing the superintendent to grant the trooper's request for a disability pension.The State of Rhode Island appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, finding that the superintendent's denial of the disability pension was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court held that the superintendent had reasonable grounds to conclude that the trooper's assault of the individual was not in the course of performance of his duties as a state police officer, and therefore his disabling injuries were not suffered in the course of performance of his duties. The case was remanded back to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rhode Island Troopers Association v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Newport School Committee and the Cumberland School Committee (collectively, plaintiffs) and the Rhode Island Department of Education and the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education (collectively, defendants). The dispute arose when the plaintiffs refused to reimburse the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) at the "per-pupil special-education" rate for the cost of educating children who were placed in residential treatment programs by DCYF but were not receiving special-education services. The Family Court had placed two children in the temporary custody of DCYF and designated Newport and Cumberland as the residences of the children's custodial parents for the purpose of determining the municipalities' financial responsibility for the children's education.The Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education agreed with DCYF's argument that the municipalities were required to pay the per-pupil special-education rate according to the unambiguous language of the relevant statutes. The Commissioner issued two decisions ordering Newport and Cumberland to reimburse DCYF for the cost of educational services provided to the children at the special-education rate. After the Council on Elementary and Secondary Education denied the municipalities' independent appeals of the Commissioner's decisions, the municipalities appealed to the Superior Court. The trial justice consolidated the two cases and issued a written decision, determining that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute required the designated city or town to pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF rather than the higher, per-pupil special-education rate.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and found that there is nothing in the relevant statutes that expressly obligates a municipality to pay the per-pupil special-education rate when the child in question is not actually receiving special-education services. The court concluded that municipalities are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil special-education rate when there were no special education services rendered and thus, no special education costs incurred. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to resolve the remaining question of what reimbursement, if any, DCYF should receive for the educational cost of non-special-education students placed in residential treatment programs that include the delivery of educational services. View "Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education" on Justia Law

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This case involves four individuals, Joao Neves, Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro, who were convicted of various crimes in Rhode Island and were serving multiple sentences, including life sentences. The issue at hand is the interpretation of a Rhode Island statute, G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e), which was enacted in 2021 and provides that any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to their twenty-second birthday, other than a person serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole review after serving no fewer than twenty years' imprisonment.The state argued that the statute applies only to individuals serving a single sentence and does not require the aggregation of multiple sentences for parole eligibility. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the statute applies to "any offense," and thus requires the aggregation of multiple sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility.The trial justice agreed with the respondents and ordered that each respondent be immediately released on parole. The state appealed, arguing that the trial justice's interpretation of the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by modifying judicial sentences.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the statute mandates the aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility. The court also concluded that the statute, as interpreted, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the court found that the trial justice erred in ordering each respondent to be immediately released on parole, as the statute only provides a qualified offender the opportunity to appear before the parole board, not the right to be paroled. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments of the lower court, and remanded the cases to the parole board for further proceedings. View "Neves v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a plaintiff, Carol Allen, who slipped and fell on the steps of Newport City Hall while exiting the building after paying her property taxes. At the time of the incident, there was light to moderate snowfall, and the steps were covered with a slushy film. Allen suffered a severe head injury as a result of the fall, which led to multiple seizures and the loss of her ability to taste and smell. She filed a negligence lawsuit against the city and its employees, alleging they failed to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions.The Superior Court ruled in favor of Allen, finding that the city and its employees had a duty to clear the steps of snow and ice, even during an ongoing storm, due to the unusual circumstances of the case. The court found that the city's failure to apply ice melt and take other protective measures exacerbated the risks inherent in using the stairs during a storm. The court also found that Allen was 35 percent comparatively negligent for her fall.The city and its employees appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court, ruling that the city and its employees did not have a duty to clear the steps until a reasonable time after the storm had ended. The court found that the city's failure to take precautionary measures did not exacerbate the risks already inherent in traveling during a storm. Therefore, the court concluded that there were no unusual circumstances that triggered the city's duty prior to the end of the storm. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the city and its employees. View "Allen v. Sitrin" on Justia Law

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The City of Pawtucket petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to review a judgment in favor of the Rhode Island Department of Revenue (DOR) and other defendants. The case revolved around two properties owned by The Memorial Hospital, which were deemed ineligible for state aid under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) Act for fiscal years 2021 and 2022. The City argued that the hearing justice erred in upholding the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act, which stated that the properties were not eligible for PILOT funds.Previously, the Superior Court had ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the DOR's interpretation of the PILOT Act was not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported in the record, or an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the properties were not owned by a licensed hospital and were therefore ineligible for consideration under the PILOT statute. The City appealed this decision, arguing that the properties should be eligible for PILOT funds because they were still being used for medical care and treatment, even though they were not owned and licensed by the same entity.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the PILOT Act's definition of a "nonprofit hospital facility" required that the hospital-owner of the property also be the holder of a state-issued license. Since Memorial Hospital's license was deactivated in 2018, the properties were deemed ineligible for PILOT funds. The court concluded that the City's argument conflating tax-exempt status with PILOT fund eligibility was unpersuasive, and that the DOR's decision to deny the disbursement of PILOT funds for the properties was not erroneous. View "City of Pawtucket v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The case involves Fuller Mill Realty, LLC (Fuller Mill) and the Rhode Island Department of Revenue Division of Taxation (the Division). Fuller Mill was part of the Rhode Island Historic Preservation Tax Credits Program, administered by the Division. Fuller Mill entered into an agreement with the Division in 2016 for a project. In 2018, the Division notified Fuller Mill that it had forfeited its rights to any historic tax credits for its project due to inactivity. After administrative proceedings and providing supplemental documentation, Fuller Mill's tax credits were reinstated. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Division rescinded Fuller Mill's tax credits in 2020 for failing to complete the project by the agreed deadline. Fuller Mill requested an administrative hearing to challenge the rescission.The Division denied the request for a hearing, leading Fuller Mill to file an appeal in the District Court. The Division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Fuller Mill had waived its right to an administrative hearing and appeal in a stipulation of settlement and dismissal. The District Court denied the Division's motion to dismiss, leading the Division to file a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that the terms of the April 2021 stipulation were clear and unambiguous, stating that Fuller Mill had knowingly and voluntarily waived its right to an administrative hearing and to a District Court appeal. The court concluded that the hearing judge erred in denying the Division's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the District Court and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the case. View "Fuller Mill Realty, LLC v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law