Justia Rhode Island Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions in Family Court alleging that Respondent had abused and neglected his two minor children and sought to terminate Respondent’s parental rights to both children. After consolidating the neglect and termination petitions for trial, the family court granted DCYF’s petitions and terminated Respondent’s parental rights to his two children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not infringe Respondent’s due process rights when she rendered her decision to terminate Respondent’s parental rights immediately after she had appointed substitute counsel; and (2) the trial justice did not err by finding that DCYF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was unfit to parent his two minor children. View "In re Jake G." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, the family court issued a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to three of her children. Mother appealed, arguing that both R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7 and Supreme Court precedent with respect to the factors to be considered when addressing a petition for termination of parental rights violate her constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother’s parental rights as concerns her three children, holding that Mother’s contention on appeal had been waived, as Mother did not raise her constitutional argument before the family court. View "In re Shy C." on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jah-nell’s mother and father. After a trial, the trial justice concluded that Father’s parental rights to Jah-nell be terminated. Specifically, the justice found that Father was unfit because he had been unable to complete the objectives of his case plans, that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Jah-nell with Father, and that it was in Jah-nell’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the trial justice’s finding of parental unfitness and the trial justice’s finding that DCYF provided reasonable efforts at reunification and that, notwithstanding those efforts, there was not a reasonable probability that Jah-nell would be able to be reunified within a reasonable period of time. View "In re Jah-nell B." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to his son. After a trial held in 2014, the trial justice concluded that Father was unfit to parent his son. A final decree was subsequently entered terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence, in finding that DCYF had proven that Father was unfit to parent his son; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at reunification between Father and his son. View "In re Max M." on Justia Law

After the parties’ divorce was granted and a final judgment of divorce was entered, William filed two motions in the family court seeking clarification of the division of assets, specifically as to two businesses that he and Valerie had operated during their marriage. The family court justice entered an order clarifying the final judgment of divorce and awarding the businesses to William. The court then entered an order adjudging Valerie in contempt and ordering her to comply with the final judgment of divorce. Included in the order was an award of interest against Valerie. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the chief judge of the family court did not err in assigning the motion for clarification to the family court justice who had presided over the original divorce action; (2) the family court justice did not err in issuing a decision on William’s motion for clarification; and (3) Valerie pointed to no valid basis for disturbing the contempt finding. View "Bremer v. Bremer" on Justia Law

Respondent was indicted for inflicting numerous injuries on his five-week-old daughter, resulting in the infant’s death. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families subsequently petitioned to terminate Respondent’s parental rights to his other child, a one-year-old son. After a trial, the family court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Respondent was an unfit parent due to the cruel and abusive nature of his conduct towards his daughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice’s finding that Respondent caused his daughter’s injuries was reasonable, and termination of Respondent’s parental rights to his son logically followed. View "In re Kristopher J." on Justia Law

In 1996, the parties were granted a divorce. When the divorce became final, the parties’ jointly executed property settlement agreement, which, among other things, set forth the distribution of Defendant’s retirement benefits, was incorporated but not merged into the final judgment. In 2012, Plaintiff sought enforcement of the provision that set forth Defendant’s obligation to make payments to her from his pension. The family court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the family court as to the pension benefits and interest due Wife; but (2) remanded the issue of attorney’s fees, holding that because the hearing justice never calculated them, the issue must be remanded for the family court to address the basis for such an award and the calculation thereof. View "Maccarone v. Maccarone" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the parents of a minor child. The family court entered an order granting joint custody of the parties’ child to the parties, physical placement with Mother, and visitation in favor of Father. Mother later filed an expedited motion to suspend Father’s visitation and to grant her sole custody of the child, claiming that Father had previously visited the child without his parents’ supervision in direct contravention of a previous court order. The hearing justice found Father to be in willful and malicious contempt of the court’s prior order and modified Father’s visitation to provide that all visitation take place at the courthouse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in determining that modifying the visitation was in the child’s best interests. View "Pacheco v. Marulanda" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their two sons. The Family Court terminated the parents’ parental rights, but the Supreme Court vacated the decree. New case plans were subsequently developed for the parents, but when the parents showed no progress and continued their alcoholic lifestyle, the DCYF filed new petitions to terminate both parents’ rights. In 2013, the Family Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the parents’ appeals and affirmed the decree of the Family Court, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, competent proof to support the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their children. View "In re Steven D. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former wife of Defendant, filed a complaint seeking protection from abuse from Defendant. A magistrate of the family court entered a temporary order restraining and enjoining Defendant from contacting Plaintiff. The chief judge of the family court affirmed the magistrate’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s conduct was of the type that the General Assembly mandated could be the predicate for the issuance of a protective order; and (2) the magistrate did not exceed her authority in issuing a civil restraining order after determining that the restraining order was necessary to protect Plaintiff from Defendant’s harassment. View "Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh" on Justia Law